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A growing literature studies the causes and consequences of civil conflict. Several of these studies 
are of Nepal’s civil conflict that lasted for a decade from 1996. Coincident with this conflict was a 
surge in work-related emigration, affecting education and human capital investments, labour supply, 
and local economic activity. While a few prior studies look at the effects of Nepal’s conflict on 
emigration, many key features of the conflict are ignored. In particular, heterogeneity due to the 
highly localized nature of the conflict tends to be ignored by the type of data and research designs 
used in prior studies. In this thesis, I contribute to the literature on the causes and consequences of 
civil conflict by constructing and using very local indicators of driving forces and intensity of 
Nepal’s civil conflict.  
Contrary to prior literature that suggests there is more conflict in poorer regions, I find 
poverty is associated with less conflict risk and conflict intensity, partly due to a change in strategy 
by the rebels in Nepal to target richer middle class and urban areas to win the war. At the same 
time, inequality and caste-based polarisation at local levels were major contributors that escalated 
the civil conflict. In order to study conflict escalation and also to study the impact of conflict 
intensity on migration, I construct a database of conflict deaths, and of poverty, inequality and caste 
polarization for almost 4000 localities. In contrast, most previous research on Nepal relies on data 
aggregated to the district level, suppressing detail as there are only 75 districts and there was far 
more variation in conflict intensity within districts than between districts. Estimated impacts of 
conflict on emigration are substantially distorted by using district-level conflict data. 
The growth in emigration that sees over two million Nepalese working abroad has also 
given a great boost to remittances, which are now equivalent to about one-third of GDP. The effects 
of emigration and remittances on human capital investment – particularly child schooling and child 
labour – remain debated in the literature. I construct a two-wave panel at the locality level to study 
these issues, with careful attention paid to the endogeneity of emigration and to spatial spillover 
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effects. In localities with a greater increase in emigration, the net enrolment rate in secondary 
education rises and child labour for older children decreases. A possible channel for this effect is 
that migration and remittances help credit constrained households to cover extra schooling costs and 
compensate for the foregone earnings from child labour. In addition to finding an overall positive 
effect of emigration, I find that the direct (own) effect of emigration increases labour supply of the 
female labour force but decreases the labour supply in the agriculture sector. There are also positive 
spatial spillover effects for rural localities, that likely occur through rising local wage rates. 
Given these generally positive effects of emigration, the fact that local conflict intensity 
suppressed the growth in emigration suggests that there is a lasting negative effect of the civil 
conflict in particular parts of Nepal. These effects would not be apparent in the overly aggregated 
data on conflict that has been used to date. Thus, one contribution of this thesis is to show the 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Motivation and contribution of the study  
A growing literature studies the causes and consequences of civil war. The identification of the 
short- and long-term impacts of civil conflict is crucial to guide post conflict policy. More 
generally, understanding why conflict escalates and persists and what are the underlying 
mechanisms that prolong conflict are important to the design of adequate policies and institutions. 
Recently, Nepal’s civil conflict, which lasted for about ten years (1996-2006), has received 
attention in the literature, especially in terms of impacts on migration, human capital, women’s 
empowerment, local economic activities, and so on. The rise in civil conflict was accompanied by 
growth in work related international migration from Nepal. Specifically, the growth in emigration 
from Nepal is such that over two million Nepalese people are now working abroad. This rise in 
work related migration reduced poverty considerably. Yet, the issue of how emigration and 
remittances affect human capital and domestic labour supply are important policy concerns since 
the country is expected to have a 17% emigrant population by 2025 (Sijapati et al., 2015).  
In light of the existing state of knowledge, this thesis is intended to make several 
contributions to the literature. First, I aim to identify the role of poverty, inequality and caste 
polarisation in escalating civil conflict, and subsequently estimate the impact of civil conflict on 
international migration. Second, in contrast to previous literature, I develop conflict intensity 
measures and associated factors at the local level (third sub-national level or village) for almost 
4000 localities. Most previous research in Nepal has focussed on more aggregated units of just 75 
Districts. Third, I highlight key a aggregation issue in civil conflict related literature that may have 
distorted the estimated impact of civil war. Fourth, I explore the impacts of emigration on human 
capital and labour supply to highlight possible long term effects of civil conflict. More precisely, if 
civil conflict has an impact on emigration, which is a major income generating activity in Nepal, 
then long term impacts of conflict crucially depend on how emigration affects human capital, local 
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markets, and so on. Fifth, I examine spatial spillover effects of emigration and remittances on 
labour supply.        
In the last ten years, there has been a surge in literature exploring the causes of civil conflict 
and its consequences for migration, education, women’s empowerment and so on in Nepal. For 
example, major studies are conducted by Adhikari (2012), Bohara et al. (2006), Do and Iyer (2010), 
Murshed and Gates (2005), Nepal et al. (2011), Pivovarova and Swee (2015) and Shrestha (2017). 
Apart from Nepal et al. (2011), these prior studies have ignored a key feature of Nepal’s civil 
conflict, which is that it was very localised and heterogeneous. While conflict spread from west to 
east of the country over ten years, it was not evenly spread across the country and localities were 
not all affected to the same extent.   
The common problem with these studies is that they typically rely on spatially aggregated 
conflict data that are easily available at the district level (second subnational level) and ignore the 
local variation. In fact, there was far more variation in conflict intensity within districts than 
between districts. Nepal’s civil conflict was very localized, and almost 45% of localities (also 
known as Village Development Committees or VDCs and sometimes just villages) had no deaths 
recorded. In contrast, when data are aggregated to the district level just two of 75 districts (that is, 
3% of the total) had no conflict-related deaths. Thus, the spatially aggregated data make the conflict 
appear more widespread, and this may distort estimated impacts on migration, human capital and 
other outcomes of research interest. Over aggregation of conflict data is inappropriate if there is lot 
of heterogeneity in conflict at local level (Sambanis, 2002; Taydas & Peksen, 2012). In particular, 
this can create mean reverting measurement error that will distort the estimated impact of conflict. 
This bias matters because researchers need to correctly identify the local consequences of conflict in 
order to design appropriate post conflict policy. 
Similarly, when studies look at determinants of civil conflict, they often use survey 
estimates like poverty and inequality, which are traditionally available only at the first or second 
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sub-national level (such as province and district). However, the administrative level for which 
survey data are easily available is not necessarily the right aggregation level, especially in countries 
like Nepal with a lot of local heterogeneity (Cederman & Gleditsch, 2009). Studying civil conflict 
at overly-aggregated levels like the district level may distort our understanding of how conflict 
escalates and persists. This may be a major issue in conflict-related studies in other countries where 
researchers appear to have assumed that civil war is a fairly aggregated outcome and the factors that 
affect conflict are homogeneous across the country or across larger spatial units. Instead of 
designing an analysis based on the availability of aggregated poverty and inequality estimates, a 
better solution is to use modern small-area estimation techniques to get welfare estimates at the very 
local level to reflect local heterogeneity (Elbers et al., 2003).  
Another key trend that my research exploits is that Nepal has also witnessed a significant 
rise in work related migration along with the rise in civil conflict. Consequently, emigration for 
work emerged as a major source of livelihoods and subsequent inflows of remittances led to a 
significant reduction in national poverty. Yet, there are limits on our understanding of how 
emigration is translating into better child school performance and labour supply of non-migrants, 
both in Nepal and more generally (Davis & Brazil, 2016; McKenzie & Rapoport, 2011). Relatedly, 
there is also rising policy concern in Nepal regarding falling labour supply in agriculture and the 
manufacturing sector. Indeed, the manufacturing sector partly relies on labour coming from India, 
while agricultural households either have to rely on family exchange labour or leave the land barren 
due to the labour shortages.  
Previous studies in Nepal including Acharya & Leon-Gonzalez (2014), Shrestha (2017), and 
Karki Nepal (2016) and studies from elsewhere that explore the impact of emigration and conflict 
on human capital tend to focus on simple indicators, such as the school attendance rate. This is a 
relatively crude measure because most school-age children are in school and it doesn't capture the 
impact on quality of schooling. Indeed, in Nepal, most of the school-age children are in school and 
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it is over-age enrolment, slow progression, and grade repetition rather than non-attendance are the 
major problems. 
Similarly, while a rise in outflow of labour has increased household disposable income, it 
has reduced the supply of labour in the domestic labour market, either due to migrants leaving the 
country or non-migrant members withdrawing from the labour market. There are some studies like 
Lokshin et al. (2009), Phadera (2016), and Shrestha (2017) that explore the effect of emigration on 
the labour force participation (LFP) of non-migrants. Yet, these studies only explore the direct 
(own) impacts of emigration and ignore spatial spillovers where not only the sending locality but 
also neighbouring localities are affected if the labour markets are spatially interconnected. These 
spatial spillover effects may have important policy implications in a country like Nepal where 
villages are often closely linked.  
This thesis contributes to the peace and conflict literature by constructing indicators of 
conflict intensity and its driving forces like poverty and inequality at the local level (at the third 
sub-national level or village) for almost 4000 localities. I use modern small-area estimation 
techniques linking census data to surveys to derive precisely estimated welfare estimates for 3862 
localities. Likewise, I use census data to estimate wealth inequality, which is based on a household 
assets indicator (McKenzie, 2005), and caste (ethnic) polarization index for each of the 3862 
localities. To measure the impacts of emigration on child schooling and the labour supply of non-
migrants, I use a two-wave panel at locality level (for almost 500 sampling units) paying careful 
attention to the endogeneity of emigration and to spatial spillover effects. I use the predicted 
migration rate as an instrument variable to overcome endogeneity concerns. I develop age-specific 
schooling outcomes such as net enrolment rates and child labour indicators. Considering the 
important role of emigration and remittances in the local economy, I measure direct and spatial 
spillover effects on labour force participation rates. Specially, I develop a geographic proximity and 
road network based interconnectedness matrix to capture potential spillover effects.  
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1.2 Research Questions 
In light of the existing state of knowledge, this study aims to address the following research 
questions:  
i) What is the effect of poverty, inequality and caste polarisation on the escalation of civil 
conflict at local level in Nepal?  
ii) What is the impact of civil conflict on international migration from Nepal and does the answer 
to this question depends on how data on conflict are aggregated?  
iii) How does international migration and subsequent remittances affect child schooling and child 
labour?  
iv) How does international migration affect the labour supply of left behind members? Does 
international migration also have a spillover effect on interconnected localities?   
1.3 Escalation of civil conflict in Nepal 
Nepal's civil war, which erupted in 1996, was a direct outcome of failed development policies, 
regional inequality, social and economic injustice, rising poverty and inequality (urban and rural 
inequality, caste based inequality, elite and non-elite inequality) and continued domination by the 
ruling class. The armed movement of Maoists (a rebel group) aimed to transform the country from a 
constitutional monarchy to communist rule and establish the principle of equality. The demand for 
greater equality, women’s inheritance rights, an end to racial and caste-based discriminatory 
practices, and autonomy for local indigenous groups drew major support, especially from the 
relatively poor and underprivileged western regions of the country. At the beginning, the Maoist 
campaign to punish the perpetrators of caste- and gender-based discrimination and sexual abuse 
drew greater support from women, and the Dalit and Janjaties caste groups.1  
 
1 Janjaties are indigenous communities, they were landless and worked as slaves for the dominant castes for many 
years. Dalits are considered as untouchable and historically they were slaves and constitutionally not free to own 
physical assets.  
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Once the Maoists had gained popular support from rural and underrepresented communities, 
they began their political campaign by targeting police installations to confiscate supplies of 
weapons and ammunition. The lack of resistance from the police force in the western region meant 
that by 2001 the Maoists had quietly taken control of twenty major districts (of 75) (Libois, 2016; 
Pivovarova & Swee, 2015). Overall, in the first five years (1996-2000) of the civil war, conflict was 
low in intensity; less than 1700 people were killed and only around 500 villages (out of a total of 
3982 villages), mostly from western Nepal, had experienced some form of conflict. The Maoists 
began the war as a weak rebel group, and in the first five years, they consolidated their 
organisational and military capacities, and this enabled them subsequently to pose a considerable 
challenge to the government forces. 
Until 2000, only the police force was deployed to control these Maoist influences in the 
countryside. After the Royal Massacre in 2001, which occurred independent of the Maoist conflict, 
the conflict intensified and engulfed more than 55% (2280 out of 3982) of the localities in Nepal. 
The Maoists sensed an opportunity in the weakening political situation and falling public 
confidence in the government, especially because many people blamed the new king, Gyanendra, 
for the Royal Massacre. As the Maoists’ popularity extended in the west of the country, they 
strategized to gain control over the central and eastern part of the country and ultimately to capture 
the capital city, Kathmandu. They also realised that winning over the middle class was the only way 
to capture strategically important urban areas and cities, and was an important source of income, 
which would help win the war for them. This strategic shift is known as the “Prachanda Path''.  
The year 2001 was a major milestone in the history of the armed conflict, witnessing the 
extension and intensification of the conflict from both sides. The increase in conflict intensification 
was led by the government’s first state of emergency declaration and subsequent deployment of 
54,000 Royal Nepalese Army soldiers throughout the country in 2001 to back up the police force as 
a part of the Global War on Terror (Sharma, 2006). From the rebels’ side, initial weapon raids that 
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were limited to remote and abandoned posts in the countryside were transformed into more 
organised large- scale attacks on government strongholds and urban areas. The rise and spillover of 
armed conflict (from west to east) and ongoing political instability also destabilized the economy 
and increased unemployment, which further fuelled the intensity of the conflict. The civil conflict 
took a very ugly turn and many civilians and members of the middle class lost their lives in the 
crossfire.  
The Maoists progressively expanded their armed struggle across the country, eventually 
controlling 35 of the 75 districts (Pivovarova & Swee, 2015), and repeatedly challenged the 
Nepalese Army and police force. As a result, the conflict reached its peak in 2001-2004 before 
beginning to subside in 2005 and afterwards. In 2005, the Maoists called for a unilateral ceasefire to 
participate in peace talks with seven major political parties. Later in 2006, a popular uprising and 
demonstration by the Nepali people against the King brought the end of the Monarchy. A peace 
agreement signed with the political parties led to the end of the decade-long conflict.  
1.4 A brief history of migration from Nepal 
Nepal has been sending labourers to the Indian subcontinent as far back as the 19th century when 
Nepalese used to migrate to Lahore within Punjab. Therefore, those working abroad are often 
known as “lahures''. Over time, the migration to the Indian subcontinent rose substantially, and it 
was augmented by the territorial expansion of Nepal and the “Sagauli” Peace treaty with the British 
East India Company. Later, the 1950 open border treaty with India and free labour mobility 
between India and Nepal made India an attractive and low-cost destination for migrants. Nepalese 
men were mainly employed in the Indian army, Indian police force and other public sector jobs. 
Until 1980, India was the only destination for work related migration due to restricted international 
mobility and a low capacity to finance migration to other destinations. After 1981, Nepal witnessed 
a decline in the share of migrants working in India. This share declined to 77% in 2001 from a little 
over 90% in 1981 and further dropped to 38% in 2011 (CBS, 2001, 2011). Yet India is still a 
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primary destination for people from relatively poor regions, and seasonal migration to India from 
the far west and mid-west regions is still very high. The pre-existing migrant networks in major 
Indian cities that help with job search make this an attractive destination for the poor. 
Over the last two decades, foreign labour migration beyond India has become a major 
source of income for Nepalese households and the overall economy. The adoption of a free market 
economy and democracy in 1990 increased mobility and freedom of the labour force. After 1995, 
there was a remarkable increase in international migration due to the oil boom in the Gulf countries 
and economic growth in the ASEAN region. Migration for work to another dozen destinations, 
especially in the Middle East, is a new phenomenon in Nepal, which was facilitated by the Labour 
Act 1985. This act has allowed private recruiters to directly recruit Nepalese workers for foreign 
employment (Government of Nepal, 2014). This new opportunity to migrate to high-income 
destinations has become a boom for the Nepali workforce, especially from the central and eastern 
regions, because their close proximity to the capital city facilitates recruitment and they have 
greater access to finance to pay upfront migration-related costs. In 2002, two-thirds of people 
migrating abroad (other than to India) were employed in Gulf countries, which was a ten-fold 
increase from the 1997 figure. In the last decade, the outflow of migrants has extended from the 
Middle-East and North African countries to other Asian countries, such as Hong Kong and Korea. 
Between 2001 and 2011, there was a more than 200% increase in labour emigration, and if this 
trend continues, by 2025 Nepal is expected to have an oversees migrant population of 4.4 million 
(around 17% of the total population) (Sijapati et al., 2015).  
The rise in migration was followed by a surge in remittance inflow, which has become an 
important pillar of Nepal's national and household economy to finance imports and consumption. 
From a meagre USD 55 million in 1993, the remittance inflow increased to USD 147 million in 
2001. As a result of the continued outflow of the labour force after the decade-long civil conflict 
and political instability, the remittance inflow jumped to USD 3.3 billion in 2011 and USD 6.3 
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billion in 2017. With the increase in the size of remittances, their share and role in bringing stability 
to the national economy have also increased. In 2001, the contribution of remittances to GDP was 
only 2.4%, but this figure increased to 21.6% in 2010 and 31% in 2017. However, the actual size of 
remittances is likely much greater, given that the majority of migrants in India send remittances via 
informal channels, which are undocumented. The massive surge in remittance inflow has increased 
household disposable income, fuelled household consumption and led to a decline in the poverty 
rate, which fell from 42% in 1996 to 25% in 2010. 
1.5 Introduction to the data and sources  
In this thesis, I use the INSEC (Informal Sector Service Centre) database to measure the risk of and 
intensity of local conflict. INSEC is an independent NGO in Nepal and is the most reliable source, 
which closely monitored human rights violations during the civil war and collected and stored 
detailed information on approximately 15,000 conflict victims (Libois, 2016; Valente, 2016). While 
the database has detailed information about conflict victims, year of death, perpetrators, place of 
death, residence of the victim and so forth, it was stored as raw data and aggregated and published 
at the district level only. Earlier studies use this district level aggregated data that are easily 
available for all 75 districts of Nepal. As opposed to these studies, I use the raw data to identify the 
locality of victimisation for each of the almost 4000 VDCs in Nepal, successfully geocoding a little 
over 97% of the conflict cases. In my thesis, every death and every disappearance that was never 
relocated is counted as a death. 
The second way that I utilise much more finely grained local information is in terms of some 
of the drivers of conflict. Typically, survey estimates from national sample surveys are available at 
the first or second subnational level, and total observations are insufficient to yield welfare 
estimates for lower administrative levels. While other major studies for Nepal rely on national 
sample surveys for welfare estimates, typically available at the district or higher level, I link the 
Nepal Living Standard Survey (NLSS) 1996, a nationally representative dataset, with Census 2001 
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extract data to get welfare estimates for all these census households.2 I use these household welfare 
estimates to derive poverty estimates for almost 4000 localities. Additionally, I also use extract data 
with a approximately one-in-seven subset of the tenth and eleventh national population and housing 
censuses in 2001 and 2011. Both censuses provide information about age, education, literacy, 
international migrants, and household assets for each observation. Previous studies mostly rely on 
consumption to measure inequality among households, instead, I use a household assets indicator 
(as a wealth inequality measure) from census 2001 given that assets are a long term indicator of 
household wealth. Using the 2001 and 2011 censuses, I derive emigration rates, literacy, working-
age population indicators and so on at the locality level. Similarly, local level information on village 
level forest cover and elevation is extracted from Goodman et al. (2019). I use night time light 
satellite observation data (from the Defence Meteorological Satellite Program) to measure local 
economic activity.  
A further innovation of my research in that while previous studies in Nepal rely on cross-
sectional data to estimate the impacts of emigration, I use the 2008 Nepal Labour Force Survey 
(NLFS II) and 2010 Nepal Living Standard Survey (NLSS III) 2010 data to construct a two-wave 
panel. These two surveys have the same sampling frame so I can develop a two-period panel of 
almost 500 primary sampling units that are common to the both surveys (CBS, 2010). With this 
dataset, I am able to examine impacts of migration that should not be affected by time-invariant 
unobservables. Additionally, one of the major contributions of this thesis is that I identify GPS 
coordinates of these 500 local units (using Google maps and Municipality and Village maps) and 
use national road network data from the World Food Programme (WFP) to measure spatial spillover 
effects. This is a type of impact that is ignored so far in previous studies.      
 
2 CBS provides access to census extract data only which has unit record data for around 11% of the national population 
for census 2000 and 15% for census 2010.  
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1.6 Main Results 
In this sub-national level study, I find that the wealthier villages in Nepal experienced more conflict 
because the rebels targeted the middle class to gain resources and as an entry point into strategically 
important cities or urban areas. While poverty may be a cause of civil war at the national level, the 
same relationship need not exist at the local level because rebels target specific areas that align with 
their strategic interests. In contrast to poverty, conflict is likely to occur and persist in those areas 
that have high relative inequality. This result supports the fact that people weigh relative wellbeing 
more heavily than absolute wellbeing, and inequality plays a major role in creating social tension 
and breaking harmony. Similarly, localities with greater polarisation in terms of caste had higher 
risk of conflict as the minority group in these localities harbours grievances and seeks vengeance.  
The effect of civil conflict on migration is negative, and it primarily reduces the emigration 
to high-income destinations because conflict affected the incomes of the residents and their 
financing capacity. Conflict can also interfere with travel to Kathmandu city that was needed for 
recruitment and visa processing (in contrast to emigration to India that proceeds informally). 
Consequently, the conflict-affected localities experienced lower growth in emigration and so may 
still suffer from after effect as these localities are likely to have less access to remittances. To 
estimate the distortion that may have been caused by over aggregation of conflict data, I also 
compare district vs village level aggregation of conflict. I find that district-level aggregation tends 
to overstate the impact of conflict, by up to four-fold. While measurement error usually attenuates 
econometrics estimates, for mean-reverting error that results from over-aggregation, exaggeration of 
impacts is possible. Thus, using more aggregated conflict data, such as district-level death rates, 
may bias microeconomic effects of the war.  
Moreover, I also find that migration increases the net enrolment in secondary education, and 
this positive effect on human capital occurs through reduced child labour. Migration helps 
households to overcome liquidity constraints, which lessens the need for children to be in the labour 
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market, and increases education outcomes. Similarly, the direct effect of emigration is increasing 
labour force participation, but this positive effect is limited to the female labour force. Emigration is 
also associated with a fall in labour force participation in the agriculture sector as farm work is less 
preferred in remittance receiving households. Additionally, the spillover effect of emigration on 
labour supply is positive and its magnitude is as large as the direct effect, but this type of spillover 
is limited to the rural localities. The positive effect of emigration on labour supply occurs through 
the rise in local wage rates and in local economic activities that create an incentive to participate in 
the labour market. 
1.7 Organisation of the thesis  
This thesis contains six chapters. In the introduction (Chapter One), I present the motivation for this 
research and briefly discuss the major literature gaps, the data used and the major findings. Chapters 
Two to Five are the major body of this thesis. In the next two chapters, I discuss the determinants of 
civil conflict and the effect of conflict on international migration. Chapter three also presents an 
analysis of the aggregation issue in conflict data that may have affected previous research. In these 
chapters, I use disaggregated conflict data at the village level and explore the causes and 
consequences of civil conflict. Chapters Four and Five examine the effect of migration on child 
schooling, child labour and labour supply of non-migrants. In Chapter Four, I discuss the 
instrumental variables strategy and show how age-specific enrolment rates could better capture the 
effect of emigration compared to the traditionally used school attendance rate. Chapter Five focuses 
on the effects of migration on labour supply, and explores direct and spatial spillover effects that 
may have important policy implications. Chapter Six presents the conclusions and implications for 
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Chapter Two: Escalation of civil war in Nepal- The role of poverty, 
inequality and caste polarisation 
 
Hari Sharma & John Gibson  
Abstract 
A growing literature examines effects of poverty, inequality and polarisation on civil war. Few 
studies examine effects at very local levels despite considerable spatial heterogeneity in many civil 
wars. We study Nepal's civil war, which escalated sharply from 2001, using geo-coded data on 
15,000 conflict deaths. We also use small-area estimation to form poverty and inequality estimates 
for almost 4000 localities. Contrary to prior findings, it appears that higher local poverty rates 
reduced the risk of conflict and the number of deaths. This negative association is explained by the 
shift in strategy by the rebels, to target richer middle class and urban areas so as to access resources 
as a way to win the war. We also find that local relative wealth inequality is associated with 
escalation of the civil conflict, suggesting that relative wellbeing affects decisions about rebellion 
and conflict. Caste polarisation also raises odds of conflict and the number of deaths, especially 
where the dominant caste groups were larger. In a society where individual identity and alliances 
are defined by a discriminatory and unequal caste system, the probability of conflict is likely to be 
higher.  
Keywords: Civil war, inequality, polarisation, poverty, small-area estimation, Nepal 










Civil war is detrimental to development of a country. Understanding why conflict escalates and the 
propagation mechanisms that prolong conflict are important concerns for designing policies and 
institutions that can further the peaceful coexistence of people. Many studies explore causes of civil 
war at nation level (Sambanis, 2002; Taydas & Peksen, 2012), thus treating it as an outcome whose 
driving factors are homogeneous within a country. Yet civil war rarely spreads over the entire state 
and is often locally concentrated. Drivers of conflict are also usually not homogeneous across the 
state (Cederman & Gleditsch, 2009). The “Naxal” movement in India and conflict in Mindanao are 
typical examples of these localised conflicts (Eastin, 2018; Gomes, 2015; Hoelscher et al., 2012; 
Khanna & Zimmermann, 2017). A particular concern is that studying civil conflict at overly-
aggregated levels may distort understanding of how conflict escalates and persists (Cederman & 
Gleditsch, 2009).  
 In this paper we use disaggregated administrative data on civil war deaths for almost 4000 
localities in Nepal. We also use small-area estimation techniques to link survey and census data in 
order to construct welfare indicators for each of these localities. We use these data to explore the 
effects of poverty, inequality and caste polarisation on the escalation of Nepal’s civil conflict 
between 2001 and 2005. We believe there is much to gain from such granular-level study when 
conflict and its determinants are spatially heterogeneous. 
Nepal’s civil war that ran from 1996 to 2006 is typical of such heterogeneous conflict. It 
was low intensity and localized for five years (1996-2000), with conflict-related deaths in fewer 
than 500 localities (of 3982 nationally; localities are also known as VDCs or Village Development 
Committees, and used to be called panchayats). Of 15,000 conflict-related deaths or disappearances 
from 1996 to 2006, fewer than 15% happened in the first five years (Figure 1). In 2001, the rebels 
changed their strategy and (unrelatedly) King Birendra and his family were murdered by the crown 
prince who then committed suicide. The new king mobilised the Nepalese Army throughout the 
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country in 2001 to support the police force as part of the ‘Global War on Terror’ (Sharma, 2006a). 
After that, the conflict spread to almost 60% of localities, and 85% of all conflict-related deaths 
occurred from 2001 to 2005 (Joshi & Pyakurel, 2015). Yet even with this escalation the conflict was 
unevenly experienced; out of about 2300 localities with conflict deaths from 2001-2005, only 661 
(261) had five (ten) or more deaths. The conflict was heterogeneous, with not all localities (which 
we will also term ‘villages’ at some points) affected to the same extent.      




























An important issue for researchers studying heterogeneous conflicts is the appropriate level 
of spatial aggregation. If raw data on conflict deaths can be geo-coded, researchers can aggregate to 
any level. Survey estimates used in conflict models, such as for inequality and poverty, were 
traditionally available only at the first or second sub-national level (such as provinces and districts) 
but modern small-area estimation techniques linking census data to surveys give welfare estimates 
at the very local, village level (Elbers et al., 2003). Therefore, the administrative level for which 
data are easily available matters less now for choosing the right aggregation level (Cederman & 
Gleditsch, 2009). The prior studies of Nepal’s civil war mostly use district level data. Sharma & 
Gibson (2019) note this may not be desirable as death rates varied far more within districts than 
between districts. Moreover, a district covers 2000 km2, on average, which is 55-times larger than 
the average locality, so a lot of fine detail may be lost in district data. Poverty and related 
characteristics such as caste and the local environment also can vary significantly within districts 
(Central Bureau of Statistics, 1996). Likewise, spatial factors such as forest cover and elevation are 
heterogeneous within districts, and these factors may make some localities more vulnerable to 
conflict than others (Braithwaite, 2006, 2010). For these reasons we model the escalation of Nepal’s 
civil war at the locality level, using both cross-sectional and panel analyses for almost 4000 
localities. 
In contrast, prior studies of causes and effects of the civil conflict in Nepal mostly use 
district-level data. Do & Iyer (2010) explored effects of district-level poverty on the conflict. 
Related studies examine effects of horizontal inequality, relative deprivation, polarisation, civic 
participation and social capital (Bohara et al., 2006; Deraniyagala, 2005; Murshed & Gates, 2005; 
and Sharma, 2006b). Holtermann (2016) considers the relative capacity of rebels to escalate 
conflict. The data used in these studies is district level or even more aggregated. In terms of 
consequences of the conflict, Adhikari (2012), Pivovarova & Swee (2015), De Juan & Pierskalla 
(2016), and Shrestha (2017) examine effects on internal displacement, on schooling, on political 
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trust and on emigration. While outcome measures in these studies are often at a more disaggregated 
level, such as from household survey data, the conflict rates are calculated at the district level and 
so smooth over much of the heterogeneity in the conflict. 
Perhaps the closest study to ours is Nepal et al. (2011), who use data for 3860 villages to 
examine effects of inequality and poverty on conflict intensity. There are three concerns about this 
study. Like us, they use data from the Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), a NGO that 
monitored human rights violations by both government and Maoist forces, whose data are 
considered the most reliable source on the conflict (Joshi and Pyakurel, 2015). Yet Nepal et al. 
(2011) only geo-coded 2623 deaths between 1996 and 2003, which is just 28% of the total conflict 
deaths recorded by INSEC in that period. In contrast, we geo-coded 97% of the 15,021 deaths 
covered in the full decade-long INSEC dataset. If the missed deaths are not random, the findings 
from Nepal et al. (2011) may be distorted. Second, their data end in 2003 so over 4000 conflict-
related deaths in 2004 and 2005 are ignored by their analysis. Finally, their research design is purely 
cross-sectional (as are other studies on Nepal also), and so cannot inform about the conflict 
escalation that occurred from 2001 onwards. 
We find a negative effect of local poverty rates on the risk of conflict and the number of 
deaths. The poverty rates are for each locality, from small-area estimates linking detailed welfare 
indicators from the National Living Standards Survey to spatial coverage of the 2001 National 
Population Census. Other studies for Nepal, like Do & Iyer (2010), Sharma (2006a), and Hatlebakk 
(2010) find district-level poverty rates are positively related to conflict but this may be from overly-
aggregated data disguising patterns seen at more local levels. Our results are consistent with what is 
proposed by Boulding (1962) and found (for Liberia) by Hegre et al. (2009), that rebel groups 
protect zones of influence and take conflict to the government strongholds as the rebels get stronger. 
In Nepal the Maoist rebels made a major strategic shift in 2001, to target urban areas and the middle 
class, so as to access resources and to garner greater support as a way to win the war. More 
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generally, our results support the agnostic view that, notwithstanding the fact that internal conflict is 
more likely in poor countries (Theisen, 2008, Braithwaite et al., 2016),  poverty is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for the escalation of internal conflict (Tollefsen, 2017; 
Verwimp et al., 2019). 
As opposed to patterns for poverty, greater relative inequality was a major cause of conflict 
escalation. This finding may support the idea that people weigh relative wellbeing more highly than 
absolute wellbeing, so worsening inequality can heighten social tension and provoke violence 
(Koubi & Böhmelt, 2014). It also seems that polarisation by caste mattered to the escalation of the 
conflict. The struggle by Dalits (‘untouchables’) against “dominant classes” (the Brahmin/Chhetri, 
Thakuries and Newars castes) during the civil war is largely unnoticed in the empirical literature on 
causes of the conflict. Yet Dalit activists were active even before the civil war and later joined with 
Maoists to oppose caste-based discrimination (Bownas, 2015). To understand the effect of caste 
dynamics in Nepal we developed a caste-based polarisation index which goes well beyond the 
previous polarisation measures used by Nepal et al. (2011). More generally, our results suggest that 
a polarised society with a “dominant caste” is prone to conflict when a minority discriminated-
against group gets some support from rebels. Our results also illustrate that when individual identity 
and alliances are defined by a discriminatory caste system, as in Nepal, conflict is likely to occur.  
Overall, the data, method and range of covariates in this paper go well beyond prior papers 
relating to Nepal. While other studies use cross-sectional analysis, we use time and spatial fixed 
effects to account for heterogeneity over time and space. We model conflict and conflict intensity in 
two ways; whether a death(s) occurred in a locality in a given year (using a logit model), and how 
many deaths per locality each year (using a negative binomial model). The rest of the paper is as 
follows: section 2.2 provides background on Nepal’s civil war, and the data collection and empirical 
strategy are discussed in section 2.3. The findings are reported in section 2.4 and the conclusions 
are presented in section 2.5.  
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2.2 Nepal’s civil conflict (1996-2006) 
In the lead-up to the civil war, 1990 was an important milestone in the social and political 
transformation of modern Nepal, with steps to restore democracy, and increase political freedom, 
social mobility and economic advancement. Yet, the transition to democracy was marked by 
corruption and weak institutions, and increased power of traditional elite dominant groups. Social 
and economic transformations gave greater freedom to middle class and “dominant caste” 
populations but marginalized, indigenous and socially excluded communities were side-lined from 
this improvement.3 In fact, political participation and access to employment, healthcare and 
education for these communities failed to take off. Thus, while the national poverty rate was 42% in 
1996 (CBS, 1996), it was far higher in the marginalized far-west and mid-west regions, at 58% and 
62%, and also much higher for Dalit communities and for the class known as Janjaties.4 Elite 
capture of the centre and rising poverty in rural areas created grievances and resentment towards the 
state. 
In 1996, the Communist Party of Nepal (CPM-Maoist) formally declared war against the 
state so as to replace the constitutional monarchy with rules enforcing equality (Gobyn, 2009). The 
Maoist movement benefitted from the resentments created by rising social and political inequality 
and by poverty, and caste and ethnic discrimination so it drew major support from poor regions like 
the far west and mid-western regions. The opportunity cost of conflict is lower in poor regions, and 
it is relatively easier to recruit poor people who may harbour greater resentment against the 
government and thus be more likely to join a rebel group. The rebels also benefitted from 
remoteness and the presence of dense forest and mountains, which favoured guerrilla war tactics. In 
the early stages of the conflict, rebel activity concentrated mainly in the poorest and most 
 
3 Dominant castes are Brahmin, Chhetri (including Thakuries) and Newars who traditionally received favour from the 
King and state, and are regarded as higher class.   
4 Janjaties are indigenous communities that are battling to restore their cultural, linguistic, religious and land ownership 
rights. They were landless and worked as slaves for the dominant castes for many years. Dalits are considered as 
untouchable and historically they were slaves and constitutionally not free to own physical assets. Although caste-based 
discrimination is criminalised in the constitution of Nepal it is still practised, including in the capital city Kathmandu. 
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underdeveloped regions of the mid-west and far-western parts of Nepal (Figure 2.2). Indeed, until 
2000, conflict was largely limited to western Nepal, with only 493 villages having conflict-related 
deaths and 1693 people killed. 




Source: INSEC, Nepal. 
In 2001, it became clear to the rebels that a struggle against the state that was limited to poor 
and remote regions was unlikely to succeed. Instead, they needed to capture urban areas and gain 





cities as a way to win the war (Gobyn, 2009). Rapid expansion of Maoist cadres and increased 
activities in new areas also precipitated this need to form a new war strategy. The second national 
Maoist convention in February 2001 adopted a new approach and decided to wage large-scale war 
to win over the middle class and gain access to urban areas (Davis et al., 2012; Gates & Miklian, 
2010; Gobyn, 2009; Nayak, 2007). This strategic shift is also known as the “Prachanda Path” 
(Ogura, 2008). This reformulation of the Maoist war strategy aimed to destabilise the central power 
of the state, instigate revolt within the security forces, and garner support of mainstream political 
forces such as civil society and the urban population in order to win the war (Nayak, 2007).  
Not long after this change in strategy by the rebels, the unexpected Royal Massacre in June 
2001 (a murder-suicide) contributed to an escalation of the civil war. The new King, Gyanendra 
Shah initiated the formation of an armed police force and mobilisation of the army to control the 
rising Maoist insurgency (Davis et al., 2012). The deployment of armed police and the Royal 
Nepalese army to restrict the rising Maoist influence contributed to an escalation in the civil conflict 
(Nayak, 2007).  
The spread in conflict from 2001 is shown in Figure 2.3, with almost 60% of localities 
(specifically, 2280 out of 3982) experiencing conflict-related deaths between 2001 and 2005. Thus, 
2001 is seen as a major milestone in the history of Nepal’s armed conflict, with a rapid spread out 
from rural western regions to begin challenging the government in the urban areas and cities in the 
richer central and eastern parts of the country (Holtermann, 2016; Nayak, 2007). Yet even with this 
spread there was a lot of heterogeneity in conflict intensity, as most conflict-affected localities had 
fewer than 15 deaths over this five year period (three per year, on average) with more localized 









Source: INSEC, Nepal. 
At least some of this heterogeneity in deaths was due to the hit-and-run war tactics of the 
rebels, that killed many civilians and led to increasing human rights abuse from both sides (Nayak, 
2007). The escalation of armed conflict also destabilized the economy and increased 
unemployment, which further fuelled the intensity of the conflict as rebels gained popularity and 
support from the unemployed. The extent of escalation is shown by the fact that the Maoist rebels 





Nepalese Army and police force. From this greater position of strength, the rebels called for a 
ceasefire in 2005 to enable their participation in peace talks with seven major political parties. 
These peace talks marked the beginning of a new chapter in Nepal’s politics as the popular uprising 
and demonstrations by the Nepali population against the King in 2006 brought an end to both the 
civil conflict and the Monarchy. The peace agreement formally ended a decade-long civil war that 
cost over 15,000 lives.  
2.3 Data and Empirical Methods 
Our conflict data are from INSEC, an NGO who maintained a database of over 15,000 conflict-
related deaths during the civil war period of 1996 to 2006. The INSEC database has detailed 
information about type of victim (civilians, rebels, military), the perpetrators, place and date of 
death, place of residence and victim age. We used this database to geocode the place where each 
victim was killed. For 97% of victims we could link to the locality (among all the 3982 VDCs in 
Nepal). In addition to deaths, we count disappearances that were never relocated as deaths. Thus, 
we have a comprehensive measure of the changing location of the civil war conflict in Nepal that 
eclipses previous geo-coding efforts (e.g. Nepal et al. 2011). 
 The shift in the rebels’ strategy from early 2001 and the militarization after the Royal 
Massacre in June 2001 created a sharp change in the extent and location of the conflict. This is seen 
in the comparison of Figures 2.2 and 2.3 and in the far greater number of conflict-affected villages 
and conflict deaths from 2001 onwards seen in Figure 2.1. Given this dramatic shift, we argue that 
conflict from 2001 was substantially different to what had occurred in the five years prior, and 
indeed was a shift that changed the structure of Nepal’s politics. Thus, our models focus on this new 
phase of conflict, by considering the changing risk of a locality being conflict-affected and the 
changing number of conflict deaths in each year from 2001 to 2005. We allow an impact from the 
past by using conflict data from 1996 to 2000 as one of several explanatory factors for the location 
and intensity of conflict in the 2001-05 period. 
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Our other sources of data include an extract from the tenth national population and housing 
census in 2001. Microdata are provided for what is roughly a one-in-ten sample on age, education, 
literacy, international migration, household assets and so on (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2001), 
and we use these data to construct control variables. Our forest cover and elevation data are 
locality-level averages from AidData (Goodman et al., 2019). Night time lights, from satellite 
observation, are used to measure local economic activity (Gibson et al., 2020). The variables of 
main interest are poverty rates, a caste-based polarisation index, and inequality (overall, in terms of 
assets, and also looking at relative inequality amongst the poor), all measured at the local level. The 
computation of these variables is discussed in the following sub-sections.  
2.3.1 Survey to census imputation of small area poverty 
Poverty and inequality may be important drivers of conflict escalation. The maps in Figures 2.2 and 
2.3 highlight the heterogeneous nature of the conflict, and suggest the need for local measures of 
poverty. Previous conflict-related research on Nepal uses district level poverty estimates, from the 
1996 Nepal Living Standards Survey (NLSS). However, this survey has limited spatial coverage 
because the sample of just over 3300 households is from only 275 localities, less than seven percent 
of the total. So using these data directly makes researchers choose either to focus on a small subset 
of localities or to use poverty rates calculated at a spatially aggregated level that may disguise much 
of the heterogeneity. Also, the NLSS sample is designed to be representative at the ecological zone 
level (five zones) and not at the district level where the sample is too small (often just 12 or 24 
households drawn from one or two villages in a district). 
While the NLSS is spatially limited, the 2001 census extract covers over 0.5 million 
households and represents every locality. The drawback of the census is that it lacks information on 
consumption and so cannot be directly used to calculate poverty. However, the small-area-
estimation (SAE) method of Elbers, Lanjouw and Lanjouw (2003) [hereafter, ELL] combines the 
spatial coverage of the census with the topical detail of the living standards survey to let us 
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calculate poverty rates for every locality. Consider the following linear model of per capita 
consumption:  
𝑌𝑐ℎ = 𝛽𝑋𝑐ℎ + 𝑢𝑐ℎ                                                                                  (2.1) 
for household ℎ living in cluster 𝑐. The vector of predictor variables 𝑋𝑐ℎ is restricted to those that 
have comparable distributions across the census and survey. A key feature of the ELL method is 
attention to the spatial characteristics of the disturbance term 𝑢𝑐ℎ which has two independent 
components:  
𝑢𝑐ℎ =   ɳ𝑐  +  𝑒𝑐ℎ                                                                               (2.2) 
where ɳ𝑐 is the cluster effect and 𝑒𝑐ℎ is a household-specific random error term. The cluster effect 
captures the unobserved similarities in consumption for households surveyed in the same locality, 
which if unaccounted for would lead to distorted measures of uncertainty when the predicted 
consumption for each census household is used to calculate local poverty rates. The ELL method 
involves estimating a “beta model” of consumption and an “alpha model” of the household-specific 
random error (details are reported in Appendix A.2.1 and A.2.2). 
In the simulation stage, the estimated parameters from the alpha and beta models are applied 
to the 𝑋𝑐ℎ characteristics of each household in the census. For each simulation, a set of 𝛽 and ?̃? are 
drawn, and the simulated value of the cluster specific variance  ?̃?ɳ
2  is obtained and used to calculate 
the household-specific variance ?̃?𝑐ℎ
2  for each census household. Then ɳ̃𝑐 and  ?̃?𝑐ℎ are drawn from 
the corresponding distribution and the consumption for each census household ?̃?𝑐ℎ is then imputed 
as:  
?̃?𝑐ℎ = 𝑋𝑐ℎ𝛽𝐺𝐿𝑆 + ɳ̃𝑐  + ?̃?𝑐ℎ                                                                                  (2.3) 
By repeating the simulation 200 times we create a new set of coefficients and disturbance terms 
each time. The mean value of all 200 simulated consumption values is calculated for each census 
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household and is used to calculate locality-level poverty rates, while the standard deviation for the 
200 simulations provides an estimate of the standard error. Generally, ELL estimates at locality 
level have similar precision to that of survey estimates at district level. 
The average poverty rate from the ELL simulations is 35.0%. This is midway between 
survey estimates of 41.8% in 1996 and 30.8% in 2004 (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2004). Our 
estimate matches these, as it relates to 2001 (we use census data from that year); a linear decline in 
poverty between 1996 and 2004 would give a rate of 35% for 2001. Of note is that the poverty rate 
varies greatly over space, with a lot of within-district heterogeneity. Figure 2.4 shows this 
heterogeneity, contrasting the mean poverty rate in the district with the lowest and highest rates. For 
instance, Dhading district in central Nepal has a mean poverty rate of 31.8 % with a lowest poverty 
rate of 21.3% and a highest rate of 54.0%. This variation in poverty rates is seen in all regions. The 
fact that some localities may be more vulnerable to conflict than others, due to differences in their 
poverty rates, would be obscured if the more aggregated poverty rates, such as from the district 














Figure 2.4: Spatial variation in poverty rate in all 75 districts of Nepal 
 
Source: Authors calculation from Small Area Estimation 
2.3.2 Household Assets indictor for inequality:  
Inequality indexes are often used in empirical models of conflict (Koubi & Böhmelt, 2014). Prior 
studies for Nepal use the Gini index (e.g., Nepal et al., 2011) but we go beyond this by using two 
indexes. The first measures relative inequality amongst the poor, using their squared proportionate 
shortfall from the poverty line. The second index uses census data for 20 household assets. Assets 
are good long-run indicators of household wealth, and are easier for survey respondents to report 
(McKenzie, 2005). We use the first principal component score 𝑌 for household 𝑖 given the assets 
vector 𝑋, which is the linear combination of:  
𝑌𝑖 =  𝑎1 (
𝑥1− ?̅?1
𝑠1
) +  𝑎2 (
𝑥2− ?̅?2
𝑠2
) + ⋯ + 𝑎𝑘 (
𝑥𝑘− ?̅?𝑘
𝑠𝑘
)                        (2.4) 
for 𝑎 = (𝑎1, 𝑎2 … … 𝑎𝑘) coefficients, and ?̅?𝑘 and 𝑠𝑘 means and standard deviations of ownership 
rates for the kth asset. The first principal component score provides the maximum discrimination as 
assets that vary most across households get the largest weighting.  
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Given that 𝑌𝑖 can take negative values (as the mean is zero across all households), we cannot 
use measures of inequality like the Gini coefficient that are only defined for positive values. 
Instead, our measure of relative inequality for locality 𝑙 is estimated as: 
𝐼𝑁𝑙 =  
𝜎𝑙
√𝜆
                                                                           (2.5) 
which is the ratio of the standard deviation of the first principal component score 𝜎𝑙 to the 
eigenvalue 𝜆, which is also the variance of 𝑌𝑖 across all households in the sample. In other words, if 
𝐼𝑁𝑙 is greater than one then locality 𝑙 has more inequality in the asset index than is apparent for the 
whole population, and vice versa (McKenzie, 2005).  
2.3.3 Ethnic polarisation index  
Polarisation is a term used to define the relative strength of two or more groups in society (Esteban 
& Ray 1994; Wolfson 1994). Reynal-Queroal (2002) formed a polarisation index related to conflict 
and Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2005) specifically consider effects of ethnic polarisation on civil 
wars. Other studies also note the impact of racial, religious and language diversity on civil war 
(Denny & Walter, 2014; Esteban et al., 2012). Yet the caste-based diversity prevalent in South Asia 
receives little attention despite caste discrimination being a major cause of the rise of the Maoist 
movement in India (Gomes, 2015). The caste system is also dominant in Nepal with so-called 
“lower castes”, especially Dalits and Janjaties, discriminated against. For example, Dalits comprise 
80% of the ultra-poor of Nepal and are subjected to bonded labour, slavery, trafficking and other 
forms of extreme exploitation. Goyal et al. (2005) note that during the civil war, the army and the 
police force regularly punished Dalits without any evidence of their involvement with the Maoists, 
and often carried out sexual and physical abuse against women from this community. 
To capture effects of local caste polarisation we formed a Reynal-Querol (RQ) index:  
𝑅𝑄 = 1 −  ∑ [







                                                  (2.6) 
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where 𝜋𝑖 is the share of each caste group (for N groups) in a locality. The RQ index captures 
distance of a group from a (1/2,0,…..0,1/2) bipolar distribution. For example, a locality with two 
individuals has distance zero if both belong to the same group, and is otherwise one. To construct 
an RQ index we identify six different groups, following the caste classification of Nepal’s 2006 
DHS survey (Bennett et al., 2008). Those of Brahmin, Chhetri and Newars caste are one group, and 
are considered the dominant group. Dalits are one group. The Janjaties from the hills ecological 
zone are one group and from the terai (lowlands) are another. The Dalits and Janjaties groups are 
considered the dominated group. We put other castes from the terai ecological zone into one group, 
and all other remaining castes that do not belong to any of the above classifications into one group. 
Our polarisation index is motivated by the fact that conflict is more likely to occur if a large 
minority group faces a large majority group. Therefore, the RQ Index is able to capture conflict 
effects when there are two major contesting groups in a society (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005). 
2.3.4 Econometric Model 
We have data for all 3982 localities in Nepal for the 2001 to 2005 period. We develop two 
dependent variables: to explain the probability of conflict we use a binary measure of whether a 
locality had any conflict deaths in a given year and to explain the intensity of conflict we use a 
count variable of the total number of deaths in the locality in each year. Our econometric 
specification to investigate the correlates of conflict is as follows:   
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡 =   𝑋𝑖𝛽𝑛 +  𝑉𝑖𝑏𝑛 +  𝑀𝑖𝑡𝜃𝑛 +  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡96−00 +  𝛼𝑧 +  𝛿𝑡 +   𝑒𝑖𝑡             (2.7) 
The binary conflict outcome and intensity of conflict are denoted by 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑡. We use 𝑋𝑖 to 
represent variables of interest, such as the poverty rate5, inequality and polarisation, which are 
 
5 A concern with interpreting results for equation 2.7 is the independence assumption embedded in equation 2.1. The 
small area estimate of poverty could be the outcome of conflict rather than a cause. For example, conflict may affect 
local economic activities if people in a conflict affected locality are reluctant to go out for work, and then the error term 
in equation 2.1 may correlate with the right-hand side variable, so beta (β) is no longer an estimator of causal effects. 
There are two main reasons why this is unlikely and why the independence assumption should hold. First, one of the 
benefits of survey to census imputation in this setting is that the imputed poverty rates are due to chronic poverty. The 
census attributes (like assets, age, gender, education and so on) used in the imputation do not fluctuate much in the short 
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measured at one point in time. The time-invariant control variables are denoted by 𝑉𝑖, while time-
variant controls are denoted by 𝑀𝑖𝑡. The coefficient vectors to estimate are 𝛽, 𝜃  and 𝑏, while 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is 
an error term that we initially treat as independent and identically distributed (iid) across panels and 
time with variance (𝜎2). We later use a spatial autoregressive model as a robustness check, relaxing 
these error assumptions. We also use time fixed effects for each year and 15 zonal (or 75 district) 
fixed effects for variation over space, denoted by 𝛿𝑡 and 𝛼𝑧 . We use a logistic regression model for 
the binary conflict outcome, and a negative binomial regression model for the count data to deal 
with the over-dispersion in conflict deaths.  
Control variables: 
When measuring effects on conflict of our main variables, it is important to control for confounders 
that may correlate with variables of interest and outcomes. Previous studies, such as Ware (2005) 
and Miller & Ritter (2014), highlight emigration as both a cause and an effect of conflict. For 
example, remittances may finance rebel activities or alternatively may reduce grievances if they 
serve as additional income in the absence of state support (Regan & Frank, 2014). Emigration may 
have a direct effect by allowing an outlet for young people (who may otherwise be recruited by 
rebels). To control for demographic and human capital effects, we include the share of the working 
age population (aged 15 to 59) and the share of those people with at least basic education ( 8 years 
of school). Rebels may more easily recruit in less educated areas if people feel future prospects are 
limited. Our migration, working age and education control variables are measured from the 2001 
Census. 
The risk of conflict often increases with distance from the capital city as the state may 
particularly fortify their headquarters. Another spatial effect is that rebels often concentrate near 
 
run and so this approach is unlikely to capture any transitory increase in poverty that is caused by conflict. Second, 
while Nepal’s civil conflict lasted for ten years it started to escalate only after 2001. Specifically, after the Royal 
massacre, the new King Gyanendra mobilised the Nepalese Army in November 2001 and civil conflict escalated after 
this. In contrast, the poverty estimates from census 2001 are unlikely to be affected by conflict because census 
fieldwork was conducted in July 2001 while before the Army was mobilised. 
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international borders (Buhaug et al., 2009; Cederman et al., 2009). To control for these effects, we 
include distance to the capital city (Kathmandu) and to the Indian border (which has free movement 
unlike Nepal’s other borders) calculated using ArcGIS software. 
Some studies highlight the role of geographic attributes like forest cover and elevation in 
influencing conflict (Buhaug et al., 2009; Cederman et al., 2009). In guerrilla war, rebels may 
shelter in forests and high elevation areas, that are strongholds for them, to plan timely attacks on 
government forces. Considering this, we include forest cover and elevation in our model. In Nepal, 
villages located in very high elevations have only small populations and so may have experienced 
less conflict. We include a mountainous region dummy variable for localities above 2800 metres 
elevation. Urbanization, industrialization and socioeconomic development also influence conflict 
but data on these factors at subnational level are sparse so we use locality-level satellite-detected 
night time light data as a proxy, as lights provide a reasonable measure of local economic activity 
(Henderson et al., 2012). 
Nepal’s conflict took a sudden turn in 2001, moving well beyond the original areas but there 
was no ceasefire in these areas, which still had conflict. So following Bleaney and Dimico (2011), 
we use an indicator for whether there was any conflict in the locality in 1996 to 2000 as a control 
variable. Any drivers of this prior conflict, including poverty, are thus controlled for by inclusion of 
this control variable and so our specification implicitly gets at the change in the risk of conflict, 
controlling for baseline characteristics (including spatial fixed effects at region or district level). 
With our main variables of interest measured in 2001, reverse causation from the escalated conflict 
in the 2001-2005 period can also be ruled out. 
2.4 Results and discussion 
The definitions and summary statistics for all variables are reported in Table 2.1. Our main results 
are reported in Table 2.2, using six models – three for the risk of conflict (logit models) and three 
for the number of deaths (negative binomial models). The models differ by type of fixed effects (for 
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15 regional zones or for 75 districts) and whether the caste polarisation rate is interacted with the 
local population share of the dominant caste groups. Two further tables are presented after the main 
results, to show the robustness of the main findings to replacing the panel specification with either 
cross-sectional models or with spatial spillover models.  
 
Effects of poverty and inequality 
Poverty is often considered as a major driver of conflict, as poor people may harbour grievances 
against the state and may have less to lose from involvement with rebels. Yet it is unclear whether 
relationships that seem to  hold in aggregate data also hold at the very local level (Tollefsen, 2017). 
At least for Nepal, conflict seems higher in localities with a lower poverty rate, contrary to what 
prior studies based on district level data have suggested. Using the results in column 1 of Table 2.2, 
where unobserved factors are controlled for at the zonal level, for every ten percentage point 
 Table 2.1: Variable definitions and descriptive statistics (N=3982)  
  Mean Std Dev Min  Max 
Conflict affected locality during 2001-2005 (0/1)  0.573 .495 0 1 
Number of conflict victims from 2001 to 2005 3.049 9.07 0 186 
Locality affected by prior conflict, 1996-2000 (0/1) 0.123 .329 0 1 
Prior conflict, 1996-2000 (Number of victims) 0.425 1.945 0 37 
Poverty head count rate (percentage) 35.02 11.91 14.6 90 
Inequality amongst the poor (squared gap, percentage) 0.485 0.54 0.2 6.34 
Inequality index (asset-based, first principal component) 0.37 0.178 0.012 1.18 
Caste polarisation (RQ Index) 0.723 0.194 0 1 
Share of locality who are from dominant caste (percentage) 32.86 27.32 0 100 
Emigration rate, 2001 census (per 1000 population) 38.77 45.11 0 631.8 
Share of forest cover relative to land cover (percentage) 40.11 32.16 0 100 
Mean elevation (metres) 1096.5 970.4 64.3 5429.2 
Mountainous village (=1, otherwise zero) 0.057 0.231 0 1 
ln night lights DN annual value (economic activity proxy) 0.507 1.01 0 5.35 
Share of working age population (ratio) 0.52 0.05 0.11 0.76 
Working aged population schooled grade  8 (ratio) 0.41 0.157 0 1 
Distance to Capital city (Kathmandu) (kilometres) 220.05 147.8 1 599.1 
Distance to Indian border (kilometres) 48.9 36.5 0.001 195.1 
Source: Author’s calculation from NLSS-1996, Census 2001 and INSEC and other sources documented in text.  
Note: Whether conflict-affected, number of victims, share of forest cover and local urban activity are time-varying, with averages over T=5 
shown, other variables are measured in a pre-conflict year (2001 or earlier).        
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increase in the locality poverty rate (just under a one standard deviation change) within same Zone, 
the risk of conflict would decrease by 4.2 percentage points (the effect is statistically significant at 
the p < 0.01 level). In terms of the expected number of conflict deaths, the results in column 2 
suggest there would be 0.2 fewer deaths per locality with a ten percentage point higher poverty rate 
within same Zone. These results suggest that during the escalation of the conflict, wealthier areas 
had more risk than did poorer areas, as their families and assets were the direct targets of some of 
the violence6.  
 
6 To overcome endogeneity concerns about equation 2.1, the 2001 conflict period was dropped from the model as a 
robustness test. After restricting the conflict period studied to 2002 to 2005, the impacts of poverty appear to be similar 
to what is reported in the main results, and so the conclusions continue to hold. 
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  Table 2.2: Estimated effects on conflict probability and conflict intensity using logit and negative binomial models 
  Zonal fixed effect    District fixed effect   Interaction model 
  Conflict Deaths   Conflict Deaths   Conflict Deaths 
Polarisation Index (RQ Index) 0.0565 0.4910   0.0436 0.3387   0.0488 0.1112 
  (2.544)** (4.098)*** (1.982)** (2.797)*** (0.210) (0.631) 
Poverty rate -0.0042 -0.0214   -0.0015 -0.0082   -0.0335 -0.0251 
  (7.307)*** (7.149)*** (1.759)* (1.905)*   (7.638)*** (8.016)*** 
Inequality amongst the poor 0.0233 0.1860   0.0111 0.0960   0.1596 0.1805 
  (1.929)* (2.846)*** (0.971) (1.470)   (1.760)* (2.674)*** 
Overall inequality (asset index) 0.2925 1.4383 0.2706 1.2903  2.2058 1.5902 
 (11.655)*** (11.452)*** (10.816)*** (10.17)***  (11.506)*** (12.406)*** 
% of Dominant caste             -0.0104 -0.0090 
              (3.267)*** (3.712)*** 
% Dominant caste  RQ Index              0.0125 0.0123 
              (2.553)** (3.346)*** 
Emigration rate -0.0010 -0.0056   -0.0007 -0.0040   -0.0079 -0.0065 
  (8.379)*** (7.893)*** (4.858)*** (4.739)*** (8.352)*** (8.939)*** 
% of forest cover 0.0009 0.0054   0.0007 0.0046   0.0065 0.0060 
  (4.379)*** (5.229)*** (3.530)*** (4.292)*** (4.370)*** (5.740)*** 
ln (Mean elevation) -0.0007 -0.0194   0.0150 0.0658   0.0019 -0.0339 
  (0.080) (0.409)   (1.054) (0.877)   (0.029) (0.692) 
Mountain (=1, zero otherwise) -0.0963 -0.4815   -0.1052 -0.5236   -0.7690 -0.5018 
  (4.053)*** (3.865)*** (4.551)*** (4.045)*** (4.255)*** (3.938)*** 
ln (urban activity (night lights)) -0.0015 0.0271   0.0055 0.0605   -0.0064 0.0208 
  (0.329) (1.172)   (1.134) (2.517)**   (0.180) (0.884) 
% of working age (15-59) 0.0000 -0.0216   0.0940 0.5665   -0.0098 -0.2524 
  (0.001) (0.050)   (1.752)* (1.710)*   (0.017) (0.550) 
Working age schooled grade  8 -0.0010 -0.0058   0.0001 0.0008   -0.0065 -0.0053 
  (3.631)*** (3.602)*** (0.311) (0.428)   (2.910)*** (3.118)*** 
Distance to capital city 0.0216 0.0283   -0.0572 -0.4472   0.1690 0.0260 
  (1.377) (0.363)   (2.028)** (3.397)*** (1.420) (0.325) 
Distance from Indian border    -0.0000 -0.0002   0.0005 0.0026   0.0004 0.0005 
  (0.003) (0.114)   (1.090) (1.108)   (0.200) (0.316) 
Prior conflict (1996-2000) 0.1273 0.6325   0.1112 0.5716   0.9753 0.2129 
  (11.162)*** (10.803)*** (9.158)*** (9.481)*** (11.212)*** (6.145)*** 
Zonal Fixed effect  Yes Yes   No No   Yes Yes 
District Fixed effect No No  Yes Yes  No No 
Time Fixed effect  Yes Yes    Yes Yes    Yes Yes  
Wald test 1161.95 1547.42   1431.19 2021.46   1168.43 1452.31 
F-test (Chi-squared)    469.70 582.38  356.75 480.48    
Observations 19910 19910   19765 19910   19910 19910 
Notes: Conflict is a binary outcome if a locality experienced conflict in a particular year, and deaths is the total number of conflict deaths each year in a 
locality. The cell values for the conflict columns are marginal effects (dy/dx) at mean estimated from a logit model. Cell values for the deaths columns are 
from a negative binomial regression model. The estimates for the binary conflict outcome in the interaction model are odds ratios. The Wald test is testing 
the joint significance of all explanatory variables in the model. The F-test performs the joint significance test for explanatory variables other than the 
fixed effects for time, for districts, and for zones. For the conflict regression, the t-statistics in () are derived from cluster-robust (for 3982 villages) 
standard errors; ***, **, * denote 1%, 5%, 10% statistically significance.   
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These results are consistent with the concept of support and target value proposed by 
Boulding (1962).7 Rebel groups first protect their primary zone of influence and then take the 
conflict to the government’s stronghold areas, which has strategic importance to the rebels in terms 
of what they need in order to win the war (Hegre et al., 2009). At the beginning of the civil conflict 
in Nepal (1996-2000), the Maoist armed movement was restricted to the poor and underdeveloped 
region of the country, where they have gained the people’s support and strengthened their rebel 
forces. After transforming into a formidable fighting force (year 2000 onwards), the Maoists shifted 
the war strategy and targeted areas in order to win middle class support, both as a source of 
resources and as a gateway to the cities or urban areas (Gobyn, 2009; Holtermann, 2016). The 
Maoists realised that their traditional way of struggle was unlikely to win a war if they lacked 
middle-class support (Nayak, 2007).  
Our two indicators of local inequality – overall asset inequality and relative inequality 
amongst the poor – are positively associated with risk of conflict and the intensity of the conflict. 
For instance, a standard deviation increase in the inequality index in same zone based on household 
assets would raise the risk of conflict by about six percentage points, and the expected number of 
deaths by about 0.3 per locality per year. These effects are precisely measured, regardless of 
whether unobserved factors are controlled for with fixed effects at the zonal level or the district 
level. The effects are smaller for relative inequality amongst the poor, with a standard deviation 
increase associated with about 0.1 more deaths per locality per year and this effect becomes 
imprecise if district fixed effects are used. Nevertheless, the fact that conflict was, overall, less 
likely in poor areas but that greater inequality, overall and amongst the poor, saw more conflict 
suggests that relative position in a (local) society may matter – if some people judge that they are in 
 
7 In the context of civil war in Nepal, ‘support level’ relates to the condition in which a rebel group gained the support 
of the population in the form of financial contributions, army recruits, and the provision of places to hide. In contrast the 
‘target level’ refers to places and actions that had strategic importance to the rebel group, such as winning the support of 
the middle class, strategic locations for war, and sources of finance. 
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a lower position than others, even amongst the poor, it may lead to a sense of unfairness that plays a 
role in heightening social tensions.  
Although we lack data on land ownership there is likely to be a link between the inequality 
measures, conflict, and patterns of land ownership. At about the time the conflict escalated, almost 
one-half (44%) of households were marginal landowners who owned less than 0.5 ha of land 
(Deraniyagala, 2005; Macours, 2010). Therefore, the Maoists' demand for greater land equality, 
where they confiscated lands from landlords and redistributed to the poor who had little or no land, 
was an important source of their popularity and helped them to gathered support, at the expense of 
support for the government.  
Effect of caste polarisation 
In localities with greater polarisation in terms of caste, there was more risk of conflict and greater 
intensity of conflict. According to the results in column 2 of Table 2.2, a standard deviation increase 
in local caste polarisation within same zone would increase the expected number of conflict deaths 
by 0.1 per locality per year. Although effects of caste are rarely examined our result is consistent 
with other findings that diversity based on race, identity, ethnicity, and linguistics plays a key role 
in escalating civil war (Bosker & de Ree, 2014; Cederman et al., 2009; Nepal et al., 2011; Janus & 
Riera-Crichton, 2015). In Nepalese society, identity of an individual and alliances they form are 
defined by the pre-existing caste system, which is still prevalent in almost every part of the country.  
To further explore effects of caste-based polarisation and the influence of dominant castes 
(Brahmin, Chhetri and Newars), we interact these two variables, with the results in the last two 
columns of Table 2.2. The larger the share of the dominant group (the ones doing the caste-based 
discriminatory practices) and the greater the polarisation, the higher the odds of conflict and the 
intensity of conflict. This result is consistent with the idea that discriminatory practices carried out 
by the dominant caste against minority groups contributed to the escalation of conflict. If 
membership growth for the Maoists and increased Maoist rebel activities were partly due to the 
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exclusionary, caste-based discriminatory practices against Dalits and Janjaties it suggests that the 
rebels benefitted from local grievances in polarised villages. In particular, the rebels may have 
gathered support from the two dominated groups to make common-cause in their fight against the 
caste-based discriminatory practices. 
The coefficient on the emigration rate is worth discussing here. In table 2.2, the effect of 
emigration (a control variable) is very large, in that it suggests that a one standard deviation 
increase in the emigration rate within the same zone reduces the conflict risk by 9 percent and the 
conflict intensity by 0.03 deaths. The outflow of the labour force to foreign employment reduces the 
risk of conflict for two major reasons. First, emigration reduces the number of people that can 
otherwise be recruited by rebels and mobilised to fight against the state. Second, the subsequent 
inflow of remittances serves as additional household income and helps to reduce grievances against 
the state. Therefore, households that have emigrants are less likely to participate in conflict or 
support rebels’ activities.  
Robustness check   
We use two different approaches to check whether our main findings are robust. The first is to 
recast the model as cross-sectional, by collapsing the annual variation from 2001 to 2005. In other 
words, our first dependent variable is redefined as a dummy for whether a locality had any conflict 
deaths from 2001 to 2005, and the second dependent variable is the total number of those deaths. 
For time-varying controls (forest cover and night lights) we use the average of their values from 
2001 to 2005. In Table 2.3, Model 1 presents the results where the polarisation index, the poverty 
rate and the inequality indicators are all directly included, and in Model 2 the polarisation index is 
interacted with the dominant caste population share. 
 The main finding that the risk of conflict and the number of conflict deaths is lower in 
localities with a higher poverty rate persists when the temporal variation has been suppressed. For 
example, a locality with a ten percentage point higher poverty rate (slightly less than one standard 
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deviation) within same zone would expect 0.3 fewer deaths (one-tenth of the mean number) than an 
otherwise similar locality. A higher degree of caste polarisation for a locality is associated with that 
locality having more conflict deaths, and when this is interacted with the local share of the 
population who are from the dominant caste, it appears that it is especially the more polarised 
localities where the dominant caste had a larger share of the population that had more conflict 
deaths. The two types of inequality that we measure are both associated with a greater number of 
conflict deaths, while the overall inequality in terms of the asset index is also associated with 
greater risk of conflict. The main patterns amongst the control variables also persist; conflict is 
more likely and more intense in forested areas and in places that had prior conflict, and is more 
likely but not more intense in localities further from Kathmandu. Conversely, the risk of, and 
intensity of, conflict was lower in localities that had higher prior emigration, in high mountain 
areas, and in more educated areas. 
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Table 2.3: Cross-sectional analyses of effects of poverty, inequality and polarisation on conflict  
 Model 1  Model 2 
  Conflict  Deaths   Conflict  Deaths 
Polarisation Index ( RQ Index) 0.0310 0.5697   -0.0627 0.2634 
  (0.630) (3.460)***   (0.228) (1.086) 
Poverty rate -0.0062 -0.0320   -0.0253 -0.0340 
  (4.657)*** (6.684)*** (4.497)*** (7.096)*** 
Inequality amongst the poor 0.0161 0.2856   0.0662 0.2620 
  (0.635) (2.403)**   (0.632) (2.180)** 
Overall inequality (asset index) 0.4993 2.2332  2.0427 2.2192 
 (8.065)*** (9.020)***  (7.974)*** (9.060)*** 
% of Dominant caste       -0.0023 -0.0099 
        (0.587) (3.068)*** 
% Dominant caste  RQ Index       0.0055 0.0109 
        (0.915) (2.143)** 
Emigration rate -0.0021 -0.0077   -0.0089 -0.0077 
  (7.241)*** (6.806)*** (7.282)*** (6.706)*** 
% of forest cover 0.0015 0.0058   0.0063 0.0057 
  (3.413)*** (3.488)*** (3.395)*** (3.472)*** 
ln (Mean elevation) -0.0120 0.0742   -0.0594 0.0881 
  (0.588) (0.980)   (0.692) (1.155) 
Mountain (=1, zero otherwise) -0.2301 -0.7514   -0.9306 -0.7968 
  (4.302)*** (3.904)*** (4.167)*** (4.109)*** 
ln (urban activity (night lights)) -0.0175 0.0102   -0.0724 0.0150 
  (1.587) (0.224)   (1.586) (0.332) 
% of working age (15-59) -0.3715 -0.2963   -1.5726 -0.2666 
  (1.623) (0.350)   (1.642) (0.319) 
Working age schooled grade  8 -0.0013 -0.0061   -0.0055 -0.0046 
  (1.919)* (2.552)**   (1.951)* (1.877)* 
Distance to capital city 0.0737 -0.2368   0.3017 -0.2306 
  (2.284)** (1.234)   (2.271)** (1.201) 
Distance from Indian border    0.0007 -0.0006   0.0024 0.0000 
  (1.083) (0.255)   (0.897) (0.001) 
Prior conflict (1996-2000) 0.2534 0.3694   1.0457 0.3766 
  (7.641)*** (4.803)*** (7.568)*** (4.698)*** 
Zonal FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Pseudo-R2 0.0863 0.0536   0.0865 0.0543 
Notes: Conflict is a binary outcome if a locality had any conflict deaths from 2001 to 2005, and deaths is the total number of conflict deaths 
from 2001 to 2005. N=3982. Other notes, see Table 2.     
Our second sensitivity analysis relaxes an assumption that is inherent when using typical 
regression approaches, that the conflict events in one locality are independent in space from events 
in other (neighbouring) localities. The diffusion aspect of conflict over space and time, either at 
national or local level, receives little attention (Schutte & Weidmann, 2011). There are a range of 
spatial spillover models available (LeSage & Pace, 2009; Fischer & Getis, 2009) but they are only 
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rarely used to study conflict (Anselin & O’Loughlin, 1992; Ayana et al., 2016). If spillovers are 
ignored it may lead to estimation bias, and also to incorrect inferences if errors are wrongly treated 
as independent. These issues likely matter to the escalation of conflict in Nepal because there was 
considerable clustering in the conflict deaths, with a statistically significant global Moran statistic 
(I= 159.6) for the relationship between deaths in a locality and deaths in neighbouring localities. 
To allow for spatial spillovers we use a spatial autoregressive model (SAR), where the 
spatial lag of the dependent variable (the average in neighbouring localities) is included as an 
additional regressor.8 This lag structure allows for spatial spillovers because if a change in covariate 
X causes a local change in the outcome, that may affect outcomes of neighbours; in turn, the change 
in the outcome for the neighbours affects the outcomes of their neighbours, including the original 
area. For both the risk of conflict and conflict intensity (which is measured as number of deaths per 
thousand of population), the coefficient on the spatially lagged dependent variable is 0.26 and is 
statistically significant at the p<0.01 level. Thus there is strong evidence of spatial spillovers in 
conflict. 
With spillover and feedback effects, the impact of a change in a covariate in locality i on 
outcomes in locality j may differ for each i-j combination. These various impacts can be 
decomposed into direct and indirect components, following LeSage and Pace (2009): 
• Direct effect: the effect of a change in a covariate in locality i on the dependent variable in 
locality i, averaged over all 3982 localities 
• Total effect: the effect of the same change in the covariate in all localities on the dependent 
variable in locality i, averaged over all localities 
• Indirect effect: the difference between the total effect and direct effect.9 
Table 2.4 presents the result for this decomposition, which shows similar patterns to the main 
 
8 Due to the simultaneity, this model is estimated with generalized spatial two-stage least squares (GS2SLS), using the 
estimator developed by Drukker et al. (2013). If we include a spatial lag of the error term this variable is statistically 
insignificant (p < 0.22) and other coefficients are similar to those that contribute to Table 2.4.  
9 An intuitive discussion and example of these direct, indirect and total effects is provided in Gibson (2019).   
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results in Table 2.2. In particular, poverty still has a negative effect on the risk of conflict and the 
intensity of the conflict while local inequality (of assets) has positive effects on conflict, especially 
though the direct channel. While caste polarisation is still associated with a greater risk of conflict, 
it has a weakly negative effect on conflict intensity (deaths), in contrast to the results that did not 
allow for spillovers. Another change from the earlier results is that the inequality amongst the poor 
has no impact on conflict intensity, but still makes the risk of conflict higher. The patterns of 
impacts from the control variables are largely as they were from the models that did not account for 
spillovers. The results in Table 2.4 suggest most of our findings are robust to using a more general 
spatial model and so our conclusion about the conflict escalating into non-poor areas from 2001 
onwards continues to hold.      
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 Table 2.4: The estimated direct, indirect and total impacts from Spatial Autoregressive models (SAR)   
  Conflict (Probabilities)    Conflict death rate 
Impacts (dy/dx) Direct Indirect Total    Direct Indirect Total  
Polarisation Index 0.0369 0.0095 0.0464   -0.0489 -0.0126 -0.0615 
  (1.82)* (1.81)* (1.82)*   (1.75)* (1.74)* (1.75)* 
Poverty rate -0.0037 -0.0001 -0.0047   -0.0031 -0.0008 -0.0039 
  (6.65)*** (6.33)*** (6.67)***   (4.09)*** (3.97)*** (4.09)*** 
Inequality amongst the poor 0.0231 0.0060 0.0291   -0.0016 -0.0004 -0.0021 
  (2.13)** (2.12)** (2.13)***   (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Overall inequality (asset index) 0.3159 0.0816 0.3975   0.1588 0.0410 0.1998 
  (13.15)*** (10.29)*** (13.01)***   (4.79)*** (4.58)*** (4.78)*** 
Emigration rate -0.0008 -0.0002 -0.001   -0.0008 -0.0002 -0.001 
  (7.4)*** (6.91)*** (7.42)***   (5.00)*** (4.80)*** (5.00)*** 
% of forest cover 0.0005 0.0001 0.0006   0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
  (2.79)*** (2.78)*** (2.79)***   (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
ln (Mean elevation) 0.0051 0.0013 0.0064   0.0245 0.0063 0.0308 
  (0.62) (0.61) (0.62)   (2.15)** (2.13)** (2.15)** 
Mountain (=1, zero otherwise) -0.0715 -0.0185 -0.0900   -0.0924 -0.0238 -0.1162 
  (3.51)*** (3.44)*** (3.51)***   (3.29)*** (3.23)*** (3.29)*** 
ln (urban activity (night lights)) -0.0033 -0.0009 -0.0042   -0.0206 -0.0053 -0.0259 
  (0.80) (0.80) (0.80)   (3.52)*** (3.44)*** (3.52)*** 
Share of working age (15-59) 0.0684 0.0177 0.086   0.1081 0.0279 0.1360 
  (1.39) (1.39) (1.39)   (1.60) (1.59) (1.60) 
Working age schooled grade  8 -0.0008 -0.0002 -0.001   -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0005 
  (2.89)*** (2.87)*** (2.90)***   (1.18) (1.18) (1.18) 
Distance to capital city 0.0312 0.0081 0.0393   0.0396 0.0102 0.0498 
  (2.40)** (2.37)** (2.39)**   (2.21)** (2.19)** (2.21)** 
Distance from Indian border    -0.0001 0.000 -0.0001   0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 
  (0.36) (0.36) (0.36)   (0.24) (0.24) (0.24) 
Prior conflict (1996-2000) 0.1392 0.0359 0.1751   0.1457 0.0376 0.1834 
  (11.89)*** (9.83)*** (11.85)***   (9.06)*** (7.95)*** (9.03)*** 
Pseudo-R2  0.1028        0.0435     
Notes: Direct, indirect and total impacts are calculated following LeSage & Pace (2009), with the coefficient estimates they are derived from 
available from the authors. The Spatial Autoregressive Model (SAR) uses a first order contiguity weight matrix. Zonal and Time fixed effects are 





This study has investigated escalation of civil conflict at the local level. A sizable literature 
examines effects of poverty, inequality, and polarisation on civil war, yet little attention is paid to 
how these relationships hold at local levels. For Nepal, we consider that locality-level indicators of 
conflict and the driving forces of conflict are more appropriate than indicators at the more 
aggregated district level that has been the focus of most previous studies because the conflict (and 
some of its correlates) was spatially heterogeneous. Indeed, there was more than three times as 
much variation in conflict death rates within districts than between districts (Sharma & Gibson, 
2019) so district-level data may disguise key patterns. 
 In order to construct our locality-level database, we geocoded 97% of conflict-related 
deaths, eclipsing prior efforts such as Nepal et al. (2011) that geo-coded just 28% of deaths. We 
also use small-area estimation methods to combine the spatial coverage of a census with the topical 
coverage of a living standards survey, to form poverty and inequality indicators for almost 4000 
localities. We also use an extract from the census to calculate a polarisation index based on caste, 
which is very important in South Asia. With this database that goes far beyond what prior studies 
for Nepal have used, we estimate panel, cross-sectional and spatial spillover models of the 
likelihood of a locality being affected by conflict and the intensity of the conflict, in terms of the 
number of deaths. 
We find across all of our models that poverty was negatively associated with conflict. The 
fact that the conflict escalated in localities with lower poverty rates is consistent with the shift in the 
Maoist war tactics in 2001, known as the “Prachanda Path”, to target richer areas so as to gain 
resources, destabilise the central power of the state, instigate revolt within the security forces, and 
garner support of mainstream political forces such as the urban middle class. This shift is also 
consistent with the concept of support and target value proposed by Boulding (1962); rebel groups 
protect zones of influence and take conflict to the government strongholds as the rebels get stronger. 
Our major finding also suggests that care is needed in interpreting results of prior studies like Do 
46 
 
and Iyer (2010) that found a positive association between poverty and conflict; spatial aggregation 
may have contributed to this result. 
While conflict escalation was less likely in poor areas, it was more likely in unequal and 
caste-polarised areas. These results point to the possible role of an unequal local society breeding a 
sense of unfairness that plays a role in heightening social tension and provoking violence. Such 
factors may especially matter where individual identities and the alliances they form are affected by 
the pre-existing caste system which was highly discriminatory to some groups. That conflict-related 
deaths were higher in polarised localities where dominant caste members were a larger share of the 
population may also suggest that the common-cause that the rebels sought with dominanted groups 
like the Dalits may have conditioned patterns of conflict, as suppressed groups harbour grievances 
and want vengeance. Both hostility and antagonism were an outcome of the discriminatory practices 
of the dominant group. With a better understanding of the important role of local inequality and 
caste polarisation in raising the probability of conflict and the intensity of that conflict, it may be 
possible to design better institutions that can help further the peaceful coexistence of people.  
2.6 Reflection on this chapter  
As discussed in section 3, one of the major concerns with the evidence reported here is that 
poverty may be the outcome of civil war so the coefficient on the imputed poverty rate may be 
biased. The treatment effects reported in this chapter are estimated in a different way from the 
treatment effects reported in chapter 4 and 5 in the sense that formal modelling of endogeneity is 
not considered here. In contrast, instrument variables (using historical migration rates) are used in 
chapter 4 and 5 to overcome endogeneity concerns. A key difference is that the imputed poverty 
rate used in this chapter is based on census attributes that should not reflect transitory change in 
poverty due to conflict (if there is any such reverse effect). Therefore, even in the absence of 
instrument variables like those used in chapter 4 and 5, the poverty estimates used here are less 
likely to be affected by civil conflict and so the regression coefficients should still be valid 
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estimates of treatment effects. Nevertheless, in other settings where the timing of conflict and the 
timing of measurement of poverty (either directly through survey or indirectly through census-to-
survey imputation) differ from the current situation, researchers may be advised to use valid 
instrumental variables for poverty when analyzing the impact of poverty on civil conflict. 
Additionally, the predicted poverty rate is considered as data in the main conflict model 
without considering the errors that may surround our poverty estimates. This happens because the 
poverty estimates of some villages are more accurately estimated than others, but all are equally 
weightage in the main model. The one approach to deal with this challenge is to use standard error 
of prediction as a weighting variable so that villages with the most precise estimates of imputed 
poverty will get higher weights than others. The implementation this weighting approach is outside 
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Details on the Models Used for the ELL Survey-to-Census Imputation 
 
Table A.2.1: Beta Model estimates, Covariates Selected from Backward Stepwise Regression (with removal at p>0.1) 
  CDR EDR WDR MWDR FWDR 
Mountainous village (=1, otherwise zero) -1696.66         
  (2.48)**         
Hilly village (=1, otherwise zero)     3810.31     
      (8.45)***     
House owned by household (=1, otherwise zero)         -10155.01 
          (2.50)** 
Literate members in HH 3038.05 -523.94   934.12 905.01 
  (5.79)***  (2.82)***   (3.61)*** (4.63)*** 
Literate male members in HH -1547.88    -537.08   
  (2.62)***     (1.90)*   
Age of HH head spouse -52.96         
  (3.79)***         
HH head religion (Hindu=1, otherwise zero) -2896.29   -1287.07     
  (3.28)***   (1.67)*     
HH head “Upper caste” (=1, otherwise zero) 2106.67     1624.39   
  (2.74)***     (5.43)***   
HH head “Dalit caste” (=1, otherwise zero) -2128.81   -1913.83     
  (3.25)***   (3.25)***     
HH members currently attending school -903.35         
  (3.71)***         
Total poultry owned by household         -80.97 
          (2.40)** 
Total members in non-agriculture   407.70       
    (1.81)*       
HH head sex (male=1; female=2)   2139.60     2006.25 
    (2.6)***     (2.95)*** 
HH head age    44.63       
    (2.52)**       
Source of drinking water (tub well or hand pump)   -2857.56       
    (5.76)***       
Members (aged  8 ) with primary education   1347.44 961.73     
    (4.18)*** (4.89)***     
HH head literate (=1, otherwise zero)   2297.52       
    (3.55)***       
Intercept  11431.68 3958.74 6222.16 3581.49 12232.45 
  (11.25)*** (3.22)*** (9.96)*** (18.97)*** (3.0)*** 
R-squared 0.1082 0.1244 0.0744 0.2003 0.2105 
Notes: Estimated with NLSS data, using covariates with overlapping distribution in the Census extract. The t-statistics are in ( ) and ***, **, * denote 
1%, 5%, 10% statistically significance. The domains are the five development regions CDR= Central Development Region; EDR= Eastern 
Development Region; WDR=Western Development Region; MWDR= Mid-Western development Region; FWDR=Far-Western development Region. 







Table A.2.2: Alpha Model estimates, Covariates Selected from Backward Stepwise Regression (with removal at p>0.1) 
  CDR EDR WDR MWDR FWDR 
Mountainous village (=1, otherwise zero) -1.138         
  (3.55)***         
Literate members in HH 2.510       -3.914 
  (4.71)***       (3.55)*** 
Literate male members in HH -1.626         
  (4.87)***         
HH head literate (=1, otherwise zero)   0.637       
    (2.81)***       
HH head sex (male=1, female=2)         -21.285 
          (3.14)*** 
Total poultry owned by HH         0.292 
          (2.4)*** 
Members (aged  8 ) with primary education     0.390     
      (3.94)***     
Literate members in HH*yhat 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.001 
  (1.79)* (1.92)*   (3.61)*** (3.53)*** 
Literate male members in HH*yhat       0.000   
        (2.28)**   
HH head sex*yhat   0.000     0.005 
    (2.53)**     (3.43)*** 
HH head age*yhat   0.000       
    (2.06)**       
Age of HH head spouse*yhat 0.000         
  (5.27)***         
HH head religion*yhat 0.000   0.000     
  (4.86)***   (2.0)**     
HH head “Dalit caste” *yhat 0.000         
  (2.01)**         
HH head “Upper caste” *yhat 0.000     0.000   
  (4.77)**     (1.67)*   
Members with primary education*yhat   0.000       
    (2.77)***       
HH Members currently attending school*yhat 0.000         
  (4.39)***         
Source of drinking water*yhat   0.000       
    (1.66)*       
Total members in non-agriculture *yhat   0.000       
    (2.58)***       
Total poultry owned by household*yhat         0.000 
          (1.95)* 
Total members in non-agriculture*yhat*yhat   0.000       
    (2.46)**       
Hilly village*yhat*yhat     0.000     
      (5.0)***     
HH head sex*yhat*yhat         0.000 
          (3.28)*** 
House owned by household*yhat*yhat         0.000 
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          (4.1)*** 
Members attending school*yhat*yhat 0.000         
  (3.31)***         
HH head religion*yhat*yhat 0.000   0.000     
  (2.87)***   (2.26)**     
Literate members in HH*yhat*yhat 0.000       0.000 
  (2.46)**       (2.13)** 
HH head “Upper caste” *yhat*yhat 0.000         
  (4.0)***         
Intercept -5.654 -7.932 -10.486 -8.412 1.330 
  (7.39)*** (23.76)*** (34.2)*** (52.63)*** 0.520 
R-squared 0.1455 0.0762 0.0643 0.0558 0.1850 
Notes: *yhat is an interaction of the variable with yhat, and  *yhat*yhat is a interaction of the variable with square of yhat. For other notes, see 






Chapter Three: Mean-Reverting Errors and Spatially Aggregated Conflict 
Data- Impacts of Civil War on International Migration from Nepal 
 
Hari Sharma & John Gibson  
 
Abstract 
A growing literature studies microeconomic effects of war on human capital formation and labour 
market activity. A common research design is to relate spatially aggregated data on conflict rates at 
the first or second sub-national level to more spatially disaggregated survey data on outcomes of 
interest. Several studies focus on Nepal’s civil war, that ran for a decade from 1996, and use 
conflict-related deaths in Nepal’s 75 districts (the second sub-national level). Variation in the 
conflict-related death rate within Nepal’s districts is more than three times higher than the variation 
between districts. Consequently, using district-level conflict data creates a mean-reverting 
measurement error on the right-hand side of regression models, makes the conflict seem more 
widespread, and biases econometric estimates of conflict impacts. Prior studies also ignore spatial 
spillovers, where conflict may affect outcomes not only locally but also in surrounding areas. To 
deal with these biases, we use measures of conflict intensity for Nepal’s 3982 localities in a spatial 
Durbin model of the change in emigration rates between the 2001 and 2011. We distinguish 
emigration to India, which is informal and long-standing, from emigration to other countries that is 
a recent development for Nepal and requires formal recruitment and visa processes. Higher conflict 
intensity is associated with slower growth in the emigration rate between 2001 and 2011. It is 
mainly indirect impacts, based on the spatial lags, which matter and it is emigration to destinations 
other than India most deterred by the conflict. The estimated impacts would be substantially 
distorted if conflict intensity was aggregated at the district level, as in much of the literature. 
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A growing literature studies microeconomic effects of war on human capital formation and labour 
market activity. A recent review by Verwimp et al. (2019) notes that an objective of this literature is 
to study ‘ways in which individuals, households, and communities, behave, adapt, make decisions 
and live in conflict-affected contexts’ (p.1). A typical research design is to relate spatially 
aggregated data on conflict rates at the first or second sub-national level to more spatially 
disaggregated survey data on outcomes of interest. For example, studies of Nepal’s civil war, that 
ran for a decade from 1996, use conflict-related deaths in 75 districts (the second sub-national level) 
as predictors of internal displacement rates (Adhikari, 2012), and of survey measures of female 
employment (Menon and Van der Meulen Rodgers, 2015), schooling attainment (Pivovarova and 
Swee, 2015), and international migration (Shrestha, 2017).10 Elsewhere, Chamarbagwala and 
Morán (2011) use civil war victimization data for Guatemala’s 22 departamentos (the first sub-
national level) to predict individual-level human capital formation, while Kountchou et al. (2019) 
use conflict data for 53 districts in Chad in a model of child health and nutrition for 20,000 children 
in 650 DHS survey clusters.11 
 A problem with this research design is that the vector of data on conflict indicators is 
implicitly ‘stretched’ to line it up with the more disaggregated outcome measures, and this is likely 
to cause a bias in econometric estimates of the impact of the conflict. The local conflict rate is likely 
to influence individual decisions about labour market activity and human capital investments and 
will vary from the district-level conflict rate. Specifically, using district-level rates creates a mean-
reverting measurement error; the fatality rate in areas with no (or few) fatalities is overstated by 
 
10 Do and Iyer (2010) use district-level data to study geographic and poverty-related causes of the conflict. 
11 There are examples of using more finely-grained conflict data, including Fergusson et al. (2019) who use 
municipality level conflict rates for Colombia, Guariso and Verpoorten (2014) who use sub-district conflict rates for 
Rwanda, and Libois (2016) who counts deaths in a 20 km buffer around surveyed villages in the 12 months prior to the 
2004 Nepal Living Standard Survey. Simpler indicators used in Nepal include a dummy variable for DHS villages that 
reported any conflict deaths between 1996 and 2004 (Nepal et al., 2018) and the number of months that a village (for 
the 380 villages in the 2016 DHS) was exposed to conflict (Phadera, 2019). Yet the issues associated with the optimal 
level of spatial aggregation of conflict data are not discussed in these studies. 
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using fatality rates for more aggregated areas, while it is understated for localities with higher 
fatality rates than the district average. If errors are mean-reverting, regression coefficients may be 
exaggerated, rather than attenuated as happens with random measurement error, with exaggerated 
impacts seen in the results we report below for Nepal. Also, the instrumental variables (IV) 
estimator may be biased and inconsistent (Black et al., 2000). Thus, even if a researcher has a 
plausible instrumental variable, used because of concerns about the endogeneity of local conflict 
rates, if there is mean-reverting measurement error then the IV estimates of conflict impacts are still 
likely to be biased. 
 A key issue when aggregating conflict data is what aggregation level best preserves 
information. A desirable property for forming groups is that knowing that an observation is in a 
particular group tells us, by itself, a lot about the observation. Hence, within-group variation should 
be low and between-group variation high if the group indicator is to be informative. The spatial 
heterogeneity in intensity of Nepal’s civil war means a lot of information is lost if conflict data are 
aggregated to district level. For example, variation in total deaths and in the death rate within 
districts was more than three times higher than variation between districts. This within-district 
heterogeneity also shows up as a low intra-district correlation coefficient (=0.08), which can be 
interpreted as a measure of the reliability of the district-level mean. Knowing that a household 
comes from a particular district is not very informative about the conflict experienced by that 
household because the district mean has such low reliability. At district level the conflict also seems 
more widespread; while all but two (of 75) districts had some fatalities, only about half of the 3982 
localities had any conflict-related fatalities. This pattern is also likely to occur elsewhere because 
civil wars in developing countries are often spatially concentrated conflicts (Verwimp et al., 2019). 
While maximizing between-group variation would seem to suggest using conflict data for 
the finest possible spatial unit (e.g. an individual street), two other considerations come into play. A 
very small area, like a street, is unlikely to correspond to the spatial range of the daily activities 
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carried out by people living in conflict-affected contexts, and so bigger spatial units may be more 
relevant. Offsetting that, there are often restrictions on media during wars, limiting access to 
information about how intense or widespread is the conflict. For example, press freedom was 
suspended after Nepal’s army mobilized to fight the Maoist insurgents in 2001, and targeting of 
journalists by both the army and the Maoists led to some media self-censorship (Hutt, 2006). Under 
these conditions, news of local outbreaks of conflict may not spread across a district via media and 
may instead be by word of mouth. Districts in Nepal have average area of 2000 km2 (similar to the 
UK county of Warwickshire or to Mauritius) while the average locality is just 36 km2. With fairly 
big districts and small localities, and restricted media, it is likely that one would know the local 
conflict rate rather than the district conflict rate, because parts of a district may be up to 50 km 
away. So a second consideration is: for what level of spatial aggregation is it likely that individuals 
knew the conflict rate? 
In order to study these issues more formally, we measure conflict intensity for Nepal’s 3982 
localities (VDCs or Village Development Committees, once known as panchayats). We use conflict 
death rates from 2002 to 2004, when fighting was heaviest, with two-thirds of the total 15,000 
deaths occurring in those three years. Our results would be largely the same if we used data on the 
full decade of conflict-related deaths. We find a strong mean-reversion if district conflict rates are 
used to proxy for VDC conflict rates, which exceeds the degree of mean reversion found in several 
other variables in development economics (as tabulated by Abay et al. (2019)). This matters 
because strong mean reversion for right-hand side variables causes regression coefficients to be 
exaggerated, overstating the impacts of the conflict. 
The particular outcome we focus on is emigration, because labour export is a key feature of 
Nepal’s economy, with two million Nepalese working abroad sending almost US$7 billion in 
annual remittances (equivalent to 29% of GDP, the third highest rate in the world). The existing 
literature suggests conflict increased emigration from Nepal (Shrestha, 2017). More generally, the 
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idea that conflict is an important push factor in international migration is widespread in the 
literature (e.g. Naude, 2008). Yet conflict can also increase the costs of migration, by making travel 
for documentation (passports and visas) and recruitment more hazardous and also by lowering the 
ability to finance migration if conflict negatively affects incomes or access to lenders. Given these 
potentially offsetting effects, we test if the local intensity of Nepal’s civil war, measured at the VDC 
level, affected the growth in emigration rates, both in the same localities and elsewhere. We 
separate emigration to India, which is low-cost, informal, and has occurred for decades, from 
emigration to other countries, where formal (and costly) recruitment and visa processing (in 
Kathmandu) is required, and which has been a recent large-scale development for Nepal. 
Our migration data are from Nepal’s 2001 and 2011 census of population, which asks about 
members of households who are overseas. The peak conflict period occurred between the two 
censuses, which limits use of panel data methods to relate contemporaneous conflict to 
contemporaneous emigration, where VDC-level fixed effects could be used to deal with omitted 
heterogeneity. Instead, we use long differences, with our outcome measures the change in the 
emigration rates for each VDC between 2001 and 2011. With differencing we remove the influence 
of time-invariant factors, such as geography, that may affect conflict and the propensity to emigrate. 
Control variables from the census are also in long differences, while our main variable of interest is 
the conflict intensity at the peak of the fighting, from 2002-04. We use a spatial Durbin model that 
allows indirect effects of the conflict in one locality to affect outcomes in (all) other localities. This 
deals with another problem in the existing literature, of not allowing for spatial spillovers, where 
local conflict may affect outcomes not only in that particular area but also in surrounding areas. 
 We find that an increase in conflict intensity, by one death per thousand population at the 
peak of the conflict (2002-04), is associated with slower growth in the emigration rate between 
2001 and 2011. Specifically, the emigration rate rose by 3.9 persons per thousand fewer (equivalent 
to ten percent of the mean increase) than it would have in the absence of the conflict. This effect is 
60 
 
predominantly though the indirect channels that operate via the spatial lags in the conflict rate and 
in the emigration rate. When we disaggregate by destination, it is emigration to non-India 
destinations that is most depressed by conflict. This likely reflects the greater cost (and hence, 
sensitivity to conflict-induced income losses) of this emigration channel and the need to travel to 
Kathmandu for visa and recruitment purposes, while travel to India for work could use multiple 
routes to avoid conflict hot spots. 
 A different picture emerges if we measure conflict intensity at the district level. Using more 
spatially aggregated conflict data suggests there is a large and statistically significant direct effect of 
higher conflict intensity (of one death per thousand) increasing the VDC-level emigration rate by 
eight persons per thousand overall and by eleven persons per thousand to India. These direct effects 
are offset by even larger negative indirect effects, so that the total effect of one more death per 
thousand appears as a suppression of the 2001 to 2011 increase in the emigration rate by about eight 
persons per thousand (with similar magnitudes, but not precision, of the effects for India and for the 
other destinations). These total effects are up to four times larger than when the conflict intensity is 
measured at the VDC level. These results suggest that using more aggregated conflict data, such as 
district level death rates, may bias estimates of the micro economic effects of the war because of 
mean-reverting errors. 
 Our findings also imply that people in VDCs that experienced the highest intensity of 
localized conflict may still be suffering at least one after-effect of the war. It is likely that 
remittance income in these areas is lower than it is elsewhere, since they did not participate as much 
in the huge growth in work-related emigration that the rest of Nepal experienced between 2001 and 
2011. If this is the case, it is even more important to correctly diagnose the local consequences of 
the conflict. Expecting positive effects of local conflict intensity on emigration could lead one to 
predict that conflict-affected areas will have a higher expected remittance income (from their 
expected higher emigration rate), which might help offset some of the conflict-related losses. In 
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fact, it is likely that remittance income grew less in these conflict-affected areas than elsewhere 
because the conflict had a mildly suppressing effect on their participation in the growing rate of 
emigration. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 provides the context for our 
study; Section 3.3 discusses the data and our econometric model; Section 3.4 contains the results, 
and Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 Context 
3.2.1 Emigration from Nepal 
Nepal has a long history of work-related migration, especially to its southern neighbour. This 
includes British Army recruitment of hill Nepali during World War II and recruitment of Gurkha 
regiments by India to fight in the Indo-China and Indo-Pakistan wars. An open border treaty in 
1950 made India an attractive and low-cost destination to escape domestic unemployment. Thus, 
emigration for employment emerged as a major household activity (Sapkota, 2013). For example, 
the third Nepal Living Standards Survey showed that one-third of households in 2010 had at least 
one member working abroad; mostly amongst the 15 to 59 age group. This emigration opportunity 
was especially used by households in the western and mid-western regions of Nepal, which have 
poor land productivity, high poverty and food insecurity, and poor infrastructure. These two regions 
accounted for 36% and 48% of the emigrants in India according to the censuses in 2001 and 2011 
(Central Bureau of Statistics, 2001, 2011).   
 In recent years the demand for workers in the Middle East created a new opportunity for 
emigrants from Nepal. Beginning in 1993/94, when 3,605 people obtained a permit to move for 
foreign employment in the Middle East, demand for this type of permit-based emigration (as 
opposed to the informal migration to India) rose strongly, such that there was a seven-fold increase 
(to annual recruitment of 28,000 workers) in just six years. However, the major period of increase, 
which also saw a spreading out to ASEAN countries like Malaysia, and to richer labour-scarce 
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countries like Korea, came in the decade from 2001. Between the population censuses in 2001 and 
2011 Nepal’s emigration rate more than doubled, to be over seven percent in 2011. This was due 
almost entirely to emigration to destinations other than India, as seen in Figure 3.1 which shows the 
mean and the 25th and 75th percentiles of the VDC-level emigration rate in each census. The mean 
emigration rate to India hardly changed, going from 28 to 30 per thousand from 2001 to 2011; for 
destinations elsewhere it rose from 7 to 43 per thousand. This sharp rise in emigration to places 
other than India more than doubled Nepal’s overall emigration rate. In over one-quarter of localities 
the emigration rate now exceeds ten percent (shown by the grey capped bar). Emigrants provide at 
least US$7 billion in annual remittances (equivalent to 29% of GDP, the third highest rate in the 
world) and probably more, since most remittances from India are undocumented.  
Figure 3.1: Average emigration rates from Nepal, 2001 and 2011 































 In terms of where these emigrants came from, Figure 3.2 maps the emigration rates in 2001. 
Given that three-quarters of all emigrants were in India in that year, the map for all destinations 
(panel a) is much like the map for where emigrants to India came from (panel b). The concentration 
of emigrant-source areas in the western and mid-western regions is apparent. In contrast, even 
though they were numerically far fewer in 2001, the emigrants going to locations other than India 
(shown in panel c of Figure 3.2) were predominantly from the central and eastern regions of Nepal. 
One cause of these spatial patterns is that people from relatively poor areas tend to emigrate to India 
as a low cost option due to their lack of wherewithal to finance emigration to elsewhere, like the 
Middle East, that offers higher returns. Roughly speaking, it takes from US$2,000-US$10,000 to 
emigrate to a non-India destination, in addition to the commuting cost to Kathmandu in order to 
obtain a passport and get a permit from the Ministry of Labour and Employment. The nearby 
central region is more developed, so people from there have many advantages in partaking in non-
India emigration, including lower commuting cost for getting the needed documents, high literacy 
rates, and access to financial institutions to help fund the up-front costs of recruitment and visa 
charges. 
Figure 3.2: Emigration rate to (a) all countries, (b) India (c) other Asia and Middle East 









Source: Author’s calculations from Census extract data 
 The change in emigration rates between 2001 and 2011, at the VDC-level, is shown in 
Figure 3.3. The first panel shows emigration to all countries, the second panel is for emigration to 
India, and the third is for other Asian destinations and the Middle East. These maps show the spatial 
distribution of the outcome variables that our econometric models focus on. One feature that is 
apparent from panel (a) is that almost all parts of Nepal experienced higher emigration rates over 
this decade; less than ten percent of VDCs had no rise in emigration rates (shown by the hatched 
areas in the map). It is also clear that there is a lot of variation within districts; the standard 





district correlation in the change in emigration rates is only 0.21. This suggests that it is important 
to conduct analyses at a disaggregated level. 
Figure 3.3: Change in emigration rate at VDC level between 2001 and 2011 to (a) all 












The second panel in Figure 3.3 shows the change in the emigration rate to India. Almost 
one-half of all VDCs, which cover more than half of Nepal’s area, had a fall in the rate of 
emigration to India. Conversely, the areas of increased emigration to India were along the northern 
border, in the very far west and a scattering of VDCs in the mid-western regions. When we consider 
the emigration to other Asian and Middle Eastern destinations (panel c), western areas of Nepal are 
some of the lowest participants, being in the lowest category of increase (shown by the tan colour) 
or even having decreasing rates. In contrast, the richer central and eastern areas were the major 
source of increase in emigration rates to non-India destinations, although with considerable 
heterogeneity within districts. 
3.2.2 Nepal’s Civil War 
In 1996, the Communist Party of Nepal (CPM-Maoist) formally declared war against the state with 
the aim of abolishing the constitutional monarchy and establishing communist rule. Initially, the 
conflict was restricted to the poorest and underdeveloped regions in the far west and mid-western 
regions of Nepal. The Maoists benefited from the remoteness, and the dense forest and mountains, 
which favoured guerrilla tactics for their occasional attacks on police posts and on private firms and 
banks. Chronic poverty in these regions also helped to draw in support of some locals because the 
Maoists seized land from high caste landlords and let the poor and low caste Dalit people use it 
(Bownas, 2015). While the police retaliated against these attacks (including claims of torturing 
people they believed were militants), there was no involvement by the army. Over five years of 
mainly localized fighting, which slowly grew in intensity, approximately 2000 people had been 







Figure 3.4: Annual conflict-related deaths during civil war in Nepal 
 
                 Source: Informal Sector Service Center (INSEC), Nepal. 
 The war took an unexpected turn to more generalized and intensive conflict, after the killing 
in June 2001 of King Birendra and his family, murdered by the then crown prince, who 
subsequently committed suicide. The new King, Gyanendra Shah mobilised the army to deal with 
the insurgents, after on-going peace talks broke down in late 2001. Consequently, the conflict 
spread rapidly and became more intense, with over 4000 deaths in 2002, and more than 2000 deaths 
per year in 2003 and 2004 (Figure 3.4). In total, two-thirds of all conflict deaths occurred in this 
three year period. During this period the Maoists had some control in at least 35 of the 75 districts 
(Pivovarova & Swee, 2015), with a parallel government (Libois, 2016). In 2005, the Maoists called 
for a unilateral ceasefire so as to join peace talks with other major political parties. Later in 2006, an 
uprising of the Nepali population against the King brought an end to the monarchy. By then, a 
peace agreement signed with all political parties led to the end of the decade-long conflict and by 
the time of elections in 2008 the political party based on the Maoists won close to half of the seats. 
The data in Figure 3.4 are from the Informal Sector Service Centre (INSEC), a NGO that 
monitored human rights violations by both Maoist and government forces. Their data are considered 
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For each death and disappearance (equated to death if they were never located) in INSEC’s district-
level dataset we disaggregated to VDC level by using the report of where the victimization event 
occurred. These data cover the army, police, insurgents, and civilians who may be killed in cross-
fire, by landmines, and so on. Of the 15,021 deaths covered in the INSEC data (Joshi & Pyakurel, 
2015), we could identify the VDC where the death occurred in over 97 percent of cases, for 14,595 
victims. 
The location of deaths during the 2002-04 peak in the conflict is mapped in Figure 3.5a. The 
conflict was often very localized, and almost half of all VDCs (n=1954) had no deaths recorded. In 
contrast, just two of 75 districts (that is, 3% of the total) had no conflict-related deaths. Thus, the 
spatially aggregated data make the conflict appear more widespread. At the other end of the 
distribution, just 13 VDCs had 50 or more deaths and 29 had 30 or more deaths (that is, averaging 
ten deaths per year). Variance decompositions also show that district-level analysis may mislead; 
the standard deviation (SD) in the number of deaths is 7.1 within districts and only 2.0 between 
districts. In other words, there is more than three times as much variability within a district as 
between districts. This also shows up in the low value (0.08) of the intra-district correlation in 






















SD within Districts = 7.1 
SD between Districts = 2.0 
 intra-District = 0.08 
SD within Districts = 1.2 
SD between Districts = 0.4 
 intra-District = 0.10 
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In Figure 3.5b we consider death rates rather than deaths, since Nepal’s population is 
unequally distributed over space (and the Maoists initially established in low density areas). Using 
death rates tilts conflict intensity slightly to the west, but it remains the case that the standard 
deviation in death rates within districts is three times as large as between districts so a district level 
analysis understates the spatial heterogeneity and exhibits mean reversion. We illustrate this effect 
in Figure 3.5c, which takes the same death rate data as in Figure 3.5b but averages it to district level 
before mapping; the conflict appears to be far more widespread, both in the west and also in the 
north east. Our econometric analysis in Section IV shows that this spreading effect causes bias in 
models that estimate impacts of the conflict. 
This bias occurs because using district level death rates create a mean-reverting error. If we 
consider the VDC level death rate as the correct variable for explaining outcomes at VDC level – 
such as the change in VDC-level emigration rates – the difference between the district level death 
rate and the VDC level death rate is the measurement error. On average, this error is roughly zero, 
because the same data are just being aggregated and averaged in different ways, but it is non-
random. In particular, this measurement error negatively correlates with the correct variable; 
regressing the measurement error on the VDC level death rate yields a coefficient of -0.89 (standard 
error of 0.005). Abay et al (2019) recently collated estimates of the mean reversion parameter from 
various contexts, with values that range from -0.3 to -0.8, where the more negative the value, the 
stronger the mean reversion. Unlike the standard random measurement error, that attenuates 
regression coefficients when the mis-measured variable is on the right-hand side, with a strong 
enough mean reversion the regression coefficients can be exaggerated. Such exaggeration is likely 
in the current context because the magnitude of the mean reverting parameter for conflict rates (-
0.89) exceeds the values of the mean reversion parameters reported in other contexts where 




3.3 Data and Methods 
In addition to conflict data from INSEC described above, our main data sources are the tenth and 
eleventh national population and housing censuses from 2001 and 2011. Nepal does not give 
microdata access to the full census but the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) provided extracts with 
complete records for over one-tenth of households, covering all VDCs. Census questions on 
household members working abroad provide our measures of emigration, and we express these as 
rates using the extract-level population for each VDC in each census.12 We also use census data on 
literacy rates and educational attainment, and on age structure. 
The census lacks measure of local urban growth, the absence of which may be a push factor 
for emigration. We therefore measured disaggregated urban growth using night time lights as 
detected by satellite, taking a three year average for 1999-2001 and for 2009-11 to smooth short-
term fluctuations. These lights data are best thought of as measuring urban growth because it takes 
800-times more light than a typical incandescent bulb in order to be detected from space with the 
sensors on the Defence Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) satellites (Gibson et al., 2020). 
We further rule out measuring rural economic activity by setting luminosity thresholds to 
distinguish urban and rural areas, where these thresholds match those recently used for a study of 
how urban development in India affects rural areas (Gibson, et al., 2017). Thus, changes in night 
time lights between 2001 and 2011 are more likely to be a proxy cause of emigration, rather than a 
result (e.g. as might occur if subsequent remittances enabled rural dwellers to electrify their 
dwelling). 
Table 1 has complete definitions and descriptive statistics for all of the variables that we use. 
The analysis is mostly cast in terms of long differences between 2001 and 2011 and so some of the 
environmental and infrastructural factors that may affect emigration rates and conflict intensity can 
 
12 For expressing the conflict intensity as rates per thousand population we use the full population counts for each VDC 
from the 2001 census, since we do not need household-level data for that purpose. 
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be ignored if they are fixed in the medium term. However, we do include a dummy variable for 
whether a VDC borders India (which is true for 7.6% of them) based on a GIS analysis. We also use 
the baseline emigration rates from the 2001 census which should capture other (relatively time-
invariant) factors that make particular localities more or less prone to having high emigration. Our 
objective in using these various control variables is so that the intensity of the conflict (which, 
recall, took an unexpected turn after the death of the King in 2001) is not acting as a proxy for some 
omitted local factors. 
3.3.1 The Econometric Model 
The N-vector of long differences in VDC-level emigration rates is denoted ∆𝑀𝑖 , the conflict 
intensity variables are denoted 𝐶𝑖, there are five control variables in the matrix 𝑋𝑖 (the change in the 
working age population share, the change in the literacy rate and in the share of working age 
individuals with grade 8 schooling or above, the change in local urban activity as proxied by night 
lights, and a dummy for whether the VDC borders India), and the lagged VDC-level emigration rate 
from 2001 is 𝑀𝑖
𝑡=2001. Our spatial Durbin model (SDM) is:13 
∆𝑀𝑖 = 𝛿𝑊∆𝑀𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑊𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑋1𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑊𝑋1𝑖 + ⋯ + 𝛽11𝑋5𝑖 
                   +𝛽12𝑊𝑋5𝑖 + 𝛽13𝑀𝑖
𝑡=2001 + 𝛽14𝑊𝑀𝑖
𝑡=2001 + 𝑣𝑖   (3.1) 
Here the spatial weighting matrix W describes the structure of spatial relationships between 
each VDC. The W matrix has zeros along the main diagonal, given that no VDC is its own 
neighbor, while the off diagonals are set to unity for immediate neighbors (using Queen contiguity 
weights) and zero otherwise. This model allows for changes in an explanatory variable in a 
particular VDC to not only affect the change in the emigration rate in that VDC, but also in the 
surrounding areas. The parameters to estimate are 𝛿 and 𝛽1, … , 𝛽14, while 𝑣𝑖 is a random error term 
 
13 For an excellent overview of the spatial Durbin model see Elhorst (2012). 
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which the generalized spatial two-stage least squares estimator (Kelejian and Prucha, 1999; Drukker 
et al., 2013) that we use allows to be heteroscedastic. 
The spatial Durbin model is a general model that nests several alternatives, such as the 
spatial autoregressive model, where only the dependent variable is spatially lagged, the spatial error 
model, where only the errors are spatially lagged, and aspatial models such as OLS, where there are 
no spatial lags for any variables.14 The SDM gives unbiased coefficient estimates even if the true 
data-generation process is a spatial autoregressive model or a spatial error model, but the reverse is 
not true given that it involves omitting relevant variables. Thus, the SDM provides a good general 
basis for testing the effects of conflict on emigration.  
A feature of the SDM is that the total effect of changes in an independent variable—such as 
in conflict intensity—may be quite different to what is shown by ?̂?1 since a local change in the 
emigration rate may affect the emigration rates of neighbours, which, in turn, affects the emigration 
rate of their neighbours, including the original locality. In addition to these effects that operate 
through the spatial lag of the dependent variable, the lags on the independent variables also mean 
that local changes can affect outcomes elsewhere. These spillover and feedback effects let us 
decompose effects of conflict on emigration into direct and indirect components. To see how, note 
first that equation (3.1) can also be written in matrix notation (where the five control variables in the 
X matrix, and all of the subscripts, are suppressed for reasons of expositional simplicity, and I is the 
identity matrix) as: 
∆𝑀 = (𝐼 − 𝛿𝑊)−1(𝛽1𝐶 + 𝛽2𝑊𝐶) + (𝐼 − 𝛿𝑊)
−1𝑣    (3.2) 
Following Elhorst (2012), the partial derivatives can then be written as:  
 
14 For example, the spatial autoregressive model can be derived from our SDM by imposing the restrictions that 𝛽2 =






= (𝐼 − 𝛿𝑊)−1(𝛽1𝐼𝑁 + 𝛽2𝑊)    (3.3) 
The total marginal effect of conflict intensity on the inter-censual change in the emigration 
rate, ∆𝑀 includes both direct and indirect effects, and these will vary across VDCs as a result of 
spatial feedbacks. The estimator that we use follows LeSage and Pace (2009) in reporting a single 
direct effect, that averages the diagonal elements of the N×N matrix in (3.3), and a single indirect 
effect, that averages the row sums of the non-diagonal elements of that matrix. Note that indirect 
effects of conflict arise not only from the neighbours of a VDC, when 𝛽20 but also from 
(potentially) all VDCs through spatial autocorrelation when 𝛿 ≠ 0. In other words, there can be 
both local and global spillovers, depending on the magnitude of the estimated 𝛽2 and 𝛿 coefficients.  
 The indirect effects are important for two reasons. First, while the conflict was highly 
localized, as the maps in panel A and B of Figure 3.5 show, the impact on emigration may be felt 
more widely, depending on the strength of the 𝛿 and 𝛽2 coefficients. Seen in this light, one problem 
with previous research using district-level conflict rates, effectively spreading the conflict over 
space (as seen in panel C of Figure 3.5), is that it lacks an explicit framework like the SDM that lets 
the data dictate the degree of spreading. In our estimates, the marginal effects (direct, indirect, and 
total) are computed for each of the 3982 VDCs, allowing for the possibility that in some cases there 
will be a lot of spreading of the effects and in others there will be little. This variation may depend 
on geography, population density, infrastructure, the size of spatial units, and so forth. The second 
reason that these indirect effects may matter is that the two different emigration channels available 
to Nepalese – informal to India and formal to elsewhere – have quite different spatial transactions 
costs. A person could go to India from the VDC where they live, and the free border lets them 
choose amongst a multitude of routes, so that their journey was not disrupted by conflict (or the 
risk, thereof). However, to emigrate elsewhere an aspiring migrant first had to go to Kathmandu to 
get a passport and to be recruited and undergo formal visa processing. This requirement to reach a 
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particular place, rather than to simply cross anywhere along a border, limits the set of routes 
available. Moreover, there were often lengthy delays in this process, so repeated trips to Kathmandu 
may have been necessary, and this extra travel meant that there was more potential to be disrupted 
(or to be deterred) by outbreaks of conflict along the way than was the case for emigration to India. 
In other words, outbreaks of conflict can act to raise the cost of emigration, and so, all else the 
same, lower the emigration rate. 
 Notwithstanding the generality of the SDM, the coefficient estimates are vulnerable to 
potential endogeneity of conflict intensity to VDC-level changes in emigration. One difficulty in the 
current context is that a possibly plausible instrumental variable for conflict intensity – distance 
from the capital city, if it is expected that government forces are strongest there so insurgency is 
more likely further away – would fail the exclusion restriction because travel to Kathmandu was 
needed for recruitment for migration to non-India destinations. We rely on the fact that the conflict 
took an unexpected turn after the 2001 killing of the royal family; only about 400 VDCs had been 
affected by conflict by then, but over 2200 were affected by conflict after then (Nepal et al, 2018). 
This sudden change, plus the fact that we model changes in emigration rates (effectively giving us 
village-level fixed effects) should weaken the threat of either reverse causation – requiring the 
change in emigration rates between 2011 and 2001 to affect the conflict rate in 2002-04 – or of 
omitted factors like geography and poverty that correlate with both conflict and emigration. 
Moreover, even without a plausible instrumental variable, studying the mean-reversion in conflict 
data at different levels of spatial aggregation is useful because with mean-reverting errors in right-
hand side variables the IV estimates of conflict impacts are still likely to be biased. 
3.4 Results 
The results of estimating equation (3.1) are reported in Table 3.2. There are six sets of results, with 
separate equations for the change in the emigration rate to all countries, to India, and to other Asian 
and Middle East destinations (corresponding to the maps of the dependent variables in panels (a), 
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(b), and (c) of Figure 3.3).15 The last three columns of results in Table 3.2 show what happens when 
the VDC-level death rate variable is replaced with a district-level death rate (which is mapped in 
Figure 3.5c) while the rest of the model stays the same as the corresponding model whose results 
are reported in columns 1-3. The comparison between the results in the first three and last three 
columns in Table 3.2 illustrates the bias due to mean-reverting errors that come from overly-
aggregated conflict measures. 
 The results show that higher VDC-level conflict intensity, by one death per thousand, 
directly reduce growth in the emigration rate for non-India destinations by -0.45 persons per 
thousand (statistically significant at p<0.06). The same effect, for all-destinations emigration, is 
almost the same but is imprecisely estimated, while conflict intensity appears to have no direct 
effect on the VDC-level change in the emigration rate to India. This variation supports the 
disaggregation of the emigration outflows into the low-cost, informal, channel to India, and the 
higher cost, more formal and more recent channel to other destinations. 
The coefficients with respect to the spatially weighted average of the conflict intensity in 
neighbouring VDCs are larger, at between −0.6 and −3.6. For example, for a VDC where the 
weighted average death rate amongst its neighbours was one person per thousand higher, the 2001 
to 2011 increase in the all-destination emigration rate from the surrounded VDC would be 3.6 
persons per thousand lower, and this effect is statistically significant at the p<0.01 level. The spatial 
lag of the change in the emigration rate is always statistically significant at p<0.01 for all three 
outcomes. Given that the 𝛿 and 𝛽2 coefficients are statistically significant, local conflict will have 
spatial spillover effects on the change in emigration rates, and these are calculated using equation 
 
15 The models reported in the table also allow tests of the nesting restrictions to derive some of the other models from 
the SDM. For example, for the all-destinations model, the restrictions to derive the spatial autoregressive model are 
rejected with a chi-squared test statistic of 320, those to derive the spatial error model are likewise rejected (chi-
squared=305) and those to nest an OLS model are even more strongly rejected (chi-squared=332). 
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(3.3) and presented later.16 The spatial lags indicate that conflict in neighbouring localities matters, 
and this may be thought of as raising the cost of emigration; for example, by making journeys for 
recruitment and documentation (passports and visas) more hazardous.
 
16 Elhorst (2012) distinguishes local indirect effects as those associated with 02   and global indirect effects as those 
associated with .0  As noted earlier, we follow LeSage and Pace (2009) in defining direct effects as “own region 
effects”, i.e. the effect of a change in a covariate in VDC i on the dependent variable in i averaged over all VDCs, 
whereas the total effect is the effect of the same change in the covariate in all VDCs on the dependent variable in VDC i 
averaged over all VDCs. The indirect effect is then simply the difference between the total and direct effect.  
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Table 3.2: Spatial Durbin models for change in the VDC emigration rate between 2001 and 2011, with different spatial granularity of conflict Data 
 Conflict Intensity Measured At VDC Level Conflict Intensity Measured at District Level 
Emigration to: All Countries India Othera  All Countries India Othera  
         
Conflict intensity (Death rate at peak (2002-04) -0.483 -0.011 -0.445  8.643 11.510 4.877  
 (0.91) (0.03) (1.90)*  (2.58)*** (4.67)*** (2.48)**  
 share of working age (15-59) -31.834 -38.119 -13.709  -33.117 -36.533 -13.771  
 (2.29)** (3.91)*** (1.47)  (2.39)** (3.80)*** (1.49)  
 literacy rate -9.488 3.453 7.929  -11.315 -0.054 7.414  
 (1.29) (0.67) (1.90)*  (1.54) (0.01) (1.78)*  
 share of 15-59 schooled to grade  8 -0.985 1.296 7.095  -1.393 -0.253 7.024  
 (0.20) (0.36) (2.21)**  (0.28) (0.07) (2.17)**  
 local urban activity (night lights DN) -0.584 -0.266 -0.142  -0.610 -0.287 -0.160  
 (1.73)* (1.48) (0.66)  (1.84)* (1.61) (0.74)  
VDC borders India -3.029 3.558 -2.012  -2.974 3.418 -2.011  
 (1.20) (2.17)** (1.32)  (1.19) (2.10)** (1.33)  
VDC level emigration rate, 2001 -0.370 -0.499 -0.086  -0.374 -0.505 -0.090  
 (12.41)*** (16.09)*** (1.51)  (12.48)*** (16.49)*** (1.60)*  
W  Conflict intensity  -3.563 -1.259 -0.637  -18.419 -15.400 -11.237  
 (3.14)*** (1.39) (1.01)  (4.48)*** (4.70)*** (4.42)***  
W   share of working age (15-59) 190.341 -14.093 129.084  170.322 -12.648 113.444  
 (7.08)*** (0.58) (6.72)***  (6.17)*** (0.51) (5.94)***  
W   literacy rate -114.502 -60.024 -87.956  -95.099 -42.828 -71.005  
 (8.96)*** (6.71)*** (11.26)***  (7.09)*** (4.58)*** (8.19)***  
W   share of 15-59 schooled to grade  8 -58.544 -19.489 -36.554  -47.084 -12.842 -27.397  
 (4.81)*** (2.19)** (5.09)***  (3.73)*** (1.35) (3.70)***  
W   local urban activity (night lights DN) -0.088 0.497 -0.681  0.300 0.519 -0.544  
 (0.12) (1.35) (1.33)  (0.41) (1.39) (1.05)  
W  VDC borders India -17.668 -3.760 -13.639  -18.341 -3.263 -14.644  
 (3.10)*** (1.04) (3.58)***  (3.24)*** (0.90) (3.85)***  
W  VDC level emigration rate, 2001 0.558 0.600 0.801  0.570 0.611 0.851  
 (13.75)*** (14.72)*** (7.70)***  (13.96)*** (15.11)*** (8.07)***  
Spatial lag of change in emigration rate () 0.183 0.911 0.588  0.195 0.932 0.581  
 (2.84)*** (9.76)*** (11.54)***  (2.84)*** (10.08)*** (10.80)***  
Pseudo-R2 0.1513 0.1211 0.2935  0.1542 0.1247 0.303  
Wald test for model (Chi-squared, 13 df) 422.79 487.63 2065.32  452.00 516.13  2147.66  
Notes: Estimates are from generalized spatial two-stage least squares with heteroscedastic errors. N=3982 VDCs. Variables measured in changes (shown by ) are for the change from 2001 to 2011. aOther is 




 Before turning to the estimates of direct, indirect, and total effects, we comment on two 
other aspects of the results in Table 3.2. First, several control variables show significant effects, 
particularly the change in the working age share of the total population (which rose on average by 
1.4 percentage points but with a wide range across VDCs). Improvements in the level of human 
capital, in terms of the change in the literacy rate (which rose 17 points over the decade) and in the 
share of working age individuals with at least eight years of schooling (a share which rose by one-
tenth over the decade) generally depress the rate of increase in the emigration rate, especially with 
the spatially lagged terms. This suggests that emigration is especially a vent for surplus unskilled 
labour from Nepal. There is less rise in the emigration rate in VDCs that had faster urban economic 
growth (as proxied by night lights) but with imprecisely estimated coefficients. For a VDC on the 
border with India there was a bigger rise in the emigration rate to India, by almost four persons per 
thousand, but the spatial lag of the same effect is negative and so it is only after the equation (3.3) 
estimates are computed that a clear picture of the total effect will be available. 
 The temporal lag of the emigration rate for a VDC has significant negative effects on the 
growth in emigration from that VDC, for emigration to India and to all destinations, but this effect 
is not apparent for the more formal emigration to other Asian and Middle East destinations. The 
negative coefficients could suggest a convergence process, with VDCs that had historically low 
emigration rates having a faster rate of change, to catch up to the leaders. It is also the case that 
regressions without the temporal lag of the emigration rate, which are reported in Appendix Tables 
3.1a, 3.1b, and 3.1c, show generally similar patterns for coefficients to what is seen in Table 3.2. 
These appendix tables also show what the results are like if the total conflict rate, based on deaths 
per thousand from 1996 to 2006, is used instead of the death rate at the peak of the conflict, and 
these sensitivity analysis results also are similar to the main results. The appendix tables also report 
a parallel set of aspatial OLS results that omit the spatial lags, although the data are not consistent 
with the parametric restrictions that OLS models need. 
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The last thing to note in the Table 3.2 results is what the last three columns show, using 
district-level conflict rates. Comparing with the first three columns, it seems that aggregating 
conflict data makes a big difference, due to the mean-reverting measurement error on the right-hand 
side. An increase by one death per thousand in a district would seem to directly increase the 
emigration rate by between five and 12 persons per thousand, being larger for emigration to India 
than to elsewhere and all of these effects are statistically significant at the p<0.01 level. The 
direction of the effect is the opposite of what the VDC-level conflict data show, although the 
interpretation is complicated because the spatial lags of the district-level conflict rates are all 
significantly negative and so the total effects will reflect this offsetting influence. It is clear, 
however, that smoothing the conflict data (as seen in comparing Figures 3.5b and 3.5c) has a 
potentially large effect on econometric estimates. This effect of aggregation could skew the 
interpretations of how Nepal’s civil conflict affected the change in emigration (and perhaps skew 
the interpretation for impacts on other microeconomic outcomes).17 
The direct, indirect and total impacts of changes in the independent variables on the 
outcomes are reported in Table 3.3, where these are calculated from the models reported in Table 
3.2. As noted above, we report the average impacts; the extent to which conflict intensity in a 
particular VDC impacts on the change in the emigration rate in another VDC depends partly on how 
many degrees of separation there are, in terms of the number of neighbours of neighbours needed to 
transmit the spillover effects over space and so the averages are a convenient way to deal with the 
multitude of marginal effects that could be presented. When we use the VDC-level conflict rate, we 
find that an increase in conflict intensity, by one death per thousand population at the peak of the 
 
17 This conclusion also holds if we control for travel time or travel distance from each VDC to Kathmandu, either 
directly or interacted with the conflict variables. Such estimates are only approximate, because some VDCs lack road 
access, so we had to calculate travel time and distance (using Google Maps) to the nearest point on the road network. 
The effect of conflict intensity, when measured at the district level, is still much larger than the effect when measured at 
the VDC level, even with these additional control variables. Likewise, if we were to just use OLS, despite the 
restrictions to derive OLS from the SDM being strongly rejected, we would find that apparent conflict impacts on VDC-
level emigration were overstated almost ten-fold if conflict intensity is measured at the district level (with a coefficient 
on conflict intensity of -5.3, compared to -0.56 using VDC-level conflict rates). 
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conflict (2002-04), is associated with slower growth in the emigration rate between 2001 and 2011. 
The impacts for direct, indirect, and total effects are always negatively signed, for all three outcome 
variables, although they are never statistically significant for the change in emigration to India. 
Once again, it appears that the constraints on growth of the informal and low-cost emigration to 
India differ from the constraints on growth of emigration to other destinations. These effects in 
Table 3.3 are statistically significant for two out of three of the direct, indirect, and total impacts for 
both all-destinations emigration and for the other Asia and Middle East emigration. 
In terms of the magnitudes of these impacts, for all-destination emigration a death rate of 
one per thousand at the peak of the conflict (2002-04) suppresses the rise in the emigration rate 
between 2001 and 2011 (which rose 40 per thousand on average) by 3.9 persons per thousand. In 
percentage terms, this is a ten percent smaller rise than would be predicted in the absence of the 
conflict-related deaths. This effect operates predominantly though the indirect channels, reflecting 
the fact that decisions to emigrate can depend on outbreaks of conflict in neighbours as well as in 
the home area, most likely due to these outbreaks raising the costs of emigration (e.g. by making 
travel to Kathmandu more dangerous and so less likely, thereby lowering the chance to be 
recruited). When we disaggregate the change in emigration rates into emigration to India and 
emigration to other Asia and the Middle East, it is only for the non-India destinations that the 
conflict intensity has a statistically significant effect in depressing the rate of increase in emigration. 
To compare how the total impacts of conflict on emigration appear when conflict is 
estimated at two different aggregation levels, a model with both the VDC level and District level 
conflict conflict data on the right-hand side (with VDC level emigration as the outcome variable) 
was estimated. The direct, indirect, and total impact of conflict rates at district level aggregation are 
as large as ten times the impact of conflict rates at the VDC level aggregation (refer to Appendix 
Table 3.2). This pattern is consistent with the exaggeration that is caused by mean reverting 
measurement error if we aggregate conflict data at an inappropriate level. More broadly, this issue 
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of over-aggregation of conflict rates may eventually distort our understanding of how civil war 
affects emigration, human capital, labour market activities and so on.  
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Table 3.3:  Estimated direct, indirect, and total impacts, averaging over all 3982 VDCs  
  Change in Emigration Rate to All Countries   Change in Emigration rate to India   Change in Emigration rate to othera 
  VDC Conflict   District Conflict   VDC Conflict   District Conflict   VDC Conflict   District Conflict 
Direct Effect dy/dx t-stat   dy/dx t-stat   dy/dx t-stat   dy/dx t-stat   dy/dx t-stat   dy/dx t-stat 
Conflict Intensity -0.557 1.07   8.282 2.55**   -0.221 0.48   10.581 4.51***   -0.519 2.23**   4.199 2.25** 
Δ Share of Working age (15-59) -28.055 2.06**   -29.508 2.17**   -47.193 4.64***   -45.818 4.43***   -3.746 0.42   -5.258 0.58 
Δ literacy rate -11.868 1..66*   -13.458 1.88*   -7.119 0.96   -8.451 1.17   1.072 0.25   2.030 0.47 
Δ Share of 15-59 schooled to grade ≥8 -2.187 0.44   -2.436 0.49   -2.107 0.47   -2.853 0.62   4.429 1.33   5.142 1.54 
Δ local urban activity (night lights DN) -0.584 1.79*   -0.606 1.89*   -0.219 1.38   -0.237 1.50   -0.205 1.03   -0.211 1.06 
VDC borders India -3.402 1.38   -3.391 1.39   3.462 2.02**   3.403 1.99**   -3.232 2.26**   -3.287 2.31** 
VDC level emigration rate, 2001 -0.360 12.33***   -0.363 12.46***   -0.472 15.65***   -0.477 16.03***   -0.024 0.44   -0.026 0.48 
                                    
Indirect Effect                                   
Conflict Intensity -3.348 3.33***   -15.879 4.61***   -4.483 1.29   -18.765 2.22**   -1.350 1.53   -12.538 5.18*** 
Δ Share of Working age (15-59) 169.234 7.79***   152.036 6.69***   -175.254 1.84*   -187.620 1.58   182.940 9.00***   157.302 7.55*** 
Δ literacy rate -106.600 6.84***   -90.294 5.74***   -204.200 1.87*   -171.850 1.51   -125.910 6.80***   -99.500 5.56*** 
Δ Share of 15-59 schooled to grade ≥8 -53.857 4.80***   -43.942 3.75***   -65.733 1.58   -52.536 1.15   -48.947 4.57***   -34.784 3.18*** 
Δ local urban activity (night lights DN) -0.017 0.03   0.167 0.26   0.914 0.99   1.012 0.94   -1.156 1.77*   -0.951 1.45 
VDC borders India -16.711 3.30***   -17.558 3.46***   -1.862 0.16   0.311 0.03   -22.408 4.37***   -23.587 4.71*** 
VDC level emigration rate, 2001 0.449 13.86***   0.461 14.05***   0.521 4.59***   0.564 3.57***   1.135 11.02***   1.191 11.73*** 
                                    
Total Effect                                   
Conflict Intensity -3.906 3.93***   -7.600 4.55***   -4.704 1.28   -8.185 0.99   -1.877 2.02**   -8.339 4.87*** 
Δ Share of Working age (15-59) 141.179 6.55***   122.528 5.37***   -222.454 2.26**   -233.440 1.90*   179.193 8.51***   152.044 6.99*** 
Δ literacy rate -118.470 7.19***   -103.752 6.24***   -211.329 1.84*   -180.299 1.52   -124.837 6.22***   -97.470 5.03*** 
Δ Share of 15-59 schooled to grade ≥8 -56.044 4.54***   -46.378 3.58***   -67.841 1.53   -55.389 1.13   -44.518 3.69***   -29.643 2.41** 
Δ local urban activity (night lights DN) -0.601 1.26   -0.440 0.91   0.695 0.78   0.775 0.74   -1.361 2.22**   -1.162 1.90* 
VDC borders India -20.113 4.63***   -20.949 4.79***   1.600 0.13   3.091 0.24   -25.641 5.15***   -26.874 5.53*** 
VDC level emigration rate, 2001 0.089 4.89***   0.099 5.26***   0.049 0.46   0.086 0.58   1.111 11.38***   1.165 12.23*** 




In contrast, if the district-level conflict rates are used, a direct effect of conflict in seeming to 
increase emigration appears. Specifically, higher conflict intensity (of one death per thousand) 
would seem to directly increase the VDC-level emigration rate by eight persons per thousand for 
all-destinations emigration, and by eleven persons per thousand to India. However, these direct 
effects are offset by even larger negative indirect effects, so that the total effect of one more death 
per thousand appears as a suppression of the 2001 to 2011 increase in the emigration rate of 
between 4.6 persons per thousand for emigration to India and 8.2 persons per thousand for 
emigration to other Asia and the Middle East. These total effects are up to four times larger than 
those that are estimated when the conflict intensity is measured at the VDC level. This 
overstatement is most likely due to the mean-reverting measurement error that results from using 
conflict data that are too spatially aggregated, compared to using the VDC-level conflict data. 
3.4.1 Sensitivity Analysis 
The results presented in Table 3.2 have several control variables included to ensure regression 
coefficients on conflict rates are not capturing effects of omitted relevant variables. Yet there may 
be concerns that some of these controls could be endogenous, if changes in emigration affect, say, 
the measured change in VDC-level literacy rates (as may happen if emigration is skill-selective).18 
In order to allay these concerns, we also estimated models without control variables from the census 
(working age share, literacy rate and share of the working age with Grade 8 or higher schooling). 
We report results from this sensitivity analysis in Figure 3.6, with the first column showing the 
direct, indirect, and total effects for emigration to all countries, to India, and to non-India 
destinations, with conflict measured either at the VDC level or the district level. These results 
correspond to those in Table 3.3, and are the baseline specification for the sensitivity analysis. The 
charts in the second column show the results without control variables. The patterns are exactly the 
 
18 The format of the Nepal census questions allows us to construct controls that should not be (mechanically) 
endogenous to village-level emigration rates, because we have proxy information on characteristics of emigrants so we 
can calculate changes with and without the emigrants included. For the change in the village level literacy rates the two 
ways of calculating the variable are highly correlated (r=0.97). 
85 
 
same as with control variables but the magnitudes are larger. Hence, our findings that using district 
level death rates leads to exaggerated impacts, that conflict had less effect on emigration to India, 
and that the indirect effects exceed direct effects are all repeated. Therefore, our main results in 
Table 3.3 can be thought of as a lower bound estimate of how much bias comes from using overly-
aggregated conflict data, as we could have gotten larger effects by excluding control variables from 
the main specification. 
In addition, if the studied conflict period is expanded to 2001-2004 from 2002-2004, in 
order to see if using 2001 conflict as baseline makes any difference to the estimates, the estimated 
effect of conflict on emigration is still very similar to what is reported when the focus is on the 
2002-2004 conflict. The primary reason for this is that the government mobilised Nepalese Army 
only in November 2001 and it is after this that the conflict was escalated. Thus, the data on conflict 
for periods from 2001 is similar to the data on conflict for periods from 2002, given that it was only 
very late in 2001 that escalation occurred. Indeed, until 2001 less than 600 villages have 
experienced some form of conflict and only 20 percent of deaths occurred up to this point in time. 
Figure 3.6: Main results are robust to inclusion or exclusion of control variables: 
Estimated direct, indirect and total impacts of conflict intensity 
With Control Variables Without Control Variables 
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Emigration to Other Asia and the Middle East 
  
Notes: Direct, indirect, and total effects average over all 3982 VDCs, as in Table 3. Results in the first column 
are for models with working age share, literacy rate and grade 8 or above education rate included in regression 





















































































































































In this paper, we show that research into the microeconomic effects of civil conflict may be 
distorted if conflict data are overly aggregated. A common research design in this literature is to 
match census or survey data on microeconomic outcomes (especially for human capital indicators) 
to data on conflict intensity that is reported at a more spatially aggregated level. Typically the 
conflict data is reported for the first or second sub-national level even though there may be more 
finely-grained locations listed in the original field reports on instances of conflict-related deaths. 
In the civil war in Nepal, the conflict was mostly very localized, with almost half of 
localities suffering no conflict-related deaths and with much greater variation in death rates within 
districts than between districts. Yet if district-level conflict data are used, the conflict appears much 
more generalized, with only three percent of districts not affected. Spatially aggregated death rates 
have a mean-reverting measurement error, to the extent that the behaviour of individuals living in 
conflict is most affected by their local conflict rate. When we use the finely grained data, a greater 
intensity of conflict during Nepal’s civil war is associated with a slight depressing effect on the 
growth in emigration, equivalent to about ten percent of the growth that occurred from 2001 to 
2011. However, if we use more aggregated conflict data, the conflict appears to have far larger 
effects – both indirectly and directly. This exaggeration of estimated impacts is to be expected when 
there is a strong mean-reverting error in right-hand side variables of regression models. This 
problem of using conflict data that are reported at an overly-aggregated spatial level, which makes 
the conflict appear much more widespread than it truly is and creates a mean-reverting error, may 
undermine the contribution that empirical studies of conflict can make. 
In the specific context of Nepal, the importance of distinguishing between low-cost, 
informal, and higher cost, formal, emigration is also highlighted. The growth in informal emigration 
to India appears less deterred by conflict. Given the free mobility across the India-Nepal border, a 
migrant could leave their home area and travel to an employment destination in India via multiple 
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routes in order to avoid conflict hotspots. The same flexibility was not available for accessing 
migration to the Middle East and other destinations that required an expensive (and sometimes 
lengthy) process of obtaining a passport, a visa, and being recruited. This process may have entailed 
repeated trips to Kathmandu and conflict either in the home locality or in localities on the way to 
Kathmandu could deter some potential emigrants, which is why the indirect effects from spatial 
spillovers also matter. More generally, the idea that conflict can increase costs of migration and 
interfere with the ability to finance migration may matter to post-war reconstruction policy that may 
assume that conflict is mainly a push factor for migration. It is possible that people in conflict-
affected areas need additional support to access migration opportunities that can help in rebuilding 
livelihoods. 
3.6 Reflection on this chapter 
The results in this chapter suggest that the indirect impact of civil conflict on emigration appears to 
be very large and dominates the direct impact, which is a finding that requires further discussion. 
There are multiple channels through which indirect effects of civil conflict can transmit from one 
locality to another, and disrupt the economic opportunity, mobility, and livelihoods of people in other 
areas. First, the higher conflict in one village not only affects the household's income generating 
capacity in the same village but also on its neighbours, because villages in Nepal are interconnected 
and interdependent. People move from one village to another for livelihood opportunities. A second 
reason is that emigration to the Middle East and high-income Asian countries requires travel to 
Kathmandu for visa and recruitment (and often multiple trips are needed for these purposes). So, 
conflict in neighbouring villages or in the neighbours of neighbours can interfere with these types of 
journeys. In contrast, one can select multiple routes to avoid conflict hotspots if one wanted to 
emigrate to India, given the long open border between Nepal and India. Furthermore, the conflict in 
neighbouring villages increased the risk and restricted the mobility to work or participate in any 
income generating activities. Villages are linked by labour markets, marriage markets and informal 
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finance markets, so disruptions in neighbouring villages may affect the ability to pay the upfront costs 
of emigration to non-India destinations, for example, by lowering labour demand, or by reducing the 
ability to take informal loans. The conflict and destruction of local market in neighbouring villages 
also would have negative consequences in income by preventing households from participating in 
market-oriented activities.  
Additionally, the inclusion in the models of the temporal emigration rate in 2001 requires further 
discussion. The temporal lag of the emigration rate is used as an additional control variable to allow 
for the fact that there may be some villages that exhibit convergence or that neighbouring villages 
may have a network effect that operates over time. For example, a higher emigration rate in 2001 
may leave less scope for the emigration rate to grow over the 2001 to 2011 period or alternatively the 
network between people in neighbouring villages that helps in job search and recruitment may 
encourage more emigration. This additional control essentially isolates the impact of the emigration 
rate on growth of emigration over 2001 to 2011 if baseline emigration correlates with conflict over 
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Table 3.1: Variable definition and descriptive statistics (N=3982) 
    Mean  Std Dev  Minimum Maximum 
Δ VDC level emigration rate to all countries (emigrants per 1000 population)   39.351   37.589   -143.128   318.253 
Δ VDC level emigration rate to India (emigrants per 1000 population)   0.289   29.365   -212.253   280.411 
Δ VDC level emigration rate to other Asia and Middle East (per 1000 population)   37.01   30.184   -26.805   180.328 
VDC conflict Intensity (Deaths per 1000 population at peak period (2002-2004) of conflict)   0.446   1.267   0   27.746 
District conflict Intensity (Deaths per 1000 population at peak period (2002-2004) of conflict)   0.463   0.442   0   2.706 
Δ share of working age (15-59) population to total population   0.014   0.0475   -0.304   0.215 
Δ literacy rate (share of individuals in the VDC who are literate)    0.173   0.086   -0.37   0.551 
Δ share of individuals aged 15-59 with schooling to grade ≥ 8   0.102   0.12   -0.611   0.717 
Δ local urban activity (proxied by night light digital number (DN) | luminosity ˃20%)   -0.001   1.648   -17.913   19.25 
VDC borders India (=1, otherwise zero)   0.076   0.265   0   1 
VDC level emigration rate to all countries, 2001 (emigrants per 1000 population)   41.539   49.12   0   370.69 
VDC level emigration rate to India, 2001 (emigrants per 1000 population)   34.01   45.949   0   362.069 
VDC level emigration rate to other Asia and Middle East, 2001 (per 1000 population)   6.893   12.623   0   121.827 
 Source: Author’s calculations from census extracts, from INSEC data on the conflict, and from DMSP night lights. 




Appendix Table 3.1a: Regression models for the change in the emigration rate (to All Countries) between 2001 and 2011, at VDC level, Nepal 
  Spatial Durbin Models   Ordinary Least Squares Models 
  During Peak (2002-04) Entire War (1996-08)   During Peak (2002-04) Entire War (1996-08) 
Conflict intensity (at VDC level) -0.483 0.369 -0.194 0.295   -0.796 -0.754 -0.757 -0.728 
  (0.91) (0.80) (0.52) (0.91)   (1.70)* (1.61)* (2.34)** (2.24)** 
 share of working age (15-59) -31.834 -47.665 -32.689 -49.074   34.678 33.372 33.561 32.264 
  (2.29)** (3.25)*** (2.35)** (3.35)***   (2.74)*** (2.64)*** (2.65)*** (2.55)** 
 literacy rate -9.488 -9.687 -9.447 -9.524   -37.527 -37.034 -37.132 -36.643 
  (1.29) (1.27) (1.29) (1.25)   (5.40)*** (5.33)*** (5.34)*** (5.27)*** 
 share of 15-59 schooled to grade  8 -0.985 -6.163 -0.979 -6.100   -15.376 -16.601 -15.067 -16.31 
  (0.20) (1.21) (0.20) (1.19)   (3.03)*** (3.29)*** (2.97)*** (3.23)*** 
 local urban activity (night lights DN) -0.584 -0.609 -0.58 -0.606   -0.803 -0.786 -0.803 -0.786 
  (1.73)* (1.82)* (1.73)* (1.82)*   (2.24)** (2.19)** (2.24)** (2.19)** 
VDC borders India -3.029 -2.208 -3.002 -2.159   -9.74 -9.094 -9.84 -9.186 
  (1.20) (0.89) (1.19) (0.87)   (4.43)*** (4.07)*** (4.37)*** (4.11)*** 
Emigration rate to all countries, 2001 -0.370   -0.370     -0.031   -0.031   
  (12.41)*** (12.42)***   (2.56)**   (2.59)***   
W  Conflict intensity  -3.563 -3.749 -2.020 -2.205           
  (3.14)*** (3.32)*** (2.64)*** (2.93)***           
W   share of working age (15-59) 190.341 171.657 188.364 170.182           
  (7.08)*** (6.58)*** (6.99)*** (6.53)***           
W    literacy rate -114.502 -80.003 -115.147 -80.723           
  (8.96)*** (6.30)*** (8.98)*** (6.32)***           
W   share of 15-59 schooled to grade  8 -58.544 -23.829 -58.57 -23.964           
  (4.81)*** (2.03)** (4.78)*** (2.03)**           
W   local urban activity (night lights DN) -0.088 0.010 -0.059 0.080           
  (0.12) (0.13) (0.08) (0.11)           
W  VDC borders India -17.668 -17.653 -17.935 -17.905           
  (3.10)*** (3.25)*** (3.16)*** (3.29)***           
W  Emigration rate to all countries, 2001 0.558   0.556             
  (13.75)*** (13.69)***           
Spatial lag of change in emigration rate () 0.183 0.433 0.183 0.434           
  (2.84)*** (6.87)*** (2.82)*** (6.85)***           
(Pseudo-)R2 0.1513 0.053 0.150 0.052   0.017 0.016 0.018 0.016 
Wald test for model (Chi-squared) 422.79 299.80 418.46 299.46   69.90 63.18 72.45 65.70 
Notes: t-statistics from heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in ( ), ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, or 10%. N=3982. Wald-tests have 13[12] degrees of freedom for SDM and 7[6] for 




Appendix Table 3.1b: Regression models for the change in the emigration rate to India between 2001 and 2011, at VDC level, Nepal 
  Spatial Durbin Models   Ordinary Least Squares Models 
  During Peak (2002-04) Entire War (1996-08)   During Peak (2002-04) Entire War (1996-08) 
Conflict intensity (at VDC level) -0.011 1.022 0.062 0.662   0.173 0.387 0.075 0.058 
  (0.03) (2.84)*** (0.23) (2.73)***   (0.49) (1.06) (0.31) (0.23) 
 share of working age (15-59) -38.119 -41.341 -38.323 -42.524   -80.257 -81.97 -80.916 -82.191 
  (3.91)*** (3.68)*** (3.95)*** (3.80)***   (8.42)*** (8.30)*** (8.47)*** (8.35)*** 
 literacy rate 3.453 -3.832 3.414 -3.76   9.885 8.932 10.068 9.084 
  (0.67) (0.64) (0.66) (0.63)   (1.89)* (1.65)* (1.92)* (1.68) 
 share of 15-59 schooled to grade  8 1.296 -8.876 1.310 -8.852   -1.970 -7.987 -1.793 -7.834 
  (0.36) (2.21)** (0.36) (2.20)**   (0.51) (2.03)** (0.47) (1.99)** 
 local urban activity (night lights DN) -0.266 -0.315 -0.264 -0.314   -0.138 -0.069 -0.137 -0.068 
  (1.48) (1.41) (1.47) (1.41)   (0.51) (0.25) (0.51) (0.24) 
VDC borders India 3.558 2.25 3.572 2.28   3.906 6.285 3.856 6.246 
  (2.17)** (1.23) (2.18)** (1.24)   (2.31)** (3.61)*** (2.28)** (3.59)*** 
Emigration rate to India, 2001 -0.499   0.500     -0.156   -0.157   
  (16.09)*** (16.19)***   (15.96)*** (15.99)*** 
W  Conflict intensity  -1.259 -2.287 -0.777 -1.317           
  (1.39) (2.28)** (1.36) (2.02)**           
W   share of working age (15-59) -14.093 32.075 -12.646 33.262           
  (0.58) (1.34) (0.52) (1.39)           
W   literacy rate -60.024 -9.455 -60.861 -10.065           
  (6.71)*** (0.95) (6.74)*** (1.00)           
W   share of 15-59 schooled to grade  8 -19.489 7.268 -19.309 6.977           
  (2.19)** (0.72) (2.14)** (0.68)           
W   local urban activity (night lights DN) 0.497 0.376 0.482 0.369           
  (1.35) (0.75) (1.30) (0.73)           
W  VDC borders India -3.76 -2.021 -4.087 -2.081           
  (1.04) (0.47) (1.14) (0.49)           
W  Emigration rate to India, 2001 0.600   0.601             
  (14.72)*** (14.72)***           
Spatial lag of change in emigration rate () 0.911 1.131 0.927 1.130           
  (9.76)*** (10.06)*** (10.10)*** (10.14)***         
(Pseudo-)R2 0.1211 0.0047 0.1163 0.0017   0.084 0.025 0.084 0.025 
Wald test for model (Chi-squared) 487.63 253.16 494.55 255.94   363.23 101.88 363.02 100.80 
 Notes: t-statistics from heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in ( ), ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, or 10%. N=3982. Wald-tests have 13[12] degrees of freedom for SDM and 




Appendix Table 3.1c: Regression models for change in the emigration rate to Other Asia and the Middle East between 2001 and 2011, at VDC level, Nepal 
  Spatial Durbin Models   Ordinary Least Squares Models 
  During Peak (2002-04) Entire War (1996-08)   During Peak (2002-04) Entire War (1996-08) 
Conflict intensity (at VDC level) -0.445 -0.443 -0.227 -0.248   -1.189 -1.212 -0.731 -0.82 
  (1.90)* (1.96)* (1.33) (1.50)   (3.40)*** (3.28)*** (3.02)*** (3.21)*** 
 share of working age (15-59) -13.709 -17.930 -13.461 -17.799   76.269 97.844 76.136 97.385 
  (1.47) (1.90)* (1.45) (1.89)*   (8.04)*** (9.82)*** (8.02)*** (9.76)*** 
 literacy rate 7.929 4.155 7.584 4.033   -19.85 -34.386 -19.728 -34.15 
  (1.90)* (0.98) (1.81)* (0.96)   (3.80)*** (6.28)*** (3.77)*** (6.63)*** 
 share of 15-59 schooled to grade  8 7.095 7.020 6.929 6.952   -6.978 -5.923 -6.917 -5.791 
  (2.21)** (2.23)** (2.15)** (2.21)**   (1.85)* (1.49) (1.83)* (1.45) 
 local urban activity (night lights DN) -0.142 -0.166 -0.139 -0.165   -0.732 -0.785 -0.734 -0.786 
  (0.66) (0.79) (0.65) (0.79)   (2.74)*** (2.78)*** (2.74)*** (2.78)*** 
VDC borders India -2.012 -2.164 -2.032 -2.154   -9.890 -13.675 -9.927 -13.709 
  (1.32) (1.43) (1.33) (1.42)   (5.90)*** (7.76)*** (5.91)*** (7.78)*** 
Emigration rate to India, 2001 -0.086   -0.086     0.768   0.767   
  (1.51) (1.53) 
 
(21.55)*** (21.50)*** 
W  Conflict intensity  -0.637 -0.206 0.176 0.264           
  (1.01) (0.34) (0.44) (0.68)           
W   share of working age (15-59) 129.084 125.221 130.965 125.076           
  (6.72)*** (7.05)*** (6.76)*** (7.02)***           
W   literacy rate -87.956 -103.633 -90.166 -105.305           
  (11.26)*** (14.60)*** (11.60)*** (14.86)***         
 
W   share of 15-59 schooled to grade  8 -36.554 -26.346 -37.751 -27.236           
  (5.09)*** (3.78)*** (5.24)*** (3.91)***           
W   local urban activity (night lights DN) -0.681 -0.509 -0.698 -0.513           
  (1.33) (1.01) (1.37) (1.03)           
W  VDC borders India -13.639 -16.297 -13.286 -15.962           
  (3.58)*** (4.25)*** (3.47)*** (4.15)***           
W  Emigration rate to India, 2001 (0.801)   0.799             
  (7.70)*** (7.67)*** 
 
        
Spatial lag of change in emigration rate () 0.588 0.738 0.590 0.743           
  (11.54)*** (22.77)*** (11.50)*** (22.98)***         
(Pseudo-)R2 0.2935 0.1476 0.2922 0.1465   0.1515 0.0524 0.1510 0.0522 
Wald test for model (Chi-squared) 2065.32 2084.4 2044.17 2084.52   709.80 219.60 706.93 219.12 
 Notes: t-statistics from heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors in ( ), ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, or 10%. N=3982. Wald-tests have 13[12] degrees of freedom for SDM and 
7[6] for OLS, with smaller value in [ ] for models without the temporal lag of the emigration rate. The spatial weights matrix, W uses first-order Queen contiguity. 
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Appendix Table 3.2: Estimated direct, indirect, and total impacts after including VDC and District conflict in one model  
Change in emigration rate to   All countries            India         Other 
Direct Effect dy/dx t-stat   dy/dx t-stat   dy/dx t-stat 
Village Conflict Intensity -0.474 (0.89)   -0.50 (1.00)   -0.25 0.98 
District Conflict Intensity 8.720 (2.65)***   11.05 (4.59)***   4.41 (2.35)** 
Δ Share of Working age (15-59) -29.257 (2.15)**   -45.27 (4.34)***   -6.38 (0.71) 
Δ literacy rate -13.241 (1.85)*   -8.19 (1.14)   1.71 (0.40) 
Δ Share of 15-59 schooled to grade ≥8 -2.391 (0.48)   -2.90 (0.63)   5.20 (1.56) 
Δ local urban activity (night lights DN) -0.608 (1.89)*   -0.24 (1.53)   -0.21 (1.06) 
VDC borders India -3.367 (1.38)   3.41 (1.99)**   -3.24 (2.28)** 
VDC level emigration rate, 2001 -0.364 (12.46)***   -0.48 (16.01)*** -0.03 (0.47) 
Indirect Effect                 
Village Conflict Intensity -1.608 (1.31)   -5.76 (1.15)   1.50 (1.32) 
District Conflict Intensity -14.271 (3.98)***   -13.20 (1.67)*   -13.97 (5.17)*** 
Δ Share of Working age (15-59) 153.740 (6.74)***   -183.44 (1.55)   156.84 (7.46)*** 
Δ literacy rate -89.871 (5.72)***   -170.53 (1.51)   -101.56 (5.64)*** 
Δ Share of 15-59 schooled to grade ≥8 -44.386 (3.78)***   -54.06 (1.16)   -34.89 (3.16)*** 
Δ local urban activity (night lights DN) 0.139 (0.22)   0.94 (0.87)   -0.94 (1.42) 
VDC borders India -17.646 (3.47)***   -0.36 (0.03)   -23.84 (4.71)*** 
VDC level emigration rate, 2001 0.460 (14.02)*** 0.56 (3.53)***   1.19 (11.68)*** 
Total Effect                 
Village Conflict Intensity -2.082 (1.60)   -6.25 (1.18)   1.24 (1.01) 
District Conflict Intensity -5.551 (2.58)***   -2.15 (0.27)   -9.56 (4.26)*** 
Δ Share of Working age (15-59) 124.484 (5.43)***   -228.71 (1.87)*   150.46 (6.84)*** 
Δ literacy rate -103.111 (6.21)***   -178.72 (1.52)   -99.86 (5.13)*** 
Δ Share of 15-59 schooled to grade ≥8 -46.777 (3.60)***   -56.96 (1.14)   -29.68 (2.39)** 
Δ local urban activity (night lights DN) -0.469 (0.97)   0.69 (0.66)   -1.15 (1.86)* 
VDC borders India -21.013 (4.78)***   3.05 (0.23)   -27.08 (5.50)*** 
VDC level emigration rate, 2001 0.097 (5.14)***   0.08 (0.56)   1.17 (12.17)*** 
Notes: dy/dx denotes marginal effect, which is derived from SDM. t-statistics with heteroscedastic errors,  ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, or 10%. N=3982 
VDCs.  a Other is other Asia and Middle East 
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Abstract 
In the last two decades, Nepal experienced a significant rise in work-related migration and 
subsequent remittance inflows. We examine the impacts on child education and child labour in a 
two-wave panel constructed from the 2008 Nepal Labour Force Survey and the 2010 Nepal Living 
Standards Survey. We use grade-specific net enrolment rates rather than the more commonly 
studied attendance rate, and exploit variation in destination-driven predicted migration as an 
instrumental variable. Migration and remittances appear to raise net enrolment of children in 
secondary education. The positive effect on school outcomes is complemented by a fall in child 
labour force participation. The effects appear larger for children aged ten and above, and seem to 
predominantly operate through remittances.  
Keywords: Human capital, child labour, migration, school enrolment, Nepal 




Labour migration from developing to developed countries has recently increased and is now an 
important livelihood strategy for many people in poor countries. The impact of this mobility on the 
welfare of the left-behind population, and especially on child labour and school outcomes, is of 
great interest (McKenzie & Rapoport, 2011; Davis & Brazil, 2016). The education of left-behind 
children is of particular interest to policymakers, given that human capital helps the escape from 
poverty by raising future earnings. In light of this interest, the current study identifies the impact of 
migration and remittances on child labour force participation and schooling in Nepal, which is a 
major supplier of work-related emigrants. 
Theoretical studies emphasize positive effects of migration options on child human capital. 
Higher expected earnings from the prospect of migration raise expected returns to education; the 
higher returns to skill in the future induces human capital formation today (Batista et al., 2012; 
Beine et al., 2011; Beine et al., 2008; Beine et al., 2001; Fan & Stark, 2007; Gibson & McKenzie, 
2010). Yet effects of migration on child schooling are not straightforward. Some theoretical and 
empirical studies find either no effects or even negative effects of migration on schooling (Acharya 
& Leon-Gonzalez, 2014, 2019; Acosta, 2011; Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo, 2010; Bucheli et al., 
2018; Cellini, (2007); Davis & Brazil, 2016; Di Maria & Lazarova, 2012; Koska et al., 2013; 
McKenzie & Rapoport, 2011; Nguyen & Nguyen, 2015; Shrestha, 2017). Suggested reasons for a 
lack of positive impact include: parental absence and family disruption; the need for extra workers 
due to household labour shortages; and, increased opportunity cost of participating in higher 
education if local wages rise.19 Having a migrant family member in a foreign country may also dis-
incentivize children from pursuing education if they perceive that less-skilled jobs in the destination 
can fetch them higher income from migrating rather than staying in school (Bredl, 2011; Salas, 
2014).  
 
19 Migration may force children to skip school and to participate in the labour market to help make up for the monetary 
loss faced when economically productive co-residents leave the household to go abroad. 
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A typical outcome of migration is subsequent remittances. Many studies from developing 
countries like Egypt, Mexico, Nepal, El Salvador, Sri Lanka, Ecuador, Peru, and Haiti find positive 
effects of remittances on schooling (Acharya & Leon-Gonzalez, 2014, 2018; Acosta, 2011; Alcaraz 
et al., 2010; Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo, 2010; Azizi, 2018; Bredl, 2011; Bucheli et al., 2018; Calero 
et al., 2009; De & Ratha, 2012; Koska et al, 2013; Ngoma & Ismail, 2013; Salas, 2014; Shrestha, 
2017) although Karki Nepal (2016) finds no significant impact on enrolment and child labour. The 
effects may also differ between boys and girls, and between quantity (enrolments) and quality (such 
as sending children to private schools).  
The empirical ambiguity of remittance effects reflects the fact that, theoretically, there can 
be offsetting effects. In one direction, remittances help households to overcome borrowing 
constraints and smooth consumption, which matters because many people in developing countries 
lack access to credit (Bredl, 2011; Gyimah-Brempong & Asiedu, 2015; Köllner, 2013; Kugler, 
2006; Mansuri, 2006; McKenzie & Rapoport, 2011; Melkonyan & Grigorian, 2008). These 
borrowing constraints may limit human capital investment, which translates into lower secondary 
school enrolment rates (given that this level of schooling is more costly than primary schooling), 
high dropout rates and low college enrolment rates (De Gregorio, 1996; Melguizo et al., 1996; Sun 
& Yannelis, 2016). Partly due to borrowing constraints, school children may do economic work, 
adversely affecting school performance, so a big income boost (e.g. scholarships) may be needed to 
reduce child labour (Datt & Uhe, 2019). Thus remittances may alleviate the need for child labour, 
and by releasing children from working may improve their schooling (Calero et al., 2009; Nguyen 
& Nguyen, 2015). On the other hand, if remittances fund migration and if the return to migration 
exceeds the returns to schooling, then remittances may have an indirect negative effect by raising 
the opportunity costs of staying in school (Köllner, 2013).  
Previous studies on effects of migration on left-behind children tend to focus on simple 
indicators, such as whether a child is in school (for Nepal this includes Acharya & Leon-Gonzalez, 
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2014 and Shrestha, 2017). This is a relatively crude measure because most school-age children are 
in school and it does not capture any impact on the quality of schooling. For instance, after the 
introduction of Nepal’s Education for All (EFA) program (2001-08) and School Sector Reform 
Program (SSRP) (2009-2015), school attendance is already above 90 percent (CBS, 2008, 2010). 
However, children may not be in the age-appropriate grade. For example, in 2009/10 Nepal’s Gross 
Enrolment Rate (GER) at Primary and Lower Secondary level was above 120%, due to over-age 
enrolments (DOE, 2015). If we only study school attendance, rather than age-appropriate 
enrolment, the impacts of migration and remittances on the timely transition through schooling will 
be obscurred.  
Therefore, in contrast to prior studies, we consider the effect of migration and remittances 
on age-specific schooling outcomes and child labour indicators. Our age specific schooling 
measures are net enrolment rates at Basic (grade 1 to 8 for children aged 5 to 12) and Secondary 
education level (grade 9 to 12 for children aged 13 to 16), which is the new education structure in 
Nepal. We consider age-specific attendance rates of children aged 5-16, 5-12, and 13-16, and 
dropout rates for the same age ranges. 
Only a few studies, such as Karki Nepal (2016) and Datt et al. (2019), have constructed age 
related schooling outcomes similar to ours. Karki Nepal (2016) developed age specific grades for 
children aged 5-17 and assigns a value of one if the child is currently enrolled in their age specific 
grade (and zero otherwise). Datt et al. (2019) restrict their whole sample to 6-14 years old children, 
and separate outcomes by gender but not by age group. While these two studies analyse the impacts 
on the whole sample, we separate the impact of emigration on child education for two different age 
groups, children aged 5-12 and 13-16. The impact of emigration may not be apparent on younger 
children who are of an age when school education in free and the opportunity cost of going to 
school is very low, but emigration may certainly affect the educational outcomes of older children. 
The primary reason for this is that the cost of schooling increases with the age. Higher levels of 
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schooling require higher monetary commitment from parents, and also their family must forego the 
additional income from child labour of older children. To allow for this pathway, and compared to 
these two prior studies, we additionally constructed a child labour indicator to help isolate the 
particular pathways through which emigration can affect the child schooling. We develop child 
labour force participation rates, on the extensive and intensive margins, for those children aged 8-10 
and aged 11-16.     
A further difference from most studies is that we allow for local spillovers. Typically, 
studies just compare households with and without a migrant(s) abroad; this may understate the 
impacts if migration affects households without migrants through local multiplier and general 
equilibrium effects (Theoharides, 2018). For example, if migration changes the return to education 
the decisions of both migrant and non-migrant households about the optimal level of educational 
investment may be affected. Similarly, if migration affects local wages, then the opportunity cost of 
going to school changes as well. Therefore, we conduct our analysis at the PSU level (Primary 
Sampling Unit which we denote as village in this paper). The advantage of using village level data 
is that the local spillover effects will show up at village level but may be missed at household level. 
These spillover effects should matter in Nepal, where households living in the same village are 
closely interconnected and interdependent. 
The decision to migrate is endogenous (Gibson et al., 2011) and so instrumental variables 
(IV) may be used to mitigate bias in econometric estimates of migration impacts. A related source 
of bias is that cross-sectional data are often used to estimate emigration impacts, even though such 
data have a risk of bias due to omitted variables. Instead, we use panel data with village fixed 
effects to deal with time-invariant omitted factors at the village level (and time dummies to deal 
with spatially-invariant time effects). We also utilise the strength of the 2001 Census data 
(compared to Datt et al. (2019) who rely on survey data) to construct an instrumental variable, 
following the commonly used shift share approach in the literature (Christian & Barrett, 2017; 
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Jaeger et al., 2018). Specifically, we identify a plausibly exogenous instrument for the migration 
rate using village-level variation in predicted migration (derived from the destination country 
demand for migrants). This is based on a trend migration rate which depends on the baseline (in 
2001) village share of migrants in each destination. We assume that a demand shock (change in 
demand for migrants) in the destination would primarily affect villages with stronger pre-existing 
migrant networks to that destination. The variation in predicted migration rates is determined by the 
factors outside of Nepal, and so such factors should only affect child schooling and child labour in 
Nepal through the migration and remittances channel.    
We use two nationally representative household surveys - National Labour Force Survey 
2008 and National Living Standard Survey 2010 – to construct a two-period village-level panel. We 
find that migration increases net enrolment rate in secondary education, and this positive effect 
occurs through reduced child labour for those aged 11-16. One pathway through which this effect 
could occur is that migration and remittances help credit constrained households to cover schooling 
costs and compensate for the foregone earnings from child labour. Yet the opposite picture would 
emerge if we were to just estimate effects on attendance and dropouts, as in some previous studies; 
specifically, migration seems to decrease attendance and increase dropouts. However, because of 
Nepal’s universal free education program, the dropout rate is very low (especially in the 2010 
survey) and so the estimated effect is for a rare outcome. Plausibly, there is more to be learned from 
examining the net enrolment rates in order to see overall schooling impacts that account for timely 
progress through the various school grades. 
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section II briefly describes education and migration in 
Nepal and Section III discuss the data, methodology and empirical strategy. Section IV presents the 




4.2.1 School education in Nepal 
Nepal has three schooling systems- public (community-based), institutional (private) and religious 
(Madrasas). Of the 36,016 schools nationwide, 30,034 are public, 5087 are private and the other 
895 are religious schools. Community schools are funded by the government and managed by the 
school management committee (SMC). Institutional schools are privately owned and managed, are 
fully funded by fees paid by parents for school-related activities, and have become more widespread 
(especially in urban areas) after the education sector was opened for private investment. The 
institutional schools are considered to be quality education providers and they charge high fees. The 
religious schools are Madarasha, Gumba, and Gurukul, they are few in number and are operated 
and funded by the religious organizations.  
For a long time (1850-1950) under the rule of Rana, education in Nepal was centralized and 
limited to the ruling and high caste elites. The end of Rana period brought the provision of the 
decentralized education system in Nepal, and during the Panchayat system, the 1971 Education Act 
was introduced along with the national education plan to nationalize school education. These 
schools were managed at the local level with centralized control. Later, in an effort to decentralise 
management of public schools, the EASA 2001 (Education Act Seventh Amendment) has aided 
establishing school management committees (SMC) with full representation of parents. 
More recently, universal free education is seen as a way to address poverty and to achieve 
high economic growth. To boost the universal access to quality education, Ministry of Education 
(MOE) has initiated a number of strategies and reform programs including BPEP I (1992-1998), 
BPEP-II (1998-2003), EFA program (2001-08), and SSRP (2009-2015). Through these programs, 
MOE has introduced and developed planning and strategies to transform school education and 
increase access to quality education. The Education for All (EFA) program has focused on 
improving access and quality of primary education and supported the tradition of community 
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management in school. Under EFA, the government has supported free compulsory primary 
education to increase the participation from disadvantaged and marginalized groups. To further 
increase access and complete educational sector reform, the government has introduced SSRP 
(2009-2015). The main goal of SSRP was to meet Millennium Development Goals in education, 
and it was also aimed to expand equitable access to education, improve quality and relevance, and 
strengthen the institutional capacity of the entire school education system.  
Previously, Nepal’s education system had primary level (grade 1 to 5), lower secondary 
level (grade 6-8), secondary level (grade 9-10) and higher secondary level (grade 11-12) that should 
correspond to ages 5-9, 10-12, 13-14 and 15-16. The 8th Amendment to the Education Act, in 2016, 
reclassified school education in two broad categories- Basic Education (1-8 grade) and Secondary 
Education (9-12 grade) that should be for children aged 5-12 and 13-16.20 In 2011, while the gross 
enrolment rate at basic and secondary education was as high as 124.4% and 86%, net enrolment 
rates were just 46.2% and 27.1% (Ministry of Education, 2016). The high gross enrolments at 
primary level and very low net enrolments at secondary and higher secondary level (see Table 4.1 
for details) indicates that the school progression rate is very poor and over-aged children are 
enrolled. The universal free education and partial scholarship program, especially for girls, is 
mandated by the constitution of Nepal. This has increased access to education, yet school 
progression at secondary education level remains low. Moreover, given that child labour coexists 
with schooling, any small value of scholarships may not be sufficient to reduce child labour (Datt & 
Uhe, 2019) and raise school retention. Therefore, other factors like family income, including from 
remittances, are also important to improve children’s access to education.
 
20 Education Act 8th Amendment has categorised school education into Basic and secondary education. Basic education 
(until 8 schooling year) includes Early Childhood Development (ECD) to Lower secondary level while secondary 
education (9-12 schooling year) includes Secondary (9-10) and Higher secondary (11-12) level (MOE, 2016). 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics  (N=499) 
  NLFS 2008   NLSS 2010 
  Mean Std Dev   Mean Std Dev 
Basic Education (grade 1-8) enrolment rate for child aged 5 -12 0.705 0.148   0.813 0.031 
Secondary Education (grade 9-12) enrolment rate for child aged 13 -16 0.176 0.178   0.361 0.288 
Primary level (grade 1-5) Gross Enrolment Rate for children of all age 1.397 0.626   1.358 0.609 
Primary level (grade 1-5) Net Enrolment Rate for children of aged 5-9 0.552 0.194  0.718 0.235 
Lower secondary level (grade 6-8) Gross Enrolment Rate for children of all age 0.854 0.63   0.984 0.662 
Lower secondary level (grade 6-8) Net Enrolment Rate for child aged 10-12 0.137 0.171   0.326 0.306 
Secondary level (grade 9-10) Gross Enrolment Rate for children of all age 0.591 0.66   0.929 0.867 
Secondary level (grade 9-10) Net Enrolment Rate for child aged 13-14 0.061 0.129   0.191 0.277 
Higher Secondary level (grade 11-12) Gross Enrolment Rate for children of all age 1.307 1.874   0.935 1.038 
Higher Secondary level (grade 11-12) Net Enrolment Rate for child aged 15-16 0.078 0.17   0.137 0.252 
Attendance rate for children of all age  0.903 0.114   0.919 0.115 
Dropout rate for children of all age 0.129 0.028   0.011 0.031 
Child labour force participation (child labour) for child aged 11-16 0.495 0.322   0.588 0.332 
Child labour force participation (child labour) for child aged 8-10 0.232 0.273   0.324 0.342 
Hours spend in labour market by child aged 11-16 21.928 15.20  16.909 13.988 
Hours spend in labour market by child aged 8-10 8.678 10.212  6.208 8.234 
Migration rate (in 1,000 ppln) 71.525 50.584   85.738 59.196 
Average remittance received by Household in PSU (In NPR) 3705 5993   4471 6703 
Note: Above figure are rates which ranges from 0 to 1. The quantity of child labour participation is reported in average number of hours spend in last seven days. Migration rate is measured as number of 
migrants in per thousand of population. The average remittance includes remittance from all the sources which is divided by no of household in PSU. Basic education includes primary and lower 




4.2.2 Migration from Nepal 
Nepal has a long history of work-related migration. After conquest of the Kathmandu valley by the 
King Prithivinayaran Shah, migration to India rose substantially, and was further augmented by 
territorial expansion of Nepal and the Sagauli peace treaty with the British government.21 The 1950 
open border treaty with India, which allowed free labour mobility, made India an attractive and 
low-cost destination to escape domestic unemployment, especially for households in the far-west 
and mid-west regions of Nepal that have high unemployment, poverty, and food insecurity. India is 
the first choice for people from relatively poor regions since well-established migrant’s network 
helps new migrants to find a job in Indian cities and there are no recruitment and visa costs. For 
instance, migrants from the far-west and mid-west regions of Nepal accounted for 48% and 36% of 
total work-related Nepalese migrants to India in 2001 and 2011 (CBS, 2001, 2011). 
The migration for work to other destinations, especially the Middle East, is a fairly new 
phenomenon in Nepal. The restoration of democracy in 1990 and the official move to embrace the 
market economy has facilitated and encouraged migration by allowing private recruiters to recruit 
Nepalese workers for foreign employment (GON, 2014). This new opportunity to migrate to high 
wage destinations has become a boom for the Nepali migrants, especially from central and eastern 
regions whose close proximity to the capital city aids recruitment and visa processes. People in 
these regions also have more access to finance for upfront migration-related costs. In the last 
decade, the outflow of migrants extended from Middle-East and North African countries to 
ASEAN, Hong Kong and Korea. Recently, skilled migration to OECD countries is also rising. For 
instance, one-fifth of migrants are in developed countries like USA, Canada, Europe, Japan and 
Australia (CBS, 2008, 2010). Migration to high wage destinations has become an alternative 
income-generating activity to escape high unemployment and low quality of life in Nepal. 
Consequently, the out-migration continues to rise and one-third of households have at least one 
 
21 After this treaty, the British army was permitted to recruit three Gurkha regiments from Nepalese hill people.  
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migrant member working abroad, mostly in the 15-59 age group (CBS, 2010). 
The rise in migration has led to a massive surge in remittances, rising from US$0.9 billion in 
2004/05 to US$6 billion in 2016/17. Nepal is now the sixth-highest remittance-receiving country, in 
terms of remittances as a share in national GDP. This share reached 31.3% in 2016, up from 10.7% 
in 2001. Yet actual remittance inflows are likely much higher because the informal channel 
remittances, especially from India, are difficult to track. According to CBS (2010), around 55% of 
households receive remittances each year and the average size of remittances sent per migrant is 
around US$730 a year. Of that, the average household spends around 87% on daily consumption 
and loan repayment, and just six percent is used for education and capital formation.  
4.3 Data and Methods 
We use data from the 2008 Nepal Labour Force Survey (NLFS II) and the 2010 Nepal Living 
Standard Survey (NLSS III). The primary sampling units for NLSS III are a subset of those used for 
the NLFS II, where this design was to take advantage of the cartographic segmentation and 
household listing already carried out in 2008 (CBS, 2010)22. Out of 799 PSU in NLFS II (399 
Urban and 400 Rural PSU), 174 urban and 325 rural PSU were randomly selected to provide a 
sample of 499 PSU used for NLSS III. Thus, we can average over the surveyed households in each 
PSU to construct a two-wave village-level panel to study impacts of migration and remittances, 
allowing for inter-household spillovers within villages. 
Both surveys have information on household members working abroad, and age, gender, 
ethnicity, literacy, education and employment status of household members, remittance income and 
household land ownership. We develop basic and secondary level net enrolment rates and four 
indicators for child labour force participation for school-aged (5-16) children. Our unit of 
observation is a village, and we measure migration as a rate; in terms of migrants per thousand 
 
22 In NLFS II, PSU’s are either individual wards, sub-wards, or groups of neighboring wards of a village (CBS, 2010).  
In NLSS III, 12 households are randomly selected for interview within each PSU, while 20 household are interviewed 
per PSU in NLFS II. 
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population. We calculate the average remittances per household in each village (in terms of 1000s 
of Nepalese rupees, NPR).  
We use the above information to construct as control variables, the quantity of land owned 
(a proxy for wealth), the average members per household, the share of migrants whose education is 
grade 8 or above, the share of the working-age population (15-60) in total populaton, the share of 
the working-age population with grade 8 or above education, the literacy rate, and the 
unemployment rate.23 The surveys did not have relationship matrixes to enable us to directly 
identify the parents of each child. Therefore we developed a proxy, that assumes that household 
residents aged 30 and above are likely to have a school aged children in the household. For this 30 
and above age group we calculate the proportion who have high school education or higher, and use 
this as a proxy for parental education, which is usually relevant to children's schooling outcomes. 
We also use data from the 2001 population census, to calculate for each village the international 
destinations of migrants. We separate migration to India from MEOA (Middle-East and Other Asia) 
since these are two different migration channels – informal and low-cost to India, and formal and 
high-cost to the Middle East and Other Asian countries (MEOA) (Sharma & Gibson, 2019). We 
create measures of historical migration networks separately for these two main migration channels. 
We assume that the effect of migration is mainly channeled through remittances, given that 
identifying separate effects can be difficult because migration and remittances are highly correlated. 
Also, remittances depend upon migrants becoming established in the destination, so it may take 
some time to compensate their left-behind family members for the initial loss of local income that 
the migrant would have earned if they had not emigrated. Of the total migrants from Nepal, 76% of 
them are living abroad for more than a year (CBS, 2008, 2010), and these are the ones most likely 
to send remittances. Thus, households with longer duration emigrants may see more pronounced 
 
23 We apply the definition of unemployment from NLFS II to both surveys, which is that someone did not have a job or 
business but either looked for work in the last 30 days or did not look for work but was available for work.      
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effects than do households sending new migrants. With our village-level data we are implicitly 
averaging over these differences.24  
4.3.1 The Econometric Model 
We assume that altruistic parents get utility from additional human capital of household members. 
They send children to school if they expect the discounted value of future returns from the 
additional year of schooling to outweigh the current costs. We consider that migration can have two 
opposing effects. It may decrease child human capital if parental absence, household labour 
shortages, and family disruption effects dominate. Conversely, if a household is credit constrained 
then migration-induced remittances will increase household consumption and may release the 
children from labour market activity, allowing them to spend more time in school education. 
We use a fixed-effect panel model to reduce endogeneity bias, due to unobserved village 
characteristics that are correlated with schooling and migration. Our use of village-level averages 
also helps mitigate effects of measurement error in the household-level data. Various advantages of 
panel data fixed-effect models are discussed in Hsiao (2007) and Adams Jr (2011). Our panel fixed 
effect model is as follows:  
𝑌𝑖𝑡  =  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑔 + 𝜃𝑋𝑖𝑡 +   𝑢𝑖𝑡                                             (4.1) 
𝑢𝑖𝑡  ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2𝑙𝑁)                                                                                       (4.2) 
In equation (4.1), the NT × 1 vector of dependent variables, denoted by 𝑌𝑖𝑡, is modelled as 
depending on 𝜇𝑖 and 𝜆𝑡 village and time fixed effects, the variables of main interest, migration and 
remittances, are denoted as a matrix of 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑔 and other control variables (like size of land owned, 
parents education, share of working age population) are denoted by matrix 𝑋𝑖𝑡. The 𝛽 and 𝜃 are 
 
24 Initially, the increase in income and the relaxation of credit constraints from receipt of remittances would primarily 
help a household with debt repayment, but as the duration of migration rises the effects on human capital may appear. 
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vectors of coefficients for 𝑋𝑖𝑡 and 𝑢𝑡  is a NT × 1 vector of error terms which is clustered at the 
district level for the 71 districts in the survey.  
Villages may differ in terms of their population composition, school access and quality, 
market access, labour market conditions and so on. The village and time fixed effects allow us to 
control for time-invariant village effects, and for space-invariant time effects but time-variant 
unobserved characteristics that may correlate with migration and schooling still pose a problem. 
Specifically, the endogeneity of migration may bias the estimate of 𝛽 because it is likely that 
households are not randomly participating in migration and instead there may be a simultaneity of 
migration decisions and human capital decisions, so there is threat of reverse causality. For 
example, a village with high illiteracy and poverty, low education and high rates of child labour 
may only be able to send migrants to a low-cost destination like India. So schooling, migration, and 
subsequent remittances may be affected by factors that are unobservable, but correlated with 
outcomes and with the treatment variables.  
To address potential endogeneity from migrant self-selection, a shift-share instrumental 
variables (IV) strategy is often used (Acharya & Leon-Gonzalez, 2014; Acosta, 2011; Adams Jr, 
2011; Calero et al., 2009; Datt et al., 2019; Koska et al., 2013). We use a similar Bartik-style shift 
share instrument and follow the Theoharides (2018) strategy to develop a potential instrumental 
variable for emigration. We use locality-level historical emigration to destination country shares 
from census data (from 2001) to construct this IV. Nepal has been sending migrants overseas, 
especially to India, and recently emigration for work to high-income destinations like the Middle 
East, North Africa and Malaysia has also increased. There are two potential impacts of historical 
emigration patterns on the sending locality. First, previous emigration plays the role of a network 
for new migrants and thus it increases the labour outflow by reducing the cost of emigration through 
lowering job search costs and increasing information flows. Second, the inflow of remittances helps 
households to overcome borrowing constraints and increases the financing capacity of households 
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for subsequent migration to the same destination or to other high-income destinations (noting that 
these destinations tend to be costly in terms of recruitment and visas, unlike the low cost, low return 
work-based emigration to India). The previous literature heavily relies on this IV considering that 
previous migration to a destination is a good predictor of subsequent migration, due to network 
effects (Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo, 2010; Acosta, 2011; Acharya & Leon-Gonzalez, 2014). This 
relationship is shown in Figure 4.2, for migration from Nepal to either India or MEOA where the 
emigration rates in 2001 and 2011 are strongly correlated. Therefore, to construct our IV we follow 
the following process:  
Consider the migration network in terms of the share of labour that migrated from village i 
to destination country k in year 2001 (out of the total number of people who migrated to k from 
Nepal). We then sum the total number who migrated to destination k in each year t (2008 and 2010 
given the timing of our panel). To predict the total number of migrants from the village in each 
survey year (that is, in 2008 and 2010) we weight the total migrants to destination k by the 2001 
village i migrants share to destination k. Our predicted migrant flows, which reflect destination-
driven demand for migrants, for each village are: 
𝑀𝑖𝑘𝑡







2001                                                                                                                         (4.3) 
Where 𝑀𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑝
 is the predicted number of people migrating to destination 𝑘 from village 𝑖 in 
year t, Mkt is the total number of people who migrated from Nepal to destination k in year t (2008 




2001 is the share that migrants from village i have in the total national migrants to 
destination k in the past (in 2001 in our case). First, we estimate the predicted migration rate to 
India and MEOA separately considering that these two are the major migrants’ destinations. 
Second, we sum predicted migration rate to India and MEOA to estimate total predicted migrants 
from that locality. Our predicted migration rate is a single instrumental variable which is a 
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combination of emigration to India and MEOA. Later, we normalize the total predicted migrants by 
dividing the sum by the total village population, which is essentially our instrument for migration. 
Our instrument can be interpreted as time trend migration flow as it reflects current 
emigration flow based on historical emigration rate. We expect that our predicted migration rate is a 
strong predictor of the current migration rate in each locality. Villages that have sent migrants 
previously to India or MOEA are expected to send migrants in similar manner. The existing 
migrant’s network in destination and inflow of remittances encourages further migration as the 
network helps new migrants to find jobs and the inflow of remittances helps to finance the cost of 
migration. For Nepal’s five development regions, in census 2001 to 2011 the migrants’ distribution 
across destinations is quite stable, for example, India is still a favourite destination for people from 
mid-west and far-west regions while relatively developed regions like central and eastern regions 
prefer sending migrants to MEOA. The relationship between 2001 and 2011 migrants share (refer to 
Figure 4.1 and 4.2) is quite strong, as villages continue to send migrants to destination countries at a 
similar rate, with just a small fall for India and a rise for MEOA. The local migration pattern over 
2001 and 2011 strongly suggest that early migration patterns influence outflow of migration and 
their destination choice. 
Our identification strategy will be invalid only if 2001 emigration rate correlates with the 
current child schooling outcome. In contrast, we argue that the historical emigration rate is not 
correlated with current child schooling outcomes, and any time invariant unobserved village 
characteristics that may correlate with the 2001 emigration rate is controlled for by village level 
fixed effects. Our use of the above instrumental variable along with village and time fixed effect 
should be a valid identification strategy. We estimate equation (4.1) using our village predicted 
migration rate (as derived from equation (4.3)) as instrumental variable for the actual village 
migration rate in our migration model. The resulting estimates should show the effect of migration 
on schooling and child labour and we can rule out reverse causation that would occur if the current 
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schooling conditions and child labour rates affect migration. The reason we can rule out this 
channel is that our predicted migration variable depends on the migration network from a decade 
before, yet current school enrolment and child labour rates should not matter to historical migration. 
Separately, we also estimate additional remittance models, and we use the same IV 
(equation 4.3) and replace Xitmig in equation (4.1) with Xitrem, where Xitrem stands for remittances. 
We consider that the impact of emigration channeled through remittances, and that a locality that 
had a higher emigration rate in 2001 is likely to receive more remittances today because the past 
migration network influences current emigration and that will lead to higher remittances. For 
instance, emigration and remittances are highly correlated since the primary motivation behind 
migration is getting higher earnings and sending remittances back home to improve household 
welfare. Therefore, we expect that past emigration will affect remittance inflows today through 
higher emigration, and that may affect the child schooling outcome. The validity of this IV for 
remittance model has the same reasoning as for the migration model since the impact of past 
migration affects current remittances through the channel of current emigration.  
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Figure 4.1: (a) Migrants share in India and MEOA (b) Mean of migration rate 
  

















Figure 4.2: The migrants share and migration rate in 2001 and 2011 
 




4.4 Results and discussion 
The results of the first stage equations, for the migration rate and the value of remittances received, 
are reported in Table 4.2. The instrumental variable that is derived from equation (4.3) has a strong 
first-stage effect on the migration rate (the F-test for excluding the instruments is 18.72 and 26.55 
and so it easily exceeds the usual threshold of 10 for not having weak instruments) after controlling 
for village and time fixed effects. The first stage equations closely reflect recent migration trends 
for Nepal (these trends are seen in Figure 4.1). For example, in census 2001 and 2011, overall there 
is a two-fold increase in mean migration rate, and this increase is contributed by nearly four times 
















Table 4.2: The first stage migration and remittance model estimating the effect of instrument   
  Migration Remittance 
Predicted migration rate  0.175 0.184 
  (4.698)*** (4.481)*** 
Agriculture land owned 1.132 -4.448 
  (0.560) (1.636) 
No. of Household member 4.376 3.015 
  (1.981)* (1.791)* 
Parents education (with high school or above) 61.410 67.564 
  (2.140)** (0.950) 
Share of working age (15-60) -203.554 -30.482 
  (6.412)*** (0.953) 
Share of Migrants with grade ≥ 8 5.940 14.445 
  (1.360) (1.374) 
Share of 15-60 with grade ≥ 8 3.661 0.276 
  (0.159) (0.020) 
Literacy rate aged ≥ 17 0.098 0.1315 
  (0.400) (0.648) 
Unemployment rate 47.717 80.876 
  (1.376) (0.846) 
R-Squared 0.181 0.159 
F-Statistics  18.72 26.55 
Observation 998 998 
This table shows first-stage results for migration rate instrumented with predicted migration to India and MEOA also including 
unreported time and village fixed effects. Both columns show the results from both IVs. The t-statistics in ( ) are derived from cluster-
robust standard errors (clustered at 71 Districts), ***, **, * denote 1%, 5%, 10% statistically significance. 
 
Given the validity of the instrumental variables, we proceed with the main analyses, which are laid 
out as follows (with fuller details given below). Table 4.3 contains results for the impacts of 
migration and remittances on Basic and Secondary education net enrolment rates. Table 4.4 has the 
results for the effects of migration and remittances on child labour force participation, in terms of 
the extensive margin (whether working or not) and the intensive margin (how many hours worked). 
Finally, the impacts of migration and remittances on the more typically studied indicators, of school 
attendance and the dropout rate, are reported in Table 4.5, where the purpose of these additional 
results is to contrast with the more nuanced results shown in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. 
Effect of migration on school performance 
The effect of migration on child schooling depends, in part, on how the remittances that migration 
enables help households to overcome liquidity constraints. To the extent that extra income from 
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remittances reduces the need for child labour, and provides more funds for schooling related 
expenses, it can be expected to improve indicators of school performance, such as the net enrolment 
rate. There will also be other changes due to migration, to the extent that migration opportunities 
change the decision-making of parents and children about the optimal investment in their human 
capital. The results in Table 4.3 shows that both migration and remittances have positive and 
significant effects on the net enrolment rate in secondary education for children aged from 13 to 16. 
Specifically, a rise in the migration rate by one person per thousand of population would raise the 
mean net enrolment rate at secondary school by 0.46% (p < 0.05). A similar pattern is observed for 
the net enrolment rate in lower secondary, senior secondary, and higher secondary level in Table 
A.4.2. Similarly, the remittance model shows an impact on secondary school mean net enrolment of 
around 0.44% (p < 0.01) for an increase of NPR 1,000 in the average value of remittances received. 
Another way to see the magnitude of these effects is in terms of standard deviation changes, where 
a one standard deviation increase in the migration rate and in the value of remittances received 
would result in 0.92 and 0.76 standard deviation increases in the secondary school net enrolment 
rate. While there is an overall positive effect on secondary school net enrolment rate, result in Table 
4.3 weakly indicates that the migration and remittances reduce Basic education net enrolment rate. 
The effect is significant (at p < 0.10) in migration model only.  
There are two other notable features about the results in Table 4.3. First, the effects on net 
enrolment at the Basic education level, for children aged 5-12, precisely estimated only for 
migration. There are several possible reasons for this pattern; first, there may be parental absence or 
family disruption effect of migration on the younger children that may impair their school 
performance. Second, the enrolment rates at the Basic level are universally much higher, and so 
there is less scope for between-village variation than is possible at the secondary school level and 
the estimated effect may for the rare outcome. Third, the Basic education level is far cheaper (see 
Table A.4.1 for details) and so borrowing constraints may be less binding on enrolment decisions at 
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this level. In that case, migration and the resulting receipt of remittances are less needed to 
overcome these less binding constraints. 
The second feature of Table 4.3 is that coefficient estimates are larger (and consequently 
more statistically significant) when the instrumental variables approach is used. For the fixed effects 
models without instrumental variables, even with control variables and time and village fixed 
effects, there is still the threat of reverse causality that would bias the coefficient estimates. The 
difference between the FE and FE-IV specifications reinforces the importance of having plausibly 









Table 4.3: The effect of migration on net enrolment rate at Basic and Secondary education for children aged 5-12 and 13-16   
  Basic education (aged 5-12)   Secondary education (aged13-16) 
  FE FE-IV FE FE-IV   FE FE-IV FE FE-IV 
Migration Model -0.016 -0.250      0.023 0.460    
  (0.853) (1.956)*      (1.141) (2.426)**    
Remittance Model     -0.006 -0.244       0.041 0.441 
      (0.412) (1.639)       (1.62) (3.299)*** 
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time and Village Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared (within) 0.26  0.26    0.35  0.357  
Wald test (Chi-squared)   787.06   3693.66     299.41  1273.83 
Observation 997 997 997 977 
 
992 992 992 992 
This table shows the second-stage results for educational outcome for children aged 5-12 and 13-16. Table presents both migration and remittance models. The OLS FE and FE-IV are also presented in the 
table to show the difference in the coefficients if migration is not instrumented. In FE-IV we have instrumented migration with predicted migration to India and MEOA. The t-statistics in ( ) are derived 
from cluster-robust standard errors (clustered at 71 Districts), ***, **, * denote 1%, 5%, 10% statistically significance. Note: Basic education aged 5-12 indicates the enrolment of child aged 5 to 12 in 
primary and lower secondary level. Secondary education aged 13-16 indicates the enrolment of child aged 13 to 16 in secondary and higher secondary level. Migration and remittance estimates are in 
percentage. Full results are available from authors.     
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An important feature of the Table 4.3 results is that the positive impact of migration only 
comes into play for the children aged 13 and above in secondary school. This age-specificity is 
likely due to several factors. First, the secondary school cost is much higher for households, with 
the figures in Appendix A.4.1 showing costs are up to four times as high as the cost of school at the 
Basic level. Second, in addition to the out of pocket cost of secondary education, parents also have 
to consider the opportunity cost of sending children in this age group to school. For instance, child 
labour force participation rates (for ages 10-14) in rual and urban areas are 37% and 15%, 
respectively and, around 55% of children aged 10-14 attend school while also working in the labour 
market (CBS, 2008). Thus, if remittances help households to overcome liquidity constraints, which 
lessens the need for children to be the labour market, then this effect should show up especially for 
older children at the secondary school level. Third, at the secondary level there are more private 
school options, and enrolment in these schools can be thought of as a quality response rather than a 
quantity response. This response on the quality margin may be another pathway through which 
migration and remittances help in achieving a timely completion of secondary education (Acharya 
& Leon-Gonzalez, 2014). 
Effect of migration on child labour force participation 
The migration of parents or other economically productive household members may mean that left-
behind children have to undertake additional household work or participate in the labour market to 
compensate for the foregone inputs of time and money. This may especially matter early in the 
duration of the migration tenure, because it takes time for migrants to become established and to 
save some money and send it back home (McKenzie & Rapoport, 2011). Eventually, remittances 
may rise to compensate for the income loss and the household may rearrange activities to require 
less labour or use some remittance income to hire in labour, and so when that stage is reached the 
time demands on children may fall. Consequently, at the household level there is a duration-
dependent heterogeneity in the impact of emigration and remittances on the left-behind (Gibson et 
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al., 2013) and averaging across households in a village will yield a net effect of the offsetting 
positive and negative impacts on the demand for child labour. 
It appears that for Nepal in the 2008-10 period that we study the net effect of migration and 
remittances is to reduce the risk of child labour (Table 4.4). This result is in line with previous 
studies like Calero at al. (2009), Gyimah-Brempong et al. (2015), and Koska et al. (2013). The 
reduction in the child labour force participation rate as migration rises and as remittances increase is 
apparent both for younger children (age 8-10) and for older children (age 11-16). Specifically, the 
impact for the younger children is that a one percentage point increase in the migration rate would 
result in a 0.61% (p<0.01) fall in the labour force participation rate while for older children the 
impact is a 0.40% fall (p<0.05). We also observe a similar pattern in results from the remittance 
model; if the village average of remittance receipts rises by NPR 1000 then it would reduce the 
child labour force participation rate by 0.59% for the younger children and by 0.39% for the older 






Table 4.4: The effect of migration on child labour force participation and no of hour worked in labour market 
  Labour force participation rate   No’s of hour worked 
  FE FE-IV FE FE-IV   FE FE-IV FE FE-IV 
Panel A: For children aged 8 to 10 
Migration Model 0.007 -0.609      0.003 -0.038    
  (0.210) (2.837)***   (0.303) (0.600)    
Remittance Model     -0.019 -0.588       -0.002 -0.037 
      (1.03) (3.645)***      (0.462) (0.648) 
R-Squared (within) 0.099  0.100  0.080  0.080  
Walt test (Chi-squared)  34.57  265.23   195.37  65.57 
Panel B: For children aged 11 to 16 
Migration Model 0.019 -0.403      -0.031 -0.595    
  (0.963) (2.395)**      (1.647) (3.781)***    
Remittance Model     -0.003 -0.3892       -0.063 -0.575 
      (0.160) (3.162)***       (4.88)*** (5.472)*** 
R-Squared (within) 0.237  0.236   0.099  0.122  
Walt test (Chi-squared)  165.91  1798.43   118.13  68.24 
Control Variables Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Time and Village Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Observation 998 998  998   998 998  998 
This table shows the second-stage results for Child labour force participation for children aged 8-10 and 11-16 at extensive and intensve margin. Table has two different panel (A and B) for two different 
age group of children. Table presents both migration and remittance models. The OLS FE and FE-IV are also presented in the table to show the difference in the coefficients if migration is not 
instrumented. In FE-IV we have instrumented migration with predicted migration to India and MEOA. The t-statistics in ( ) are derived from cluster-robust standard errors (clustered at 71 Districts), ***, 
**, * denote 1%, 5%, 10% statistically significance. Note: Migration and remittance estimates are in percentage. Full results are available from authors.   
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 In addition to the effects of migration and remittances on the probability that a child is in the 
labour force, there is also an effect on the number of hours that they work. These effects are 
predominantly negative, and especially for the older children. For example, if the village average 
remittance receipts rise by NPR 1000 then average hours worked by 11-16 year olds would decline 
by 0.58 hours, according to the IV results. There is a very small and imprecisely estimated negative 
effect of migration on hours worked by 8-10 year old children (an average fall of less than three 
minutes per week) while there is a much larger negative effect on the hours worked by older 
children. 
Effect of migration on school attendance and dropout rates 
In order to examine the effects of migration and remittances on commonly used schooling measures 
in previous studies, we also developed attendance and dropout rate estimates. These only consider 
whether a child is currently enrolled, irrespective of whether they are in the appropriate grade for 
their age. Results are shown in Table 4.5 (Panel A and B). From the IV estimates it seems that 
migration and remittances reduce the likelihood of a child being enrolled in school. For example, 
the results suggest that an increase in migration rate reduces the attendance rate for a child aged 5-
16 by 0.07% (p < 0.10). For the sub-group of older children (aged 13-16) the estimated fall in the 
attendance rate is by 0.38% (p < 0.01). We observe similar pattern in dropout rates, in that 
migration and remittances appear to increase the number of children out of school who have 
previously enrolled. For instance, effects on dropout are 0.07% and 0.27% (at p < 0.01) for the 
children aged 5-12 and 13-16. The remittances model shows similar results. The apparently 
negative effect of migration on school attendance that can be inferred from the results in Table 4.5 
(and is contrary to the results in Table 4.3) does align with some earlier findings for Nepal, such as 





   Table 4.5: The effect of migration on school attendance and dropout rate of children aged 5-16, 5-12 and 13-16      
  Child aged 5-16  Child aged 5-12  Child aged 13-16 
  FE FE-IV FE FE-IV   FE FE-IV  FE FE-IV   FE FE-IV FE FE-IV 
Panel A: Attendance rate 
Migration Model  -0.002 -0.067      0.005 0.028      -0.007 -0.384    
  (0.266) (1.654)*   (0.634) (0.383)      (0.404) (3.086)***    
Remittance Model     0.013 -0.063       0.015 0.027       0.002 -0.369 
      (2.02)** (1.397)     (1.88)* (0.392)       (0.19) (2.655)** 
R-Squared (within) 0.056  0.061  0.041  0.047   0.077  0.077  
Wald test  9505.29  22771.96  4222.42  16912.4   854.43  2430.66 
Panel B: Dropout rate 
Migration Model 0.000 0.0799      0.002 0.070      -0.004 0.268    
  (0.026) (5.131)***     (0.347) (3.990)***     (0.302) (2.701)***    
Remittance Model     0.001 0.076       0.001 0.069       -0.006 0.257 
      (0.867) (2.948)***      (0.76) (2.42)**       (0.642) (2.379)** 
R-Squared (within) 0.005  0.006   0.013  0.013   0.043  0.043  
Wald test  34.04  80.83   24.11  84.03   34.71  79.74 
Control Variables Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Time and Village FE Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Observation 998 998 998 998   997 997 997 997   992 992 992 992 
This table shows the second-stage results for Child school attendance and dropout rate for children aged 5-16, 5-12 and 13-16. Table has two different panels (A and B) for attendance and dropout rate. Table 
presents both migration and remittance models. The OLS FE and FE-IV are also presented in the table to show the difference in the coefficients if migration is not instrumented. In FE-IV we have instrumented 
migration with predicted migration to India and MEOA. The t-statistics in ( ) are derived from cluster-robust standard errors (clustered at 71 Districts), ***, **, * denote 1%, 5%, 10% statistically significance. 
Note: Migration and remittance estimates are in percentage. Full results are available from authors.   
 
 
    It is important to emphasize the contrast between the Table 4.3 and Table 4.5 results. In 
Table 4.3, it is seen that migration and remittances improve age-appropriate enrolment rates in 
secondary education (for 13-16 year olds) yet in Table 4.5 it appears that school attendance (at any 
schooling level) for this age group is depressed by migration and remittances, while the dropout rate 
is increased. Adding interest to this contrast is the fact that the outcome variables in Table 4.5 – 
attendance rates and dropout rates – are more like the outcome variables that previous studies for 
Nepal have used, while an innovation of the current study is to calculate and the age-appropriate net 
enrolment rate as the preferred outcome measure. One motivation for doing this is that the simple 
attendance rate is a crude measure of schooling outcomes as it do not capture the quality dimension, 
such as the timely transition through the various levels of schooling. This is especially in settings 
such as Nepal where over 90% of school-age children are in some sort of school, albeit with 
considerable over-age enrolment (as seen from gross enrolment rates of almost 1.4, meaning that 
there are 40% more children in primary grades 1-5 than would be expected from the age structure of 
children).  
The second implication of the contrast between the Table 4.3 and Table 4.5 results is that the 
effects of migration and remittances on human capital of the left behind may operate in fairly subtle 
ways; for example, by improving age-specific enrolment of older children but not of younger 
children, with the most likely explanation for this pattern due to the differing costs of the various 
levels of schooling (including the opportunity cost of labour market work). Given that many 
previous studies have used simple enrolment and dropout indicators, like those in Table 4.5, we 
suggest that it is important to construct other measures of schooling outcomes such as age-specific 
net enrolment rates, schooling deprivation indices, schooling inequality indices, and scores in 
national assessment of student achievement, in order to better understand the actual situation in 
terms of the school performance of children (Datt et al., 2020). This is especially because, for 
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policymakers, school performance may be more important than school attendance because better 
school performance can translate into a productive workforce and break the cycle of poverty. 
4.5 Conclusions 
Work-related international migration from Nepal has become a major income generating activity for 
households. From the period 2001 to 2010, Nepal experienced a significant rise in emigration rates 
and in remittance inflows, and in the same period the country has managed to reduce the poverty 
rate by half. While prior studies have linked this increase in migration and in remittances to the 
poverty reduction that occurred, concerns have remained about the impacts on child human capital 
(and relatedly on child labour), as it is the quality of human capital that will be important to ongoing 
poverty reduction in the future. Even though the beneficial effects of remittance on the 
macroeconomic indicators like GDP, the current account, and trade have been studied (e.g. Sapkota, 
2018) the potential long term impact on human capital is still not very clear. In part, this uncertainty 
reflects the offsetting pathways that, theoretically, can come into play – overcoming borrowing 
constraints and reducing the need for child labour on the one hand, but also possibly reducing the 
opportunity cost of staying in school, on the other. 
In order to inform understanding of the impacts of migration and remittances on human 
capital in Nepal we have constructed a two-wave panel of 499 villages, from the Nepal Labour 
Force Survey 2008 and the Nepal Living Standard Survey 2010. Our research design exploits the 
variation in village-level predicted migration rate, which is driven by destination countries and so 
should have impacts on these villages that only operate through migration and remittances. In 
contrast to prior studies, we focus on net enrolment rates as our main outcome variables. The 
advantage of studying net, rather than gross, enrolment rates is that it recognizes that over-age 
enrolment, slow progression, and grade repetition are common problems that plague schooling in 
many developing countries. 
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Our results show that the rise in migration and remittances increased the net enrolment in 
Secondary education (for older children aged 13-16) even while it was having a weakly negative 
effect on enrolment in Basic education. The several possible reasons are; first, for younger children, 
there may be a parental absence or family disruption effect that outweighs the positive effect of 
remittance. Second, Basic education is much cheaper for parents, with a schooling cost that is about 
four times lower than at the secondary level. Thus, borrowing constraints may matter less for 
enrolment at Basic level, whereas migration and remittances come to matter for the higher cost of 
Secondary level education – both public and private. There is suggestive evidence that the positive 
effect on Secondary education is channeled through reduced child labour. The rise in remittance 
receipts helps households to compensate for the initial income loss from having productive 
members abroad, so this reduces the need for children to be in the labour market. In turn, with 
reduced need for child labour it may free the child to participate in secondary education.  
In contrast to these findings, if we use a cruder indicator such as the school attendance rate, 
which does not distinguish between age-appropriate and over-age enrolments, it appears that the 
effect of migration and remittances is to reduce the number of children attending school. We believe 
that when a country has universal free education (at the Basic level) and when the majority of 
children are in school (as is the case for over 90% of Nepali children), the simple measure of 
whether a child is in school or not may provide misleading inferences. In particular, such a simple 
indicator fails to show impacts on the quality of schooling outcomes and on the timely progression 
through the schooling system. Hence, one take-away from the current study is the need to develop 
other measures of schooling outcomes, which can also help to measure some of the more subtle 
impacts of migration and remittances. Moreover, given the positive impact that remittances are 
shown to have, from a policy perspective it is important to increase remittance receipts. One way to 
do this, independent of increasing the number of emigrants, is to decrease the cost of remitting to, 
especially, rural areas. This reduction in costs could come from increasing the number of financial 
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institutions operating in rural areas, as a policy intervention to help achieve greater impacts of 
migration and remittances on human capital. 
4.6 Reflection on this chapter  
In this study we rather focus on within variation than between variation. The within variation 
provides more degrees of freedom and more variability in the data compared to between variation 
which would be single cross section in our case. In fact, it improves our econometrics estimates (by 
reducing the impacts of measurement error in data) and allows us to control impacts of omitted 
variable in our model by using time and spatial fixed effect.  
There is an important (albeit technical) estimation challenge posed by working with village 
level averages in each survey year. The dependent variables are bounded from below by zero and 
from above by one. If there is a non-linear relationship between the explanatory variables and the 
outcome variables then this bounding may lead to model misspecification, particularly when the 
outcome variable is near either zero or one. In this case, the fractional response model may be more 
appropriate because it restricts E(Y/X) within the [0,1] interval. However, the application of 
fractional response models is outside the scope of this study, as it requires the application of a two-
stage residual inclusion approach to overcome endogeneity concerns.  
We have also not included conflict intensity in our model even though that may have some 
effect on local labour market activities. We consider that the impact of conflict on our estimates is 
minimal because the conflict ended in 2006 and the survey data we use are for 2008 and 2010. 
Moreover, the village and time fixed effects should control for any lingering influence on our 
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25 Activity cost includes teaching, uniform, text book, transport, private tuition etc.   
26 Community schools are owned and managed by government, and institutional schools are privately managed.  
A.4.1: Per capita expenditure by household, activity cost and total cost (In NPR) at each level  
Education level Total Household cost Total cost by activities25 Total cost 
Primary level 5,417 14,832 15,459 
Community school26 1888 13,092 13,092 
Institutional school 25,576 27,546 27,116 
Lower secondary  7,410 15,905 16,482 
Community school 3525 13,419 12,419 
Institutional school 28,307 29,668 29,668 
Secondary  14,298 26,468 27,083 
Community school 7,589 22,236 22,236 
Institutional school 42,973 45,138 45,138 
Higher secondary  24,978 34,963 35,528 
Community school 16,359 29,334 29,334 
Institutional school 46,203 48,823 48,823 








A 4.2: The effect of migration on lower secondary, secondary and higher secondary net enrolment rate school aged children 10-16   
  Lower-Secondary   Secondary   Higher Secondary 
  FE FE-IV FE FE-IV  FE FE-IV FE FE-IV  FE FE-IV FE FE-IV 
Migration Model -0.003 0.575      -0.012 1.155      0.036 0.173    
  (0.116) (3.62)***      (0.466) (2.055)**      (1.525) (0.476)    
Remittance Model     0.019 0.546       0.039 1.097       0.062 0.1644 
      (0.96) (2.887)***       (1.847)* (1.506)     (1.911)* (0.452) 
R-Squared (within) 0.265  0.266   0.18  0.184   0.073  0.083  
Wald test  118.52  340.84   25.40  58.10   27.52  115.44 
Control Variables  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Time and Village FEs Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
This table shows the second-stage results for net enrolment rate for child aged 10 to 16. Lower-Secondary NER indicates enrolment of child aged 10-12 in lower secondary level, Secondary NER indicates the 
enrolment of child aged 13-14 in secondary level and Higher-Secondary NER indicates the enrolment of child aged 15-16 in higher secondary level. Table presents both migration and remittance models. The 
OLS FE and FE-IV are also presented in the table to show the difference in the coefficients if migration is not instrumented. In FE-IV we have instrumented migration with predicted migration to India and 
MEOA. The t-statistics in ( ) are derived from cluster-robust standard errors (clustered at 71 Districts), ***, **, * denote 1%, 5%, 10% statistically significance. Note: Migration and remittance estimates are in 
percentage. Full results are available from authors. N = 998    
 
 
Chapter Five: The effect of emigration and remittances on labour 
supply of the left-behind: Evidence from Nepal 
Hari Sharma 
Abstract 
The growth in work-related emigration and subsequent inflows of remittances have raised policy 
concerns about its impacts on labour supply in emigration-source countries. The growing literature 
in this area ignores spillover effects from emigration and remittances in one locality affecting 
outcomes in nearby localities. A two-period panel of 500 localities in Nepal is used, along with 
exogenous changes in predicted emigration rates, to identify impacts of emigration and remittances 
on labour supply. There is a positive impact on labour supply, but just for females. Also, emigration 
and remittances are associated with labour shifting out of agriculture as farm work is less preferred 
in remittance receiving households. While the spillover effect of emigration is as large as the direct 
effect, spillovers are limited to rural localities. Given the typical nature of rural labour markets, 
emigration-driven remittances help to overcome borrowing constraints and boost local activity that 
increases local wage rates and creates additional employment opportunities for the non-emigrants.    
Keywords: labour supply, emigration, spillovers, remittances, Nepal  




Labour export to countries like India and MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region is an 
important source of livelihood in Nepal. A growing literature in Nepal and other countries often 
links emigration and remittances with the poverty reduction (Acharya & Leon-Gonzalez, 2012; 
Acosta et al., 2008; Adams Jr & Page, 2005; Gupta et al., 2009; Lokshin et al., 2010). Yet little is 
known about how these changes affect the labour force participation of the left-behind. Similarly, 
while there is a literature on general equilibrium and spillover effects of emigration (Marchiori et 
al., 2013; Weyerbrock, 1995), effects on labour supply are largely ignored. It is likely that 
emigration and the resulting non-labour income in the form of remittances not only affect the 
sending locality but also neighbouring localities if the labour markets or other markets are spatially 
interconnected (e.g. being either adjacent or connected by road networks). These spatial linkages 
can significantly shape livelihoods (Abbay & Rutten, 2016; Banerjee et al., 2020; Dillon et al., 
2011; Gibson & Rozelle, 2003; Jacoby & Minten, 2009; Shrestha, 2020). Given this potential 
importance, this paper aims to identify the direct and spatial spillover effect of emigration on the 
labour supply of non-migrants. 
While there has been recent attention to this question, the extant studies are based on direct 
effects, often within the same household. For example, negative effects of emigration on labour 
supply of remaining male or female household members are found in Tajikistan (Justino & 
Shemyakina, 2012), Jamaica (Kim, 2007), Nicaragua (Funkhouser, 2006), Pakistan (Mughal & 
Makhlouf, 2013) and rural Mexico (López-Feldman & Escalona, 2017). These effects also show up 
in cross country studies (Chami et al., 2018). Similarly, Cabegin (2006), Funkhouser (2006) and 
Melkonyan and Grigorian (2012) have found upward shifts in reservation wages and change in 
occupation choice of the left-behind non-migrants. Similar studies in Nepal by Lokshin and 
Glinskaya (2009), Phadera (2016), and Shrestha (2017) all explore the effects of emigration on 
labour supply without considering any spatial spillovers.  
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Spillover effects are commonly studied in other areas, including the impacts of information 
flows, innovation and foreign direct investment (FDI) on firms’ productivity growth and domestic 
industrial growth (Cainelli & Lupi, 2010; De Lucio et al., 2002; Henderson, 2003; Song & Son, 
2019). While remittances are also a source of external finance for development, similar studies to 
identify spillover effects of emigration and remittances hardly exist. In order to fill this gap, this 
paper also examines spatial spillover effects of emigration, using different methods to consider 
‘nearby’ localities, in terms of both straight-line and road distance. There is a need for such an 
analysis because if emigration-driven development in one locality affects the outcomes in other 
locality, then by ignoring spillover effect the total impact of emigration would be understated.  
The main results in this study use geographic proximity based interconnectedness matrix (to 
capture the potential spillover effects), which is also most commonly used in the literature to show 
interconnectedness between localities or firms (Cainelli & Lupi, 2010; Song & Son, 2019).27 
However, the interconnectedness among localities is often not limited to geographic proximity but it 
also depends on the spatial pattern of roads or other transportation networks, the pattern of markets 
and so forth (Abbay & Rutten, 2016; Boussauw et al., 2012; Gibson et al., 2017). Given this 
limitation of geographical proximity measures, this study also uses a road network based measure 
for interconnectedness. This would reflect the critical impact of roads on livelihoods (Gibson & 
Rozelle, 2003; Shrestha, 2020). Additionally, there is also a within-locality local multiplier effect, 
especially emigration has a cross-household effect in which emigration from one household may 
affect the labour supply decision of other households in the same locality (Posso, 2012). Ignoring 
this effect may understate the impacts of emigration on non-migrant households.  
In order to study these issues, I use the 2008 National Labour Force Survey (NLFS-II) and 
the 2010 National Living Standard Survey (NLSS-III) 2010 to construct a two-period panel of 499 
 
27 Typically, geographic coordinates (latitude and longitude) of localities are used to draw a straight line distance, and 
localities that fall within some preset distance are defined as interconnected neighbours.     
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localities based on village average. The advantage of taking village averages is that it captures 
within-village spillovers, which may be missed in household level data. This within village 
spillover is important in Nepal because households living in the same village are often 
interdependent. For instance, (non-monetary) family labour exchange is very common in the rural 
agriculture sector, where members of two households jointly work in their farmland in rotation to 
avoid using paid labour. Therefore, from both national surveys, I develop labour force participation 
(LFP) rate for each village for age group 17 to 65. A disaggregated analysis further considers 
participation in agriculture and non-agriculture separately and participation of males and females 
separately. 
The endogenous nature of migration poses a major challenge to identifying impacts of 
emigration and remittances on the left-behind (Gibson et al., 2011). The two-wave panel that I 
construct allows for both time fixed effects and village fixed effects where the effect of time-
invariant unobservable factors on outcome variable and migration is ruled out. Nevertheless, if 
time-varying village characteristics correlate with both village-level emigration and domestic labour 
market trends, the empirical results could be biased. In order to deal with this threat to the validity 
of the analysis, I use an instrumental variables approach that exploits village-level variation in 
predicted emigration rates. These predictions use the destination country-specific demand for 
migrants, and so are plausibly exogenous at the village level. The predicted emigration rate is based 
on a time trend emigration rate which depends on the baseline (in 2001) village share of migrants in 
each destination. I assume that a demand shock (change in demand for migrants) in the destination 
would primarily affect villages that have stronger pre-existing migrant networks to that destination. 
The variation in predicted emigration rates is determined by factors outside of Nepal, and so it 




The results show that, after accounting for endogeneity, the direct effect of emigration 
increases the labour force participation rate of the left-behind; a pattern that would not be apparent 
if endogeneity was ignored. However, this positive effect is limited to the female workforce with no 
significant effect on males. There is also a fall in the labour force participation rate in agriculture 
sector as farm work is less preferred in households that receive remittance income. In addition to 
finding an overall increase in labour supply, I find that the spillover effect of emigration also 
increases labour supply and it is as large as the direct effect. The overall increase in labour supply is 
linked with the rise in local wage rate and economic activities (through general equilibrium effect) 
that incentivises non-migrants from interconnected localities to participate in the labour market. 
However, these spillover effects occur primarily for rural localities. One likely reason is that the 
rural labour market is financially constrained and has limited in-migration, so emigration plays a 
greater role to overcome borrowing constraints and reinvigorate the local economy that creates 
employment opportunities for non-migrants. Whereas the urban labour market has a large formal or 
semi-formal credit institution and a repository of the reserve labour force due to rural-urban 
migration (Harris & Todaro, 1970), so financial constraints are less binding and the boost provided 
by emigration and remittances may be less needed to stimulate the local economy. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section two briefly discusses emigration and 
remittances in Nepal, followed by the discussion of data and econometric model in section three. 
The estimated results are broadly discussed in section four, and the final section has conclusions.  
5.2 Context: Migration from Nepal  
Nepal has a long history of work-related migration. As far back as the 19th century, Nepalese used 
to migrate to Lahore city in Punjab. The long open border and visa-free mobility have traditionally 
made India the most attractive and lowest-cost destination to escape domestic unemployment. Since 
1981 the share of migrants working in India has declined sharply; census data show the share was 
over 90% in 1981, then 77% in 2001 and just 38% in 2011. However, for poor regions in Nepal like 
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the Far-western and Mid-western region, India continues to be an important destination, with these 
two regions accounting for 36% and 48% of total Nepalese migrants in India in 2011 and 2001 
(CBS, 2001, 2011). This outflow of labour force to India is sustained by the well-established 
migrants' network which helps new migrants to find jobs in Indian cities, often on a seasonal basis. 
 A more recent development for Nepal since 1990 is the rising share of migrants going to 
high-income destinations after the government allowed private recruiters to recruit Nepali labour 
force to Gulf countries and Malaysia. After 2001 (when the intensity of Nepal’s civil conflict was 
high), the number of people migrating to high-income destinations has increased substantially. The 
rise in civil conflict, stagnant economic growth, political instability, high unemployment and rise in 
demand for the Nepali worker in MENA and Malaysia has further fuelled outflow of labour force. 
For instance, in 1994/95, around 3600 people have secured a work permit, and this number has 
increased by more than 100,000 work permits in a single year from 2001 onwards.  
Lately, the skill-related migration to developed countries like North America, Europe and 
South Korea has also increased and people from a relatively developed region like central and 
eastern Nepal are migrating to high-income destinations. The better income-generating prospect, a 
better quality of education and life and strong social capital are some of the important drivers of 
diversification in international migration. Overall, the number of people who have emigrated has 
increased to 1.9 Million (7.7 % of the total population) in 2011 from 0.76 Million (3.3% of the 
population) in 2001 (CBS, 2001, 2011). As a result, one-third of households have at least one 
migrant member abroad mostly in the 15-59 age group (CBS, 2008, 2010). 
Subsequently, the inflow of remittances has also increased and now it plays an important 
part in the stability of the economy. Nepalese households and economy are heavily reliant on 
remittances to finance imports and consumption and to maintain the balance of payments. The total 
value of remittances from formal sources increased from USD 55 Million in 1993 to USD 147 
million in 2001. Thereafter, with a decade-long civil conflict and with political instability, 
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remittances are ever more important, increasing from USD 3.3 billion in 2011 to USD 6.3 billion in 
2017. The value of remittances relative to national GDP was only 2.4% until 2001 but increased to 
21.6% in 2010 and 31% in 2016 which has placed Nepal as a sixth ranked country in the world in 
terms of remittances relative to GDP. In addition to the formal channel, Nepal also receives a large 
amount of undocumented remittances from the informal channel, especially from India. About 55% 
of households receive remittances, with an average value per household is around USD 730 per 
annum (CBS, 2010). The massive surge in remittance inflows has increased household disposable 
income and led to a massive decline in poverty, which fell from 42% in 1996 to 25% in 2010. 
In the last two decades, Nepal has also experienced a structural transformation but triggered 
by foreign employment rather than job creation in the manufacturing sector that would occur in a 
Lewis-type model. The outflow of labour to foreign employment deprived both agriculture and 
manufacturing sector of a cheap local labour supply. These two sectors are facing labour shortages, 
and often agricultural households either have to rely on the family exchange labour or leave arable 
land barren (Jaquet et al., 2019; Kharel et al., 2019). Meanwhile, even as Nepal exports labour the 
manufacturing sector is partly relying on labour coming from India, and in the absence of a cheap 
local labour force, some factories are forced to shut down. Therefore, understanding the impacts of 
emigration and remittances on labour supply in Nepal is a major policy issue which this study aims 
to address. 
5.3 Data and Methods  
This paper relies on the 2008 Nepal Labour Force Survey (NLFS II) and the 2010 Nepal Living 
Standard Survey (NLSS III). The commonality between these two surveys is that the primary 
sampling units (which I also refer to as villages or localities) for NLSS III are a subset of those used 
for the NLFS II. This design was to take advantage of the cartographic segmentation and household 
listing already carried out in 2008 (CBS, 2010). From 799 PSU in NLFS II (half urban and half 
rural), 174 urban and 325 rural PSU were randomly selected to provide a sample of 499 PSUs for 
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the NLSS III (CBS, 2010). In both surveys the selection of households within PSUs is random, so it 
is possible to construct village averages from the household data.28 Using these two surveys I 
construct two-period panel of 499 villages. The use of village averages allow for inter-household 
spillovers to take place and mitigate the effects of measurement error in the household-level data. 
These two surveys have information about international migration and remittances, domestic 
migration and remittances, age, gender, literacy, education and employment status of the household 
members, household land ownership and so on. This study includes 41,693 (56% of the total 
population in the survey from NLFS II) and 15,505 (54% of the surveyed population from NLSS 
III) non-migrating workforce aged 17 to 65. The total number of migrants (in the same age range) in 
NLFS II and NLSS III are 18,418 and 8,438 respectively, which is equivalent to 25% and 30% of 
the surveyed population.29  
The detailed data on wage and non-wage employment, agriculture and non-agriculture 
employment and self-employment activities allow me to calculate Labour Force Participation (LFP) 
rates for each locality.30 The LFP rate is further disaggregated into a male rate and a female rate and 
rates for the agriculture and non-agriculture sectors. The LFP rates are the outcome measures in the 
empirical results section below. In the data set, one important point to note that an individual can 
engage in more than one job (maybe in agriculture and non-agriculture sector), and agriculture and 
non-agriculture work can be self-employment activity. Therefore, with multiple sources of 
livelihood, we may observe an increase in labour supply with unchanged or reduction in LFP in one 
of these sectors (agriculture or non-agriculture sector). 
 
28 In NLFS II, 20 households are surveyed per PSU (which are either individual wards or sub-wards or groups of 
neighboring wards (CBS, 2010)). In NLSS III, 12 households were randomly selected per PSU. 
29 A migrant is defined as a member of a household currently away from home (residing in foreign destination) for at 
least six consecutive months at the time of the survey. 
30 I followed NLFS II definition to construct LFP rate as the ratio of economically active population (employed and 
unemployed) to total population aged 17 to 65. Someone managing his/her own business in agriculture or non-
agriculture sector or both is considered as self-employed.       
143 
 
The variable of main interest is the locality emigration rate per 1,000 population.31 The other 
covariates are average household size, average quantity of land owned per household (a proxy for 
wealth), the gross enrolment rate at the higher secondary level (level 12), the share of the working-
age (age 15-60) in total population, the share of the working-age population with at least basic level 
education (grade ≥ 8), average literacy rate and the share of emigrants with at least basic level 
education (grade ≥ 8). International emigration may be a two-step process, where someone first 
migrates domestically and then moves to a foreign country once they accumulate sufficient 
resources. Therefore, I also include the domestic migration rate and the average remittances 
received from domestic migrants as additional controls. The definitions and summary statistics of 
all variables that are used in the main results are presented in Table 5.1.  
 
 
31 I derive emigration rate by dividing the number of emigrants from the village by the village total population.  
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics  (N=499) 
  NLFS 2008   NLSS 2010 
  Mean Std. Dev   Mean Std. Dev 
Labour force participation rate (In percentage) 83.90 14.68  85.96 12.29 
Labour force participation rate-Male (In percentage) 89.96 10.29  89.72 10.63 
Labour force participation rate-Female (In percentage) 78.29 21.49  82.73 17.20 
Labour force participation rate-Agriculture sector (In percentage) 55.57 35.07  58.80 34.83 
Labour force participation rate-Non agriculture sector (In percentage) 58.63 17.73  62.72 16.43 
Emigration rate to India  (number of emigrants per 1,000 population) 32.68 43.11   33.09 46.46 
Emigration rate to MEOA (number of emigrants per 1,000 population) 24.56 25.95   29.01 30.69 
Average remittance received per household (In NPR) 3705 5993   4471 6703 
Agriculture land owned by households (in Acres) 1.075 0.828   1.171 0.894 
Average number of members per household  5.124 0.96   5.209 1.084 
Share of working age (15-60) in the population 0.537 0.091   0.529 0.098 
Share of emigrants with schooling to grade ≥ 8  0.556 0.317   0.628 0.322 
Share population aged 15-60 with schooling to grade ≥ 8 0.381 0.227   0.402 0.219 
Literacy rate (share of individual in locality who are literate) 0.690 0.158   0.657 0.18 
Unemployment rate for adult aged 17-65 0.024 0.037   0.019 0.031 
Higher Secondary level (grade 11-12) Gross Enrolment Rate for children of all age 1.307 1.874   0.935 1.038 
Domestic migration rate (local migrants per 1,000 population) 61.76 59.72   93.05 85.21 
Average remittance received from domestic migrants (In 1,000 NPR) 2.54 3.72   0.06 0.12 






5.3.1 Interconnected matrix:  
Understanding spillover effects of emigration and remittances has an important policy implication 
in a country like Nepal, where emigration is a major income generating household activity. It is 
important because impacts of emigration and remittances often spill from one locality to another 
when they are interconnected, by affecting the local wage rate, economic activities and so on.32 
Additionally, there is also a general equilibrium effect of remittance, especially this additional 
source of income is spent in locally produced goods which helps to reinvigorate the local economy.  
The estimation of spillover effect crucially depends on the interconnected locality matrix 
which is often derived from locality specific GPS (global positioning system) coordinates. But, 
neither the NLFS II nor the NLSS III survey gathered GPS (global positioning system) coordinates 
during their fieldwork. Therefore I have retrospectively geo-coded each village, based on Village 
and Municipality administrative data and using Google Maps. The locations of all 499 localities 
(PSUs) are shown in Figure 5.1(a).    
Figure 5.1: a) Spatial Distribution of PSUs, b) PSUs and Road network 
 
 
32 The direct effect of emigration may reduce the total labour supply from the sending locality which may affect the 
local wage rate in the same locality and its neighbours. Similarly, the inflow of remittances may help to reinvigorate the 






I allow for two types of interconnectedness when estimating spillover effects. The first uses 
geographic proximity-based interconnection matrix where I identify the closest five interconnected 
localities, based on straight-line distance between the GPS coordinates of each locality. As 
discussed earlier, geographic proximity may be less appropriate if heterogeneity in geographic 
characteristics like elevation and topography interferes with straightline travel. In the context of 
Nepal with the mountainous topography, where average elevation can range from anywhere 
between 700 to 6000 meters, the geographic distance between two localities may not always be an 
appropriate measure of interconnectedness. The travel time and travel cost to go from one ‘nearby’ 
locality to another vary considerably across the country and this variation may affect their 
interconnectedness. As highlighted by Shrestha (2020), there are several reasons for this 
heterogeneity in interconnectedness. First, localities on a North-South axis are more connected via 
road than are localities that lie on an East-West axis. Second, the barriers to commute between 
geographically nearby localities are much higher and costlier in the hills and mountains than is the 




geographic proximity, spillover may not take place between them if they are not connected by the 
road network.  
To overcome this limitation I develop a second interconnected matrix where I use road 
network data to identify neighbours (see figure 5.1(b)).33 I use recent data on Nepal’s road network, 
which is extracted from the World Food Programme (WFP). The road network data cover every 
road at the village level, even walking trails. However, I limit attention to highways and primary 
and secondary roads as these are the main medium for transportation. For this study, I consider 
localities interconnected if they are joined by a road link, with the nearest neighbour estimation 
approach used. I define interconnectedness based on two conditions: the geographic proximity of 
two localities must be the shortest, and the two localities must be within five kilometres (km) of the 
closest point on the road network.34 If two shortest distance localities are outside a five km radius of 
the closest road network, they will be considered as non-neighbours. Based on these criteria I 
identify 349 (168 Urban and 181 Rural) localities and 334 (161 Urban and 173 Rural) localities as 
the first and second shortest distance neighbouring localities with road connectivity within a five 
km radius.   
5.3.2 The Econometric Model 
There can be two offsetting effects of emigration and remittances on the labour supply of the left 
behind. They may decrease their labour supply if reservation wages rise as remittances (non-labour 
income) increase the demand for leisure. Conversely, emigration may increase local wages due to 
former workers going abroad and also if remittances are invested in businesses so that local labour 
demand rises, and with higher local wages the substitution effect would outweigh the income effect, 
 
33 This is the same road network data used in Shrestha (2020). The survey data are from 2008 and 2010, if new road 
networks have developed recently then this may affect definition of interconnectedness between localities.      
34 The GPS coordinates of a village are the points which represent the center point of the locality based on its 
geographic size. Road networks often pass through the population settlement area which is not necessarily the centroid 
of the village. To allow for this, I have kept a margin of 5 km which will essentially help to determine if a village is 
connected with the road link or not.             
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so labour supply should rise. Given this ambiguity, empirical estimates are needed. Initially, 
spillovers are not considered, so the model is:   
𝑌𝑖𝑡  =  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑔 +  𝜃𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡                                            (5.1)                                     
𝑢𝑖𝑡 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2𝑙𝑁)                                                                                       (5.2) 
In equation (5.1), the NT × 1 vector of dependent variables (labour force participation rates) are 
denoted by 𝑌𝑖𝑡, and these are modelled as depending on 𝜇𝑖 and 𝜆𝑡 village and time fixed effects, on 
the variable of main interest ‒ the locality emigration rate – as denoted by matrix 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑔 and other 
control variables (such as average holdings, the working age population share and so forth) in 
matrix 𝑋𝑖𝑡. The 𝛽 and 𝜃 are vectors of coefficients for 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑔 and 𝑋𝑖𝑡, and 𝑢𝑖𝑡   is a NT × 1 vector of 
error terms which is clustered at the village level. 
To examine the spillover effect on labour supply, the interconnectedness matrix based on 
geographic proximity and the road network is used, following the identification strategy applied by 
Brinkman and Mok-Lamme (2019). The models are as follows;  
 𝑌𝑖𝑡  =  𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 +  𝛿𝑋𝑗𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑔 +  𝜃𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡                                            (5.3)                                     
𝑢𝑖𝑡 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎
2𝑙𝑁)                                                                                       (5.4) 
Equation (5.3) is similar to Eq. (1), but this time 𝑋𝑗𝑡𝑚𝑖𝑔 is the emigration rate of interconnected 
locality 𝑗 and 𝛿 is the response coefficient.  
 The two models discussed thus far, for direct effects (or own-estimation) and for the 
spillover effects, include village and time fixed-effects to reduce endogeneity bias, which may arise 
from unobserved village characteristics that correlate with labour supply and emigration. To the 
extent that these unobserved characteristics are time-varying, the fixed effects strategy will not 
remove all endogeneity bias. It is quite likely that village characteristics like labour market 
condition and access to credit vary over time and are correlated with both emigration and labour 
supply (Adams Jr, 2011). Moreover, in both the 2008 and 2010 datasets, I observe strong regional 
heterogeneity in emigration rates. Therefore, the spatial variation to identify the own-effect (and 
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spillover effects) is not necessarily random, and if time-varying village characteristics are correlated 
with both village-level emigration and domestic labour market trends, the empirical results are 
likely to be biased.  
Therefore, this study uses instrumental variable estimation approach for both Eq. (1) and (3) 
to overcome endogeneity bias (Acosta, 2011; Acharya & Leon-Gonzalez, 2014; Calero et al., 2009; 
Koska et al., 2013). Specifically, I follow the strategy of Theoharides (2018) to predict the locality 
level emigration rate to various destinations using historical (baseline) emigration patterns (from the 
2001 census data). We use locality-level historical emigration to destination country shares from 
census data (from 2001) to construct this IV. Nepal has been sending migrants overseas, especially 
to India, and recently emigration for work to high-income destinations like the Middle East, North 
Africa and Malaysia has also increased.  The historical emigration affects current migrants’ outflow 
for two important reasons. First, previous emigration plays the role of a network for new migrants 
and thus it increases the labour outflow by reducing the cost of emigration through lowering job 
search costs and increasing information flows. Second, the inflow of remittances helps households 
to overcome borrowing constraints and increases the financing capacity of households for 
subsequent migration to the same destination or to other high-income destinations. Therefore, this 
study relies on the fact that historical emigration to a destination is a good predictor of subsequent 
emigration. I use destination-specific time trend instruments in a standard two-stage least squares 
estimation approach for Eq. (5.1) and (5.3). 
Consider the migration network in terms of the share of people who had migrated from 
village 𝑖 to destination country 𝑘 by 2001 (out of the total number of people who had migrated to 𝑘 
from Nepal). The total number of migrants who migrated to destination 𝑘 in each year 𝑡 (2008 or 
2010 given the timing of panel) is then summed. To predict the total number of migrants from the 
village in each survey year (that is, in 2008 and 2010), I weight the total migrants to destination 𝑘 
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by the 2001 village 𝑖 migrants share to destination 𝑘. The predicted migrant flows (demand for 
migration) from each village then is: 
𝑀𝑖𝑘𝑡







2001                                                                                                                         (5.5) 
Where 𝑀𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑝
 is the predicted number of people migrating to destination 𝑘 from village 𝑖 in year 𝑡 
(2008 or 2010), 𝑀𝑘𝑡 is the total number of people who had migrated from Nepal to destination 𝑘 by 




2001 is the village 𝑖 migrants share in total national migrants to 
destination 𝑘 in the past (in 2001 in this case, which is when the baseline migration network is 
measured). The predicted number of migrants is normalized by dividing 𝑀𝑖𝑘𝑡
𝑝
 by the total village 
population each year. Our IV has two parts, one is predicted emigration rate to India and second is 
predicted emigration rate to MEOA. We consider that these two are major destinations for 
migration given that 35% migrants in 2011 are in India and 55% are in MEOA (CBS, 2011). 
The performance of this IV depends on stability of the distribution of migrants across 
destinations over time (Theoharides, 2018). For Nepal’s five development regions, these 
distributions across destinations are quite stable. For example, India remains a favourite destination 
for people from the mid-west and far-west regions while relatively developed regions like central 
and eastern regions prefer sending migrants to MEOA (Middle East and Other Asia). The 
relationship between 2001 and 2011 migrants share is also quite strong, as villages continue to send 
migrants to destination countries at a similar rate, with just a small fall for India and a rise for 
MEOA. Therefore, these instruments should be reasonably good predictors of the actual migration 
rate. A distinction is made between the predicted migration rate to India and the predicted migration 
rate to MEOA, considering that these two are the major migrants’ destinations, and one is a lower-
cost and lower-return destination (India). 
While the migration trends from different parts of the country are quite uniform and stable 
over time, the shares of the two major destinations have shifted. According to CBS (2001, 2010), 
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emigration to India has a falling share, whereas the share of migrants going to MOEA has increased 
from 20% in 2001 to a little over 55% in 2011. Given that emigration to MOEA is more expensive, 
these changing shares may imply that regions or villages are continuously sending migrants for 
foreign employment, and the remittances are helping households to improve welfare and to finance 
further emigration to higher cost destinations. So, the two predicted migration variables derived 
from Eq. (5.5) are a good predictor of current emigration rates. The estimated result should show 
the effect of emigration on labour supply while ruling out reverse causation that would occur if the 
current labour supply affects migration. These two predicted emigration rates are derived from the 
migration network from a decade before, and so labour supply in 2008 or 2010 should not affect 
historical migration. In other words, given that the IVs are external to the local labour supply, they 
are unlikely to be correlated with unobservable characteristics.      
5.4 Results and discussion  
In this section, I outline the first stage and main results. The OLS and IV estimates of direct and 
spillover effects of emigration on labour supply are then reported. The first stage result for the IV 
regression is in Table 5.2 using two instruments, the predicted emigration rate to India and to 
MEOA. As expected, the coefficient on instrumental variables that are derived from Eq. (5.5) have 
strong first-stage effects on the emigration rate after controlling for village and time fixed effects. 
Results are closely associated with the recent migration trends in Nepal; the share of migrants in 
India has decreased to 37% in 2011 (from 75% in 2001), the share in MEOA has increased to 56% 
in 2011 (from 20% in 2001) (CBS, 2001, 2011). The localities have also altered the destination; 
those sending migrants to India earlier are now sending to MEOA. This shift in the destination is 
also evident from the sign of coefficients of the instrumental variables, which is negative for India 
and positive for MEOA. The F-test for excluding the instruments is 13.77 which easily exceeds the 
usual threshold of ten needed for not having weak instruments. The weak instrument test statistics 





Table 5.2: The first stage model for locality emigration rate  
  Emigration Rate 
Predicted migration to India -1.017  
(3.311)*** 
Predicted migration to MEOA 0.825  
(5.054)*** 
Agriculture land owned 2.838  
(1.185) 
Average household size 2.144  
(0.958) 
Share of working age (15-60) -2.870  
(8.696)*** 
Share of Migrants with grade ≥ 8 6.831  
(1.426) 
Share of 15-60 with grade ≥ 8 -19.027  
(0.886) 
Literacy rate aged ≥ 17 42.416  
(1.917)* 
Higher secondary Gross Enrolment Rate 3.002  
(2.551)** 
Internal migration rate -0.180  
(5.950)*** 
Average size of domestic remittance  -0.425  
(0.694) 
F-Statistic (for excluding the two instruments)  13.77 
R-Squared 0.263 
Observations 998 
This table shows first-stage results for migration rate instrumented with predicted migration to India and to 
MEOA using time and village fixed effects. The t-statistics in ( ) are derived from cluster-robust standard 
errors (clustered at 499 villages), ***, **, * denote 1%, 5%, 10% statistically significance. 
 
The main results are reported in Table 5.3 to 5.6, first for the direct effects and then the 
spillover effects. Sub-sample results are given for male and female labour force participation rates, 
for agriculture and non-agriculture, and for urban and rural localities. An alternative specification to 
test for spillover effect using market-based interconnectedness and a Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) 
is presented in Table 5.7. One additional table, with estimates of the impact of emigration on the 
local agriculture wage rate, is presented in A.5.1 (this is a cross-sectional IV model designed to 
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illustrate a causal pathway that lies behind the main results for the impact of emigration and 
remittances on labour supply).  
Direct effect of emigration on Labour force participation rate35 
First, I look at the direct effect of emigration on the labour force participation rate. Table 5.3 
column 1 presents results from an OLS model for the full sample. The corresponding instrumental 
variable results are in column 2, while columns 3-6 presents sub-sample results using instrumental 
variables. It is to note that all of the instrumental variable results rely on the destination-driven 
predicted migration model reported in Table 5.2, and the F-tests for excluding the instruments give 
values of at least 14.5.  
The first thing to note from Table 5.3 is the contrast between the OLS and IV results, which 
suggests that time-varying factors correlated with emigration and labour supply will bias OLS 
results, even with village fixed effects and a rich set of control variables. All of the subsequent 
results reported, therefore, use the instrumental variables approach. According to the IV results in 
column 2, a rise in the emigration rate by ten persons per 1,000 population would increase the 
labour force participation rate of the left-behind by 1.3 percentage points (p < 0.05). Thus, it 
appears that the income effect from remittances increasing the demand for leisure is outweighed by 
a substitution effect that induces more labour supply. Indeed, there is evidence that higher local 
emigration rates increase the local wage rate (see Table A.5.1) which induces this substitution effect 
of greater labour supply. 
The results in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5.3 show that the higher LFP rate is entirely due to 
female labour supply. While there is no change in the male LFP rate, the female LFP rate would rise 
by 2.7 percentage points for every 10 more emigrants per 1000 population from a locality 
(significant at p<0.01). There are several reasons for this gendered pattern. First, emigration has 
 
35 In addition to the emigration model, I also run a separate model for remittance using same instruments. Results and 
conclusions for direct and spillover effect continue to hold in both emigration and remittance models. The result from 
remittance model is available from the author.       
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contributed significantly to empowering women in Nepal (Gartaula et al., 2010; Maharjan et al., 
2012) which has increased their mobility and participation in the labour market, especially in the 
agriculture sector. Second, other members of households may have to participate in the labour 
market to replace the initial income loss as a worker leaves local employment due to emigration 
(Posso, 2012), especially as it takes time for emigrants to get established and begin sending 
remittances (Gibson et al., 2013; McKenzie & Rapoport, 2011). Also, remittances may increase 
investment in self-employment/small enterprises, and this boost in local economic activities may 






Table 5.3: Second stage regression model for labour force participation (LFP) rates  
 OLS   IV model 
 1  2 3 4 5 6 
  LFP  
LFP LFP-Male LFP-Female LFP-Agri LFP-NonAgri 
Emigration -0.003  0.128 0.011 0.265 -0.110 0.011  
(0.342) (1.970)** (0.188) (2.820)*** (2.444)** (0.162) 
Control Variables  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time and Village Fixed Effects Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared (within) 0.154 
      
Wald test 
  
34919 29948 13443 8482 4707 
Hansen statistics (Over identification test)   0.009 0.286 0.057 0.789 0.228 
These outcome variables are labour force participation rates for adult aged 17-65. The IV results have locality emigration rates instrumented with (destination-trend-based) predicted 
migration to India and to MEOA. The t-statistics in ( ) are derived from cluster-robust standard errors (clustered at 499 villages), ***, **, * denote 1%, 5%, 10% statistically 





Table 5.3 column 5-6 shows the impact of emigration on labour force participation in 
agriculture and non-agriculture sector. This is of particular interest here as the agriculture sector in 
Nepal is facing labour shortages, and over time there has been a notable increase in cultivable lands 
that are left barren. The result from this study is consistent with previous studies which have found 
that the left-behind shift out of agriculture, either increases leisure or move to non-farm 
employment. For instance, every ten person per 1,000 population increase in emigration would 
reduce labour force participation rate in agriculture sector by 1.1 percentage point (p < 0.05). In the 
case of non-agriculture sector, the effect is positive but very small and imprecisely estimated. The 
plausible reason for this is that, in Nepal, the agriculture sector is less attractive due to its low 
productivity and farm wages or agricultural self-employment hardly generates sufficient income for 
the household to achieve a high standard of living. Therefore, for households that have alternative 
sources of income in the form of remittances, farm work is less preferred. Also, the left-behind 
often change the sector of employment and shift to self-employment activities because remittances 
help them to overcome borrowing constraints and start a new enterprise (Sousa & García-Suaza, 
2018). This result is also comparable to the recent studies like Acosta (2007), Amuedo-Dorantes 
and Pozo (2006), and López-Feldman and Escalona (2017) which highlighted the role of emigration 
in the reallocation of the labour force. 
Spillover effect of emigration on Labour force participation 
In this section, I examine the spillover effect of emigration on neighbouring interconnected 
localities. I look at the spillover effects in the first five nearest neighbours, initially based on 
geographic proximity. Later, I also compare the spillover effect in rural and urban localities 




Table 5.4: Spillover effects on labour force participation rate: neighbours based on closest geographical proximity 
 
Labour Force Participation Rate 
  1
st Neighbour 2nd Neighbour 3rd Neighbour 4th Neighbour 5th Neighbour 
Emigration 0.1208 0.1113 0.0223 0.0828 0.1010  
(2.481)** (2.824)*** (0.541) (1.770)* (2.400)** 
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time and Village Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald test 46454 42348 53153 42435 39402 
Weak IV test statistics  18.14 27.41 21.66 20.26 25.43 
Hansen statistics (Over identification test) 0.415 1.092 4.175** 0.493 0.854 






Each column of Table 5.4 presents the results of Eq. (5.3), for each of the five nearest 
neighbour interconnected localities. There is strong evidence of spillover effects on the labour 
supply of non-migrants. A rise in emigration from a locality by ten persons per 1,000 population 
would increase labour force participation rates in neighbouring localities by 0.2 to 1.2 percentage 
points (estimates are statistically significant for four out of five columns). For the first two 
neighbours, the effects are similar to the direct (own-) effect in Table 5.3 (column 2), so it is likely 
that the combined effect (direct and spillover effect) of emigration would be at least twice the size 
of direct effect. The extant literature tends to ignore this spillover effect, which may operate through 
the increase in local wage rates and economic activities in the same and surrounding localities that 
are important sources of labour market adjustment (Brandsma et al., 2014; Shrestha, 2017). For 
instance, remittances sent home by emigrants are generally spent on locally produced goods that not 
only affect the economic activities of the sending locality but also of the interconnected localities. 
The rise in economic activities in neighbouring locality creates incentives for non-migrants to 
participate in the labour market. 
Next, it is useful to think about how this spillover effect operates in rural and urban 
localities separately. This comparison is important because urban labour markets are more 
integrated than rural ones. Also, rural-to-urban migration due to the wage differential is very 
common and an important source that sustains equilibrium in the urban labour market (Harris & 
Todaro, 1970), but the same is not so for the rural labour market (i.e. urban-to-rural migration is 
rare). In Table 5.5, I examine the spillover effect for the first three nearest neighbours for both 
Urban and Rural localities. I limit the interconnected neighbours to the three nearest localities. The 
first three and last three columns report the results for urban localities and rural localities 
respectively. The notable feature of Table 5.5 is that the coefficients are precisely estimated only for 
the rural locality, and spillover occurs only between the first two nearest neighbours. The magnitude 
of spillover effect in first two nearest neighbours in the rural locality is 0.9 and 1.3 percentage 
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points (significant for both at p< 0.05), which is similar to the results in Table 5.3 and 5.4, for every 
ten person per 1,000 population increase in emigration.  
There are several reasons for this effect on the rural locality. Rural labour markets are less 
integrated and are financially constrained due to the lack of formal financial institutions. The 
remittance sent by emigrants helps to boost the rural local economy by overcoming financial 
constraints in the absence of formal credit. Similarly, remittances are generally spent in locally 
produced goods in the rural locality, which increases the local economic activities and affects the 
surrounding localities. Additionally, the urban labour market has a reserve labour force and has a 
large formal or semi-formal credit institution, therefore, emigration has limited impact, especially 







 Table 5.5: Spillover effects on labour force participation rates in urban and rural localities: neighbours based on geographical proximity 
  Labour Force Participation Rate  
 Urban localities    Rural localities   
  1
st Neighbour 2nd Neighbour 3rd Neighbour 
 
1st Neighbour 2nd Neighbour 3rd Neighbour 
Emigration 0.0511 0.0641 -0.0221  0.1278 0.0925 -0.0589  
(0.723) (1.084) (0.392) (2.412)** (2.081)** (1.049) 
Control Variables  Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Time and Village Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald test 583 1041 1017 
 
34494 38471 34926 
Weak IV test statistics  8.33 17.22 15.30 
 
4.40 8.28 6.21 
Hansen statistics (Over identification test) 0.123 0.864 1.199  0.229 0.024 3.620* 
Observations 348 348 348   650 650 650 







As discussed earlier, given the heterogeneity in spatial features of Nepal, the localities 
separated by the shortest geographic distance are not necessarily interconnected. So, in addition to 
geographical distance interconnectedness, I introduce a road network among localities. In this case, 
two shortest distance localities would be defined as interconnected localities or neighbours if they 
have access to the road network in their vicinity. This time, I limit interconnected locality only for 
the first two neighbours. Similar to the above results, Table 5.6 (columns 1 and 2) shows that the 
spillover effect of emigration is still positive and significant on the labour supply. The effect on 
labour force participation rate is as large as 1.1 percentage points (p < 0.05) for an additional ten 
person per 1,000 population increase in emigration. From this result, it implies that the spillover 







 Table 5.6: Spillover effects on labour force participation rate: neighbours based on road network  
  1st Neighbour 2nd Neighbour 
Emigration 0.1161 0.112  
(2.66)*** (2.94)*** 
Control Variables  Yes Yes 
Time and Village Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Wald test 51688 51664 
Weak IV test statistics  30.21 46.56 
Hansen statistics (Over identification test) 0.066 1.195 
Notes: The closest neighbours are based on geographic proximity and road links, as explained in the text. Other notes, see Table 5.4.     
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The strong spillover effect is consistent with the fact that emigration and remittances have 
unintended consequences on interconnected localities. The results also show that the change in local 
wage rates and the boost in economic activities (that occurs through general equilibrium effects) are 
the important mechanisms that create employment opportunities in surrounding localities and 
incentivise non-migrants to engage in economic activities.  
Robustness test  
I use two different approaches to check the robustness of spillover effect. First I redefined 
the interconnected matrix based on geographic proximity to the common market which plays a 
greater role to connect two localities. More specifically, neighbours are interconnected via the 
common market for employment, trade and so on rather than just the physical distance or road link. 
Therefore, with this specification emigration from one locality affects outcomes in the 
interconnected locality through the market. To redefine interconnectedness, I include the 
coordinates of 77 major markets across the country and linked them with the PSU coordinates (see 
Figure 5.2). The neighbouring matrix is now a combination of the shortest geographic distance 







36 The major challenge in developing market based interconnectedness is that locality can have access to more than one 
local market at a time and people do not necessarily stick to one closest local market, they commute to multiple 
markets. Also, it is not necessary that two shortest distance neighbours also have the shortest distance to the same 
common market. Given this challenge, I use a loose definition of local market interconnectedness and limit 
interconnectedness to the first closest neighbour only. In this case, two shortest geographic distance localities are 
considered as interconnected if they are also within the 15 km radius from the point of any common market. If first 
shortest distance localities are outside the 15 KM radius from any of the common market then it is treated as non-
neighbours and I assume there is no spillover between these localities. This has yielded 320 (172 rural and 148 urban) 




Figure 5.2: Spatial Distribution of PSU and local market 
 
 
Second, I use Spatial Durbin Model which by design addresses spatial heterogeneity issues 
when labour force participation in one locality is not independent in space from other 
(neighbouring) localities. Spatial model corrects the estimation bias that may arise from the spatial 
heterogeneity and autocorrelation of labour force participation over space (LeSage & Pace, 2009, 
2010). In SDM, spatial lag of labour force participation and emigration (the average in 
neighbouring localities) are included as an additional regressor.37 The coefficient on the spatially 
lagged of labour force participation rate is 0.21 and is statistically significant at the p<0.01 level. 
Thus, there is strong evidence of spatial spillover of labour force participation.  
The results from the common market neighbouring matrix (second stage regression) and 
SDM are reported in Table 5.7. Even after restricting the interconnectedness to the closest market 
place (in column 1), the main conclusion continues to hold. The result illustrates that the increase in 
emigration by ten person per 1,000 population would increase the labour force participation rate by 
 
37 An intuitive discussion and example of these direct, indirect and total effects in SDM is provided in Gibson (2019).   
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1.1 percentage points, which is similar to the result in table 5.4. Similarly, in SDM (in Table 5.7), 
the indirect impact, which includes both local and global spillover effect, of an increase in 
emigration by ten person per 1,000 population would increase the labour force participation rate by 
0.59 percentage points at p < 0.05. These results illustrate that the main results are robust to a 
different definition of interconnectedness and spatial heterogeneity and autocorrelation of 




 Table 5.7: Spillover effects on labour force participation rate: neighbours based on shortest geographical distance to the market 
 IV regression   Spatial Durbin Model (Impacts) 
  Model 1  Direct   Indirect  Total  
Emigration 0.1182  -0.008 0.059 0.0513  
(2.478)**  (0.83) (2.22)** (1.61) 
Control Variables  Yes  Yes 
Time and Village Fixed Effects Yes  Yes 
R-Squared (within)   0.1671 
Wald test 47327  
 
  
Weak IV test statistics  26.76  
 
  
Hansen statistics (Over identification test) 0.066     
Notes: Model 1 is a FE-IV model, similar to those in Table 5.6 but using the closest neighbour that has access to a market (as close as 15 km from the locality). The 
Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) provides local and global spillover estimates of emigration with a weight matrix constructed from the five nearest neighbours (KNN5). 






The growth in emigration and remittance in Nepal has raised policy concerns about its impacts on 
falling labour supply for domestic industries and agriculture sector. The extant literature that looked 
into this issue has only analysed the direct (own-) effect of emigration on the labour supply. Yet 
spillover effect that may have important policy implications in sending countries is so far 
overlooked. Typically, emigration and subsequent remittances inflow not only affect the sending 
locality but also the nearby interconnected localities. Therefore, I developed a locality 
interconnection matrix based on the geographic distance and the road network to measure these 
spillover effects. For this study, I develop a two-period panel of 499 localities in Nepal and use 
variation in the predicted emigration rate as a plausible instrument variable to overcome 
endogeneity concerns. 
After accounting for endogeneity, I find that the direct (own) effect of an increase in 
emigration rate by ten person per 1,000 population is associated with an increase in the labour force 
participation rate by around 1.3 percentage points. The positive effect of emigration is limited to the 
female labour force, and there is 2.6 percentage points increase in female labour force participation 
for every ten person per 1,000 population increase in emigration. The positive effect occurs through 
the rise in local wage rates that outweigh income effects from remittances increasing the demand 
for leisure and induce substitution effect of greater labour supply. The other possible channels are 
an increase in women economic empowerment and mobility (especially in the agriculture sector) 
and a boost in local economic activities. In contrary, emigration is reducing labour force 
participation in agriculture sector, either left-behind members increase leisure or move to non-farm 
employment. Especially, this sector is considered as low productive and working on the farm is less 
preferred in remittance receiving households.  
Moreover, the spillover effect of emigration is increasing labour supply and this positive 
effect is as large as the direct effect. However, given the distinct nature of labour markets in rural 
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and urban localities, the spillover effect is limited to the rural areas (without any significant impact 
on urban locality). There are several possible reasons for this pattern; first rural labour markets are 
less integrated and financially constrained, so emigration and remittances help to overcome 
borrowing constraints and boost the local economy in the absence of formal credit. Additionally, 
remittances are generally spent in locally produced goods that create demand, generate employment 
and boost rural local economy. Second, the urban labour markets have a large formal or semi-
formal credit institution, therefore they depend less on remittances to overcome borrowing 
constraints.  
Overall, this paper provides insights into the multiple channels that emigration and remittances can 
affect the local labour market activities. One major takeaway from this study is that to improve the 
overall welfare of the region, each household doesn't need to send a member for foreign 
employment, instead, policymakers can focus on increasing the value of remittance, either by 
sending skilled migrants or reducing the remitting cost. The higher remittance will have a multiplier 
effect on the local economy and the reduced number of emigrants would help to overcome labour 
shortage problems.    
5.6 Reflection on this chapter  
The results in Chapter 3 showed the impact of the civil war on emigration and other research has 
shown impacts on labour force participation. The conflict affected the ability to travel outside the 
village for emigration and for local employment. If civil war correlates with the past emigration (as 
shown above) and if past emigration, in turn, affects current labour force participation (as shown in 
this chapter), then there may be some doubt on our estimates in terms of an omitted relevant 
variable (the risk of conflict or the conflict intensity). However, the use of historical (2001) 
emigration as a driver of our instrumental variable strategy is from a time when the civil war was 
still at an early stage. Furthermore, our use of time and village fixed effects should control any 
lingering influence of the civil war on our estimates. in particular, since the civil war ended in 2006 
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and our survey data are from 2008 and 2010, the direct impacts of the civil war on labour force 
participation can be ruled out. Whether indirect effects, operating through the impact on historical 
emigration and net of any time and village fixed effects, are important enough to cause bias is 
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Table A.5.1: Effects of emigration on male and female rural agriculture wages (Instrumental variables estimates)38   
  Male log wage  
Female log wage 
  Task-1   Task-2 Task-3 Task-4 
Emigration 0.0037  0.0022 0.0028 0.0029  
(3.943)*** (1.625) (2.449)** (2.415)** 
Agriculture land owned -0.0262  -0.0404 -0.0362 0.0167  
(0.642) (1.152) (1.169) (0.580) 
Share of working age (15-60) 0.0281  0.0196 0.0227 0.0223  
(5.080)*** (2.853)*** (3.722)*** (3.695)*** 
Internal migration rate 0.0019  0.0005 0.0009 0.0010  
(4.865)*** (0.954) (1.894)* (2.207)** 
Average domestic remittance -0.2008  0.2962 0.2093 0.1063  
(0.724) (1.146) (1.037) (0.502) 
Higher secondary GER 0.0837  0.0593 0.0529 0.0703  
(2.748)*** (1.850)* (1.992)** (2.485)** 
R-Squared 0.046  0.075 0.070 0.056 
Observation 277   288 265 259 
Estimates are from a cross sectional instrumental variable model (for 2010), with emigration rate at locality level instrumented with predicted migration to India and 
MEOA. Wages are in logs. The t-statistics in ( ) are derived from robust standard errors. Task 1-4 are agriculture related tasks, Task-1 is for males and Tasks 2-4 are female 
specific.   
 
 
38 Wage rates are taken from NLSS 2010 community questionnaire, which provides information about the agricultural wage rate in the community for different agricultural tasks. 
Thus, the wage rates are only available from agriculture sector from rural locality.     
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Chapter Six: Conclusion and implications  
Conclusion 
Considerable attention has been paid to Nepal in academic literature in the last two decades. There 
are at least two reasons for this. Firstly, there is interest to learn a lesson from its decade-long civil 
war that killed over 15,000 people. Secondly, because of the growing export of Nepal’s labour to 
international destinations. Yet despite the literature on the causes and consequences of the civil war 
in Nepal, key features have remained largely unexamined. The major issue with the prior studies is 
that they have used overly aggregated conflict data. These data are easily available for the 75 
districts of Nepal but they ignore the local level heterogeneity in conflict. For example, by looking 
at more finely-grained data at the locality level, for almost 4000 localities, it is apparent that the 
within-district variation in conflict deaths, which is ignored in earlier studies, was at least three 
times higher than the variation between districts. The loss of information from the over aggregation 
of conflict data to the district level may distort our understanding of how conflict escalates and, in 
turn, distort understanding of impacts of the conflict on migration, education, health and so on.  
The rise in conflict was also accompanied by increased international migration from Nepal. 
By 2011 the share of the population working abroad had increased to 7% from 3.3% in 2001. The 
opening of new economic opportunities for migrants and a rise in demand for Nepali workers from 
regions like the Middle East, North Africa and Malaysia increased the labour force outflow. This 
labour migration raises important issues because even though the positive role of emigration on 
poverty reduction in developing countries is widely accepted, impacts on human capital formation 
and on the labour supply of non-migrants remained uncertain. Improved understanding of these 
issues matters especially in conflict-affected countries. For instance, if emigration has any positive 
effect on human capital and labour supply then the long term effect of Nepal’s civil conflict 
crucially depends on the impact of conflict on emigration. In other words, understanding the 
impacts of emigration and remittances on human capital and labour supply of the left behind are 
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vital to the design of adequate policies for the rehabilitation of conflict affected localities. So that 
they can better participate in the opportunities that emigration provides. 
Even though Nepal’s civil war lasted for almost ten years from 1996 to 2006, conflict 
intensity increased only after 2001, with more than 85% of the total deaths in the 2001-2006 period, 
and with lot of heterogeneity in local level death rates. Therefore, in contrast to previous studies, I 
focus on the conflict after 2000 in order to understand why conflict escalates and persists over time. 
I geocode 15,000 conflict-related deaths to the locality level for almost 4000 localities. My second 
departure from the previous literature, which uses welfare estimates from national sample surveys 
for more aggregated areas like districts, is to use small area estimation and household assets and 
caste indicators from census to estimate poverty, inequality and caste polarisation for almost 4000 
localities. I use locally disaggregated conflict data to measure impacts on international migration, 
and I show that the estimated impacts of conflict crucially depends on the spatial level that the 
researcher chooses to aggregate conflict data. 
Additionally, this thesis contributes to the migration literature by investigating the effects of 
emigration on child schooling and labour supply of non-migrants. While previous literature uses 
simple schooling indicators, I use age-specific schooling outcomes like the net enrolment rate for 
children aged 5-16. In contrast to prior studies that only focus on direct (own) effects of emigration 
on labour supply, I estimate direct and spatial spillover effects. I use a two-period panel data for 
almost 500 sampling units and use village GPS coordinates of each sampling unit and the national 
road network to develop an interconnected locality matrix so as to estimate spatial spillover effects. 
I use historical migration rates to develop the predicted migration rate as an instrument variable in 
order to overcome endogeneity concerns.  
With these new finely grained data and using econometric models that allow for spillovers I 
find the following:  
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A higher poverty rate decreased the risk and intensity of the civil conflict because the rebel 
groups targeted wealthier villages to gain resources, which aligned with their strategic interests. In 
contrast to poverty, higher wealth inequality, greater relative deprivation and caste polarisation were 
major causes for escalation of the civil war in Nepal. It seems that inequality and identity-based 
discrimination increases the risk of conflict as it creates a sense of injustice. 
In terms of its impacts, I find that conflict has reduced emigration to high-income 
destinations such as the Middle East, North Africa and Malaysia because it directly affected the 
income of the residents and interrupted journeys to Kathmandu city, which were required for 
recruitment and visa processing. In district versus village comparison of conflict data aggregation, I 
find that district-level aggregation overstates the impacts of conflict due to mean-reverting 
measurement errors and produces apparent impacts that are up to four times larger than when the 
conflict is measured at the locality level.  
Moreover, I find that emigration increases the net enrolment rate in secondary education, 
and this positive effect on human capital occurs through reduced child labour. Emigration primarily 
helps credit-constrained households to cover schooling costs and compensates for foregone earnings 
from child labour. Similarly, while I find that emigration is associated with the rise in labour 
supply, especially for females, there is reduced labour supply in the agriculture sector because 
remittance receiving households prefer non agriculture work or leisure over the farm employment. 
Additionally, the spatial spillover effect of emigration increases the labour supply and its magnitude 
is as large as the direct effect. The positive effect on labour supply occurs through an increase in 
local wage rates and in local economic activities. 
Putting these new findings together, I find that conflict affected localities are still suffering 
from the after effect of conflict. These localities have not participated to the same extent in the huge 
growth in emigration compared to the other villages, as a result of this, these localities will have 
lower remittance inflows and will have lower human capital investment. Additionally, these 
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findings have important implications for future research and policy, considering the impact of 
aggregation bias on estimated outcomes and the role of spillover effects in labour supply.  
Implications  
Lessons for future research  
This subnational level study reinforces the importance of identifying an appropriate aggregation 
level for conflict data in order to correctly estimate the causes and consequences of civil conflict. 
Based on my findings, in the future, researchers should choose the aggregation level that best 
preserves local information rather than choosing an aggregation level based on the easily available 
data. My result shows that over aggregation of conflict data may result in loss of local information 
and distort findings. Additionally, survey estimates in conflict models, such as poverty and 
inequality, which are generally available at first or second sub-national need not provide a reason 
for the aggregation of conflict data. Instead, researchers could use small area estimation techniques 
to derive welfare estimates for any subnational level in order to preserve the local information. This 
is important because research needs to identify the true effect of civil conflict in order to guide post-
conflict rehabilitation. 
Moreover, for future research, my study also suggests that there is a need to develop other 
measures of schooling outcomes like schooling deprivation indices, schooling inequality indices, 
and scores in national assessment of student achievement, and so forth, in order to estimate the 
effect of emigration on quality of schooling outcome. In a country like Nepal where school 
education is universally free and over 90% of school-age children are enrolled in school, attendance 
and dropout rates may not correctly capture the effects of emigration on quality of schooling. This 
study also highlights the greater role of the spatial spillover effect of emigration on labour supply, 
and given this, in future research, researchers should consider this additional channel to measure the 




Policy implications  
Based on the above findings, a major takeaway of this study is that reducing inequality and 
discriminatory practices are important policy interventions that can further the peaceful coexistence 
of people. One way of doing this is introducing measures such as land redistribution or targeted 
transfer of resources from high income to low income populations to reduce poverty and gap 
between rich and poor, which will lessen the risk of conflict in the future. Similarly, in Nepalese 
society, caste-based unequal and discriminatory practices are still widely in practice, therefore a 
policy to transform society to remove such practices would help to reduce social tension. The 
changes in constitutional laws that ensure equal rights for all citizens are not sufficient, the 
government should ensure that constitutional changes are put into action. Such changes will 
transform society and reduce grievances toward the state, which is crucial to eliminate large-scale 
conflict in the future.  
My study noted the positive impacts of emigration on human capital and labour supply. 
Considering the negative impact of conflict on emigration to high income destinations, 
policymakers must keep conflict affected villages in their development agenda as these villages are 
likely to have low human capital formation and low economic activities. They have not been able to 
participate in emigration to high income destinations to the same extent as have less conflict 
affected areas. Additionally, increasing remittances can be important policy intervention to help 
achieve greater impacts on the local economy. Policymakers can provide skill related training to 
migrants and encourage more skilled migration that will increase the total value of remittances that 
workers receive. Another way of doing this is decreasing the cost of remitting to, especially, rural 
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